MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS:

SOMALI AND ETHIOPIAN MIGRATION TO YEMEN AND TURKEY

FINAL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report cannot do justice to the information about the people and the journeys they made and endured which is the subject of this study. It is a complex, multitude of stories of many countries, many tragedies and many successes. The first part of the report provides an overview of previous studies locating the various trajectories of Somalis and Ethiopians out of their respective countries to neighbouring countries and across the globe. The second part reports on the survey of Somalis and Ethiopians in Yemen and Turkey.

Somalis are considered to be one of the most significant refugee populations in the world with more than one million of its 7.4 million people now living outside Somalia, and numbers growing daily. With economic, environmental, conflict and minority group issues, the numbers of Ethiopians joining the Somalis in their movement across Somalia, Yemen, the Middle East and the Gulf and into Europe has also been reportedly growing.

In July 2009, the Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF) based in Somalia and Yemen commissioned the Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) of the American University of Cairo (AUC) to produce a study in Yemen, KSA and Turkey that would "contribute to developing a forward looking strategy to strengthen the protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from Somalia or transiting through Somalia."

Data for the study was collected through a structured questionnaire given to 955 Somali and Ethiopian males (479) and females (476) aged 15–66 years including new arrivals and people residing in these locations more than one month and less than one year as well as a small group with longer term residency in Yemen and Turkey and from a small number of qualitative discussions in Syria. A literature review and key informant interviews also contribute to the study's data.

This Executive Summary provides an overview of some of the key findings for which full details can be found within the body of the report. The study provides information about the mixed migration flows through Yemen and Turkey with lesser information about Syria and includes information about the migrating populations including:

a. Region of origin and reason for leaving
b. Profile of people: age, gender, vulnerabilities
c. Points of departure, modes of transportation, funding for the transportation, transit routes
d. Specific protection challenges faced during the journey
e. Reception conditions, current living conditions and duration of the stay in Yemen and Turkey

f. Perceived adequacy of the ongoing assistance and coping strategies of the population migrating or settling in Yemen and Turkey through the UN, NGOs, government, religious organziations, communities, families, friends and personal capacities
g. Countries of intended final destination

The history of the mixed migration flows of Somalis and Ethiopians, particularly since the 1990's have been well documented and indicate many vexed and difficult experiences, and death, along the routes they have taken – across Africa to the north and south, the Arabian Gulf, the Mashreq countries, Turkey, Europe and North America. They have traversed by air, land and sea to reach destinations for which they have hopes of safety, improved livelihoods and greater prosperity than the often tortuous conditions of insecurity due to conflict, drought, unemployment and other calamities in their home regions. Their aspirations, however, are not always met.

In Yemen and Turkey, they face harsh circumstances (but different environmental conditions) with discrimination and harassment in the streets, even though they may have protection and assistance from UN aid agencies, NGOs and others.

Push factors include mainly insecurity from conflict, but also the simple expectation to improve their daily lives, particularly to find employment as the main source of income and well-being. Many, however, perhaps particularly Somalis, rely heavily upon family resources that may come from a variety of transnational networks of Somali communities at home and abroad.

The main findings of the study begin with an overview about the journey.

Reasons for travel: Somalis have migrated from all 3 zones in Somalia. However, the large majority (88%) originated from three regions in the South Central Zone. Only 12 percent of Somalis reported that they were not from conflict regions. More than half of the Ethiopians in the study originated in the Oromia region (52%) that covers central and southern parts of the country.

While having mixed motivations, "insecurity from conflict" was the overall most frequent single reason (87%) that Somali respondents gave for fleeing from their home country. This was followed by "lack of assistance to meet their basic needs" and "economic reasons", mainly related to the need for employment. Most Ethiopians also cited "insecurity" (67%) as their single most frequent reason for leaving home, while a larger proportion said it was because of "lack of assistance to meet their basic needs" (19%) and "economic reasons" (13%). Based on the stated motivations and regions of origin, it may be assumed that the large majority of those in this study could be classified as refugees having faced not only violent conflict but also the hardship that comes with such disruptions to the economy, livelihood and the difficulties of maintaining an adequate existence.

Almost half of both populations said that they had been internally displaced before leaving home. Thus, a considerable proportion of those in this study had already experienced considerable disruption to their lives through internal displacement prior to embarking upon their journeys to Yemen and Turkey. Many of the IDP camps throughout the country, including in Galkayo in Puntland have been insecure with incidents of bombings and violence against those from the south; and with poor conditions resulting in diseases and infections related to malnutrition (IRIN, 2008; IRIN, 2009). However, the data in the study does not reveal the extent to which the displacement itself was a part of the overall journey, or whether the conditions and experience of displacement were the motivating factors that led to the decision to travel abroad.

Funding the journey: The most common initial source of funding for the journey came from respondents' families (29%). The second main source was having worked and saved for the journey (21%), followed by the selling of material possessions (15%), remittances from family abroad (15%), selling their livestock (8%), selling their home and/or land (6%) and borrowing money (5%). Somalis were more likely to raise funds from family remittances, while Ethiopians were more likely to sell their animals and material possessions. Combining remittances and local family support we find that almost half of Somalis in the study (47%) had their travel funded by their families, compared with a lower proportion of Ethiopians (31%). With remittances and direct financial support, 43 percent of all respondents were funded by family. This is an important finding because it means that families, whether left behind, in the destination country or somewhere else abroad, have made a significant investment in the migration of selected individuals from their homeland to seek a better and more secure existence commonly with the expectation by them and the person migrating that it will also benefit others. On the other hand, those that had sold all their possessions (houses, property, livestock, etc.) may be seen to have seriously broken their asset ties to their country and locale of origin, making it more difficult to return, or at least reducing the incentive to return.

Travel routes and means: The large majority of Somalis started their journey from the South Central region, mainly Mogadishu/Banadir. Consistent with the previous MMTF (2008) study, the overland route by bus, car or minivan takes the main highway from Mogadishu to Jowhar, Beledweyne and Galkayo to Garoowe. From Garoowe, the route branches off to the east to the Puntland coast and Bosasso, or to the west to the Somaliland coast to Lascanood, Burco, Hargeysa, and further up the coast to Djibouti including Obock. Many (121 in the sample) travelled to Mogadishu as their first stop from elsewhere in Banadir and the neighbouring regions of the south central zone – mainly Shabeelaha Hoose, Bay, Shabeelaha Dhexe and Bakool, respectively. Others made their way more directly across the route specified above, taking various numbers of stops along the way.

The data showed a multifaceted set of routes to Turkey, with approximately 20 percent of Somalis and Ethiopians in the study flying direct from their respective countries to Jordan, going overland by car to Syria, then Turkey. Many Ethiopians either flew or went overland to Sudan and from there, either by bus to Cairo, by air to Syria or by air to Istanbul. Some flew all the way - directly to Yemen, to Syria to Turkey. By air, respondents claimed to have reached Turkey directly from Aden, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Dubai, Khartoum, Nairobi, and one from Malaysia. Before reaching Turkey, some respondents reached Syria by air from Beirut, Dubai, Jeddah, Amman, Khartoum and Aden. From Sudan, some claimed they travelled by car or walked to Libya and then, by boat, managed to get to Turkey (precise details of this sea journey are unknown).

For Ethiopians who reached Yemen, the main overland route towards the Ethiopian- Somaliland border was taken by the large majority of respondents. The road from Addis Ababa, through Nazret to Dire Dawa was common. 42 percent of respondents ended up stopping in Harer and 55 percent in Jijiga. 45 percent traveled on to the border town of Borama. Using train and road transport, half went to Djibouti and the other half made their way to Bossaso through Hargeysa and Burco in Somaliland.

For Ethiopian respondents in Turkey, the travel trajectory was very different. 40 percent reached Turkey through Syria, whether directly from Addis Ababa by air (16%) or from other countries. Taking just the first stop recorded of the 97 Ethiopian respondents in Turkey, we find that some 81 percent left Ethiopia without passing through Somalia. 5 travelled to Addis Ababa, 22 flew directly to Turkey, 20 travelled to Sudan, 14 to Syria, 12 to Beirut, 4 to Cairo, 4 to Dubai, 1 to Kenya, 1 to Kuwait, and 1 to Jordan. Others also went to these countries in subsequent stops. 5 went to Libya, 1 to Jeddah and 1 to Iraq.

Those who had, or were able to raise the funds to use air travel indicated a wealthier class of migrants, perhaps particularly of Ethiopians in the sample. However, Ethiopian women had more opportunity to gain sponsorship (or be trafficked) to travel to places like Dubai, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria for employment as domestic workers. Others, having sold all their possessions, were able to make the air journey to save themselves the difficulties and traumas of travelling overland and by sea that so many others endured.

The majority (54%) took 15-30 days to complete the journey, 17 percent took 31-90 days and 15 per cent took longer.

Assistance in the journey: Most respondents were assisted by friends and relatives along their journey, although this reduced as they moved further from home, and became more self-reliant and/or reliant upon "strangers" who were usually smugglers. As would be expected, most of the assistance in arranging the

money needed was given by relatives all along their journey, with some financial assistance from friends as well. Without a proper banking system or recognized intermediaries, and with international security measures limiting financial transfers, Somali remittances rely very much on the now well-known group of companies called Al-Barakat which established a wire transfer business (Al-Barakat Finance Group) based on the hawala system which has been reported to have transferred some $140 million per annum from the Somali diaspora into Somalia since 2001.

Dangers along the journey: Respondents reported 877 dangerous encounters along the way. Some experienced more than one danger while others did not experience any. The dangers most often reported were of "robbery and extortion" and "travel problems" such as finding accommodation, harassment and being deliberately delayed. "Travel problems" most often occurred in Djibouti and Yemen. The danger of robbery occurred in many locations but most often inside Somalia. For those who crossed Somalia overland, the militia was more responsible for the dangers at the beginning of the journeys, decreasing after the first stop when smugglers and checkpoint guards became the major source of danger. When they had reached the coast, guards at the coast also created difficulties. Overall, smugglers were the most common perpetrators of dangerous encounters. Incidents of physical assault and/or rape were reported to occur at all stops along the way - 18 cases of rape (16 female, 2 male) and 82 cases of physical assault (38 female, 44 male). These numbers are likely to be low due to the stigma placed on victims who may not want to openly share these experiences. The main points of danger in Somalia were reported to be in the town of Galkayo and at the point of departure in the coastal town of Bossaso as well as in the coastal town of Djibouti. However, it was significant that the majority of complaints and problems presented were actually about their arrival in Yemen and in Turkey.

Use of smugglers: The results here show a substantial reliance of the respondents on smugglers throughout their journey to the country where they were interviewed and it seems the business of smuggling is thriving both in demand and supply, whether in Somalia, Yemen or Turkey. This is despite increased security measures and attempts to control borders from illegal entry. It is suggested that combating smuggling by stopping smugglers will not necessarily reduce irregular migration. Rather, it makes it more clandestine and thus more costly because it becomes riskier, for both smugglers and their passengers alike. As Van Liempt (2007) suggests, the smugglers are merely the messengers. The main issue is that people turn to them in need. The dilemma is that increasing the risk of arrest and punishment of smugglers can lead to the further victimization of the people who they are smuggling. Notoriously, when the Yemeni government began to apprehend the boat smugglers (even though given relatively low fines and/or short term prison sentences), smugglers began to abandon their passengers to avoid arrest in Yemeni waters, sometimes in deep seas off the coast of Yemen, and many hundreds have been drowned trying to get to shore. This practice continues today.

Accompaniment along the journey: 72 percent of all respondents traveled without family members. 10 percent traveled with friends, 7 percent traveled with their spouses while 9 percent traveled with children under 18 year of age. More Ethiopians travelled alone (78%), compared with Somalis (58%). Almost all those travelling with a child under 18 were Somalis. 18 percent were married, 21 percent divorced and 30 percent widowed respondents - primarily women. Those women, who are actually alone and/or are single mothers with accompanying children, are a potentially vulnerable group who require support due to the challenges of their living situation as well as to avoid possible exploitation. A small percentage of men (less than 5%) also reported traveling as single parents with children. They are also a potentially vulnerable group requiring added support.

The study's findings about conditions immediately ON arrival (within the first days) and then AFTER arrival (weeks or months later) include:

Expectations about conditions in the arrival countries: Respondents in the study seemed to have somewhat realistic expectations about their opportunities when they arrived in Turkey and Yemen. They seemed to know that there would be limited availability of food, shelter, resettlement and employment opportunities.

Accommodation ON arrival: In Yemen, most of the Somalis and a few Ethiopians stayed in reception centers upon arrival. 22 percent of Ethiopians reported that they were detained. Recent arrivals in Yemen during the period of the survey felt that their early accommodation, provided for in the reception centers, was adequate. Those who arrived months earlier, however, reported their accommodation as having been inadequate. In Turkey, more than half of the Somalis and one third of the Ethiopians stayed with family or friends. 11 percent of the Ethiopians were in prison, detention or were hiding. In Turkey, the situation was reversed, with more Ethiopians satisfied with their first month's accommodation than Somalis. The results of this, therefore, show that Somalis in Yemen are largely provided with accommodation because of their refugee status. Most Ethiopians are either detained or left to their own devices to find shelter. In Turkey, apart from those who had been detained for a period of time, all were reliant upon themselves to find their own accommodation**.**

Problems in the first month AFTER arrival: In Yemen, 41 percent of Somalis and 94 percent of Ethiopians reported harassment by smugglers. 4 per cent of Somalis and 5 per cent of Ethiopians complained of having been subjected to physical violence. Other problems included inadequate provision to meet their basic needs, separation from family members, overcrowding and deportation threats. In Turkey, twice as many Ethiopians (38%) compared with Somalis complained of harassment by smugglers.

Assistance with problems ON and AFTER arrival: The data show differences in the respondents' evaluation of assistance provided to Ethiopians compared with Somalis. In Yemen, almost all Somalis received assistance from the UN (95%) with a high degree of satisfaction. 66 percent of the Ethiopians reported no UN assistance in Yemen, but of the remainder that did report receiving assistance, 23 percent rated it as adequate. Interviews with many Ethiopians complained of the unequal treatment they were receiving from UNHCR compared with that of the Somalis; just as Somalis complained of unequal treatment in Syria compared with Iraqis. Somalis also reported NGO assistance (68%) and again it was reported as adequate to very good. Almost none of the Ethiopians reported NGO assistance in Yemen. Government, religious organizations and refugee communities provided very little assistance. It is interesting that the greatest assistance to Ethiopians was reported to be from the local people (62%), although it was unclear whether this meant local Ethiopian residents or Yemenis. Family and friends provide minimal support in Yemen to Somalis, while Ethiopians had somewhat more support from friends.

In Turkey, neither Somalis nor Ethiopians reported they had received much assistance from the UN (around 12%); assistance from religious organizations was about 10 percent; local people 8 percent and the refugee community, 9 percent. Somalis most commonly received assistance through NGOs (68%) finding it adequate to very good; and some government assistance. 61 percent reported receiving assistance from friends, yet 38 percent said this was inadequate while families offer 18 percent support with a small percentage feeling it was inadequate. With regard to family and friends, it was assumed that inadequate meant that they did not receive enough, rather than the quality of assistance.

The Ethiopians in Turkey said they received no government, nor refugee community, nor NGO assistance. They most often were given assistance from friends (82%) but much fewer received support from family (18%). It was noteworthy that 54 percent of the Ethiopians received assistance from religious organisations in Turkey (compared with 10% of Somalis) which was probably largely from established Christian NGOs. Almost half of the Ethiopians also received assistance from local people.

Financial support AFTER arrival: Somali and Ethiopian respondents reported differences in their financial support. Most Ethiopians in both Yemen and Turkey said they had some form of employment and 34% received remittances from family abroad as their primary source of income. Significantly, however, only 17 percent of Somalis reported receiving remittances. On the one hand, the majority of Somalis report reliance upon financial aid from the UN (59% in Yemen and 57% in Turkey) as their primary income source. It should be noted that they may not want to admit receiving remittances in addition to the help they receive from the UN.

Accommodation AFTER arrival: In Yemen, Ethiopians are more reliant on privately organised accommodation, while Somalis can rely on support from the UN and NGOs; while in Turkey, both are largely reliant on making their own arrangements**.**

Most serious problems AFTER arrival: 65 percent cited "lack of employment" as their first and most serious problem (50% in Yemen; 84% in Turkey), which included around half of the unaccompanied minors. The longer the residency and the lack of public or UN support, the more acute the problem of unemployment is reported to become. In Yemen, Ethiopians were more likely to complain of the lack of employment than Somalis, possibly due to the large number of new Somali arrivals in the sample. 39 percent of new arrival Somalis reported unemployment as a problem. However, this grew to 79 percent once they had been living there between 1 and 6 months and 89 percent of those in residence 6-12 months. This does not mean that respondents were employed initially on arrival, but rather that unemployment was felt more acutely over time when they were unable to support themselves, and in the absence or dwindling of other forms of assistance. While a small percentage of Somalis also complained about inadequate education and inadequate health care, 31 percent said they had no serious problems. There were Ethiopians in Yemen (12%) who complained of insecurity. In Turkey, 88 percent Somalis and 68 percent Ethiopians cited unemployment as their major problem.

Family health problems AFTER arrival: In Yemen, 24 percent of Somalis and 3 percent of Ethiopians said a family member had a health problem. In Turkey, only 7 percent of Somalis and 7 percent of Ethiopians reported a health problem. The only recent arrivals to cite a health problem in Yemen were Somalis. This may have been due to their recent hazardous journeys. More importantly, however, the training for Somali interviewers in Yemen included one extra day of training on protection issues including the importance of identifying issues including health, which might also account for some of the differences in reportage between Somalis and Ethiopians in Yemen and the respondents in Turkey.

The study found a few particularly vulnerable populations which are likely to require special services including:

Vulnerable populations AFTER arrival:

78 of the women (16%) in the sample were accompanied by a child under 18 years of age and otherwise travelling alone. 6 of the men in the sample were also travelling alone with a child under 18 years. These populations of women are worthy of note since they might be in need of added assistance and vulnerable to exploitation. Several of those alone with an under 18 year old did encounter problems of robbery, physical violence and sexual abuse along the way (in Mogadishu, Beledweyne, Galkayo and Bossaso) but also in Turkey (only a few accidents were reported in Yemen) – in Istanbul (physical violence and sexual

abuse), Izmir (harassment by smugglers), Antakya (physical violence) and Konya where there were 16 cases of robbery reported.

While, on average, more than half of the unaccompanied minors reported no serious problems along the routes they took, there were cases of rape (including one male), robbery, extortion and physical violence. In Somalia, these occurred mainly in Bossaso, Galkayo, Djibouti and Obock. Most problems that the minors faced, however, were reported in Yemen, with 10 cases of physical abuse, 3 cases of sexual abuse, 16 cases of robbery, 12 of harassment by smugglers, 2 with health problems and 3 reported a lack of basic needs. In Turkey 5 minors report physical abuse in Antakya and 2 reported being robbed in Istanbul.

People with physical and mental challenges commonly need special support. 24 (2.5%) of the sample was reported to have a "disability" including 17 Somalis and 1 Ethiopian in Yemen and 3 Somalis and 3 Ethiopians in Turkey; 5 of these were Somali children under 18 years. The disabilities were all cited as "crippled legs", with one mention of polio. Additionally, 23 Somalis in Yemen as well as 2 Somalis and 2 Ethiopians in Turkey said they had a family member with a mental health problem. Two were children under 18 years.

The survey findings about their satisfaction with their journey and plans for the future include:

Was the journey worthwhile?: Overall, almost half of respondents said "yes", however, this positive response was more likely to come from recent Somali arrivals in Yemen (82%) who were receiving protection. Although around half of Ethiopians in Turkey thought the journey worthwhile, all of the Ethiopians in Yemen thought it was not worthwhile. It is interesting that while many thought the journey worthwhile for themselves, few would recommend the journey or location to others.

Future travel plans: In Yemen, 37 percent of the Somalis planned to leave within 6 months. A significant number (44%) said they intended to stay permanently (55% female: 40% married, 31% never married, 18% divorced). Over half were recent arrivals and 21 percent were minors. All of the Ethiopians in Yemen said they did not know how long they would stay. In Turkey, only 1.5 percent intended to stay permanently; 24 percent indicated less than one month and 59 percent did not know how long they would stay.

When asked what their final destinations were, many Somali (143) and Ethiopian (90) respondents in Yemen did not answer because they had indicated that they were not going to continue travelling or did not know their future plans. Thus, overall, 265 (28%) did not answer the question on final destination. Overall, the main intended final destination of respondents who answered the question was Europe (35%), KSA (22%), Canada (15%), U.S.A. (9%), Yemen (8%) and Australia (2%). For the main destinations of Europe, Canada, U.S.A. and KSA, there were no significant gender differences.

In Yemen, 62 percent of Somalis who responded said they were going to KSA; 23 percent said they were staying or going elsewhere in Yemen; 20 cases were heading for Europe (8%), 6 cases to the UAE, 3 to the USA, 2 to Canada, 2 to Syria and 1 to Australia as their final destinations. The remainder said they did not know.

Conditions required for return home: When respondents were asked what conditions would be necessary for them to return to their home countries, the large majority cited "safety and security" and "political security". However, there were significant differences between nationalities of the respondents and between those in Turkey and Yemen. For example, Ethiopians in Turkey were more inclined than those in Yemen to want employment in order to return. The most striking feature of the responses to this question, however, was that 82 percent of Somalis in Yemen said they would need safety and security, compared with only 40 percent in Turkey. This was explained by the 31 percent of the Somalis in Turkey who stated clearly (and unprompted), that they simply did not want to return at all to Somalia. 9 percent of Ethiopians in Turkey said the same. It is noteworthy how relatively few respondents in this study cited employment and education as a condition for their return (and a relatively negligible number cited food assistance, family reunion, housing, land for farming and clean water). Rather, it was the need for safety and security and political stability in their home countries that needed to be addressed first, with perhaps the assumption that the rest will follow naturally. These attitudes may also be another indicator that most of the respondents were in fact refugees fleeing conflict and insecurity and they had at least temporarily found some safety and hopeful possibilities in Yemen and Turkey.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on the results of the findings of this research.

1. Discourage the denial of human rights as a deterrent to the movement of refugees and migrants.

The denial of human rights in countries hosting refugees and migrants is not recommended as a means to deter their movement. Rarely discussed openly is the issue of the extent to which the provision of human rights in a country serves as an incentive for migrants and asylum seekers to decide to enter that country. Do migrants and asylum seekers choose to remain where they are protected and assisted? Do countries which deliberately deny human rights provide a disincentive for migrants and refugees to enter that country or stay once they are there?

Governments concerned about irregular migrants entering their countries often seek to promote tighter border control or the improvement of the provision of human rights including economic and social conditions where migrants and asylum seekers accumulate in contiguous transition states. To this end the focus of the European Union is thus understandably on the conditions of migrants and asylum seekers in the countries of Libya and Turkey. The position of Lybia was to some extent expressed in a speech by Muammar Al-Gathafi to the African Union-European Union Ministerial Meeting on Migration and Development in November 2006 where, among other things, he argued that pull factors to the EU such as human rights, the Barcelona Agreement and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are contradictory to the insistence of restricting migration to the EU because they were policies that attracted migration (Al-Gathafi, 2006). Although it was tongue-in-cheek and provocative to suggest that the EU abolish human rights as a deterrent for migrants and asylum seekers, it is an issue that is ever present. For example, if a receiving country such as Turkey, Libya (or Greece) does not provide a decent environment (migrant and refugee rights) for irregular migrants and asylum seekers will it: a) dissuade others from entering; and b) persuade those who managed to enter to leave?

In 2009 a European research network, Migreurop, raised the argument that the “ill-treatment” in Turkey and Greece is specifically a means to “dissuade [migrants and asylum seekers] from risking the adventure”. The attitude in these countries, they argue, is that “to provide hope is to encourage migration” (Migreurop, 2009: 6). They point out, however, that it is not the pull of Europe that is the issue, but the push of the conditions in the home countries. Nevertheless, once out of their countries refugees must decide where to go if the conditions in the first country are poor or unsafe. From the 1980s it was argued that deterrence could be implemented not only by applying visa restrictions, border controls and

unwelcoming or hostile reception conditions, but safe first country regulations were sought to prevent "asylum shopping" (Malmberg, 2004). When an asylum seeker is considered to be in a safe country, s/he should seek asylum there and not venture further. Countries at the border of Europe, for example, should process asylum claims there, rather than letting them enter Europe to seek asylum. They should only enter through formal resettlement arrangements. The first country of asylum is therefore important, and in this study, was an issue for Somalis and Ethiopians in Turkey who either did not want to apply for asylum in Turkey, or who insisted on the story that Turkey was their first country of asylum. If they reached Europe and were caught, they could only be returned to Turkey, not to Yemen, for example.

This raises the issue, however, of the legality of the freedom of movement of registered refugees. In principle, refugees should be able to travel from their country of asylum and have their refugee status recognized in other countries, whether they enter another country legally or not (assuming both countries are signatories to the 1951 refugee convention; for example article 31 of the convention exempts refugees from being penalized for illegal entry). The problem in practice is that governments are not obliged to accept the process of refugee status determination (RSD) by another government, or the UNHCR, prompting the requirement to re-undergo RSD which will not guarantee a second acceptance. This is particularly the case if *prima facie* status is given in the first country of asylum, such as the Somalis in Yemen, for some countries may not take it seriously. Travel to a country outside of the first country of asylum does not, or should not, nullify refugee status. However, nation states (who worry that they might decide to stay) are not obliged to offer them entry visas either.[1]

As further recommendations are considered to improve the rights and protection of mixed migrants from the Horn of Africa, two things should be kept in mind: the right of the freedom of movement for refugees; and the politics of human rights and migration; that is, the way in which states use rights, or the absence of rights to deter or encourage migrants and asylum seekers.

2. Use caution in the control of borders as a deterrent to migration in that it can increase dangers to refugees.

It appears that across Somalia to Yemen, through KSA, Syria into Turkey, Greece and Macedonia, the various borders used by migrants and refugees are quite porous (some more than others) and dangerous. The Somalis and Ethiopians who traverse these routes are both desperate and courageous to make the journeys seeking security and opportunities for a better existence. At the same time the porous nature of these borders also means dangers for trafficking (including children) and political operatives. However, tightening the borders risks the restriction of legitimate refugees. Borders are vexed issues, but perhaps

[1] I am grateful to Mike Kagan for his advice on this issue – personal communication.

the greater the presence of MMTF partners at major points of landing and arrival in all the countries under consideration here, the more likely that the dangers on arrival will be minimized.

Strong advocacy is therefore required, particularly in Yemen and Turkey (but also Libya, Greece and Italy) to ensure that the increasing securitization of the borders does not interfere with the rights of asylum seekers entering or attempting to enter those countries, as well as leaving them. The European Union is keen to prevent future irregular migration into its countries and to return those who succeed in entering irregularly. MMTF advocacy should therefore look at and work alongside the arrangements being made by the European Union with countries such as Libya and Turkey in conjunction with Greece, Italy and Frontex to ensure that migrant and refugee rights are protected.

3. Advocate for increased security at danger points during travel by land and sea in Somalia and Djibouti.

The study has confirmed the riskiest points of the land journey across Somalia to Puntland, Somaliland and Djibouti. In Somalia, apart from the war torn area of Mogadishu, the main locations of risk are Beledweyne, Galkayo, Bossaso and in the town of Djibouti. The kinds of encounters and the perpetrators have been detailed in the study. Given that the fighting in the south central zone seems to be continuing unabated, it is recommended that MMTF seek ways to improve the security of the migration routes, particularly the embarkation points on the coast,. Local Somali and international NGOs working in places like Bossaso, in particular, should be given more financial support, logistical support and protection to enhance their capacities and improve their activities. The IDPs in camps and elsewhere need enhanced attention in terms of security, food, health and educational facilities. In addition, means should be developed to warn potential travellers of the dangers they may encounter, how to avoid them and what to do when confronted with them (hazard assessment and risk minimization).

4. Facilitate security and provide immediate support services to migrants and refugees on arrival in Yemen and Turkey.

The incidents of physical and sexual abuse on arrival in both Yemen and Turkey suggest clearly that women travelling alone or with children without a male partner are vulnerable and require more attention as soon as they enter the country. For Yemen, this would require closer liaison with the Yemeni coast guard and surveillance personnel along the shores where smugglers drop their passengers off. Increased training and monitoring of proper treatment as well as knowledge of how to deal with immediate medical needs should be included. In addition to this, the study found a number of cases of new arrivals that reported some seemingly serious health and medical issues that did not receive the attention they required. An assessment of existing health care could be useful to determine why these people were overlooked.

In addition, previous research (e.g. Migreurop, 2009; Amnesty International, 2009) and in this study, access to detention centers in Turkey has been denied. MMTF should advocate strongly, perhaps with the assistance of the European Commission, to gain entry and evaluate the inmates and conditions of detention centers in and around Hatay, Van, Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Kirkareli and Erdine.

5. Monitor government plans for repatriation and ensure the full protection of human rights for refugees.

It is likely that most of the respondents in this study were refugees. The more important issue for the MMTF is not how to return them to their countries of origin but in compliance of the 1951 convention and its protocols, to protect them. If it is imperative to prevent them from moving to Europe rather than stay in their first country, whether Yemen, Kenya, Syria, Libya or Turkey, it would be more appropriate for MMTF to raise aid funds for UNHCR and NGOs to ensure decent conditions, employment and education in these countries.

Given the reports of deportations and refoulement of Ethiopians from Yemen, of Somalis from Saudi Arabia as well as deportation centers in Turkey and the concern by the EU to return irregular migrants either to their home countries, or other safe countries (including Dublin II returnees to Greece) the issue of voluntary return of mixed migrants needs to be addressed by the MMTF. Evidence from this study showed that many respondents had sold their possessions in order to fund their flight, leaving little or no tangible assets to return to. Properly funding returnees that takes account of economic circumstances in the return destination would seem to be crucial, but costly.

Advocacy and monitoring by MMTF is critical to prevent refoulement in what may be relatively arbitrary decisions. The issue of safety is primary, whether individuals are deemed convention refugees or not. It would be cynical and pointless to try to convince, cajole or even bribe people into returning to an area where their lives and well-being are at risk. The KSA government, for example, made arrangements to return Somalis to Somaliland or Puntland on the assumption that these were safe areas, but as they were from the south or south central zones, they were in effect being refouled into a zone that was hostile toward them. Voluntary repatriation should be just that, but a properly informed decision to return within the rights of migrants and the responsibility of states under international human rights and migration law.

As noted above, the greater attention to enhance the living conditions of IDPs, who currently receive very little, may be seen as an important strategy. Around half of respondents in this study had been displaced. Where people have no access to employment or education, they are more likely to seek them elsewhere. The more the enhancement of opportunities for IDPs, the more likely they will be willing to remain at

home, or at least in safe areas of their own country. The more safe opportunities that are seen to be available at home, the more likely that at least some of those abroad will be willing to return.

6. Advocate for the maintenance of the *Prima Facie* status of refugees in Yemen.

The finding that only 12 percent of Somali respondents were not from the conflict zones shows that the vast majority are clearly fleeing the war zone, seeking safety and better opportunities. The proposition to alter the *prima facie* refugee status of Somalis in Yemen (when only 12% may not be refugees) seems to present the introduction of unnecessary structural complications and financial costs in implementing individual refugee status determination procedures. While the government of Yemen has still not implemented this proposal, it is recommended that MMTF should continue to advocate against it.

7. Advocate for the protection of the Human Rights of Ethiopians in Yemen.

Ethiopians, (whether Oromo or Amharic) are receiving relatively little support from the UN by comparison with Somalis. Incidents of discrimination (including religious discrimination) and abusive treatment were reported. Therefore, a re-examination of the refugee status of Oromo and other Ethiopians from those regions where they are fleeing from violence is needed. Further re-examination of support services and protection for Ethiopian refugees should also be made that should include an evaluation of possible religious discrimination against Christian Oromo in Yemen.

8. Advocate for the protection of the Human Rights of Somalis in Syria.

Although the numbers of Somalis and Ethiopians in Syria are not large and few were able to be included in this study, a number of complaints were voiced that Somalis were not receiving the attention they deserve. It appears that there is the need to enhance the protection and assistance of Somalis, in particular, alongside Iraqis.

9. Ensure the equitable provision for human rights through support to vulnerable migrant and refugee populations.

Unaccompanied Minors: The findings suggest that unaccompanied minors are too often allowed to walk away from the services that are provided for them and thus fall prey to easy exploitation. Whether the UN or the governments concerned have the capacity to actually restrict or contain minors is a difficult issue. Thus, there would seem a need for a more comprehensive assessment of unaccompanied minors to determine how best to protect them. On the one hand, too many provisions may encourage more to migrate, given that their families have largely promoted and funded their journey. On the other hand, too little in the way of services and protection means they will want to move on into risky circumstances with smugglers and possible traffickers. It is recommended that perhaps UNHCR could work closely with

existing local NGOs or assist in their establishment to provide specific shelters for Somali and Ethiopian minors that include education as well as vocational training leading to employment opportunities.

Care for physically and mentally challenged: It is important that identification of people with physical and mental disabilities is included in medical screening and referral and that they receive appropriate care and treatment. Early identification and treatment can avoid the danger of exacerbation of their problems and risks of abuse and exploitation.

10. Facilitate Refugee Status Determination (RSD) and increased support for Ethiopians.

In Yemen, services by UNHCR and it implementing partners should be maintained since provisions for shelter, food, protection and alternative accommodation (from Kharaz camp) are deemed adequate and essential. Improvement in services was noted over the course of the past year. However, complaints were still received about the conditions on arrival particularly by Ethiopian asylum seekers and migrants. It appears that the Ethiopian arrivals need more attention and swift implementation of RSD procedures.

Given the dispersion of both Somali and Ethiopians into satellite cities in Turkey and their anxieties for both maintaining themselves in the country and preparations for moving on, UNHCR in Turkey should consider being more proactive with regard to registration, consistent with the new urban refugee policy.

11. Facilitate protection through awareness campaigns in Yemen and Ethiopia about the risks of travel and life conditions in destination countries.

When asked if they thought their journey worthwhile, more than half of the respondents said “yes”. It is common for individuals abroad, whatever their circumstances, to communicate to family and friends at home that they are fine and managing. Most do not want to worry family members and feel a responsibility to assist those at home. Interestingly, a large majority of our respondents also said they would not recommend the journey, or the country they were in, to others. This message and accurate and up-to-date details about the dangers and risks of the journey and conditions on arrival do not appear to be clearly shared. Awareness raising campaigns within Somalia and Ethiopia with messages direct from the travelers could articulate the problems and dangers of their journeys in order to dissuade some and/or at the least protect those who choose to travel.

12. Facilitate further research about the conditions of migrants and refugees in KSA and Syria.

While this study complements previous studies (e.g. MMTF, 2008; 2009), a major gap was the inability to conduct the survey in Saudi Arabia. It is recommended that MMTF continue to pursue the possibility of conducting in-depth research on Somali and Ethiopian mixed migrants in KSA, with an attempt to track individuals who had registered with UNHCR in Yemen and moved into KSA. It would also be worthwhile to look more closely at the circumstances of Ethiopians and Somalis in Syria, particularly

tracking the travel routes and means of transport to Turkey and beyond. Although there were relatively few Ethiopians in Turkey, there was evidence of a substantial number of Eritreans. A study of this community in Turkey would also be worthwhile.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rationale for the study

Numerous studies have documented the migration flows of Somalis and Ethiopians across the globe. Somalis are considered to be one of the most significant refugee populations in the world, as highlighted by the recent UNDP report "Somalia's missing millions", which estimates that, of the Somali population of 7.4 million, more than one million are thought to live outside Somalia which includes 14% of the total population located in the Diaspora, making it a "truly globalised nation" (UNDP 2009). A detailed map provided by the German Ministry of Migration (2009) provides the location of Somalis in countries around the world (See Diagram 1). Studies have explored who is moving, where, when, why and how from Somalia to Yemen, Syria, Turkey, South Africa, Europe and America. The numbers of Ethiopians joining the Somalis in their movement across Somalia, Yemen, the Middle East and the Gulf and into Europe has been reportedly growing. "Ethiopia has experienced a variety of disturbances over the past few decades that have caused both massive internal displacement and outward migratory flows. Political and economic turmoil, recurrent cycles of drought, flood and famine, and warfare have all contributed to the country's migration situation." Ethiopians are the second largest refugee/migrant group in Yemen with local estimations of the number of Ethiopians in Yemen at 10-20,000 (HRW, 2009).

The Somalia Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF Somalia) which includes UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM), OCHA, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was established in early 2007 to develop a rights-based strategy to respond to protection and humanitarian needs of migrants and asylum seekers transiting through Somalia. In 2007, the Task Force commissioned a study to improve the understanding of the migration flow through Somalia and onwards to Yemen. It found that the movements of Somalis had been mostly linked to the ongoing violence in the region, human rights violations and lack of livelihood opportunities. The study outlined the dynamics and challenges along the migration routes that commonly converge in Puntland, on the hazardous sea journey to Yemen, and during the reception of people in Yemen. This study also mentioned other routes, such as through Djibouti, although the primary focus was on the movement from the port of Bossaso in Puntland to Yemen. The results of this study were used to design humanitarian interventions in Somalia and, to some extent, in Yemen.

A similar MMTF task force was created in Yemen in 2008 in order to inform the strategic planning in the region. From discussions in a regional conference it was made clear that there was a need for a better understanding of the migration routes not only of Somalis but also of the increasing numbers of Ethiopians from and across Somalia to Yemen, KSA, Syria and Turkey and beyond and of the protection challenges encountered. Therefore, it was decided to commission this study.

MAP 1: Map outlining the location of Somalis outside of Somalia

***Courtesy of the German Ministry for Migration** (2009)*

LEGEND:

Orange: Countries with a Somali Diaspora of more than 150,000 people (Yemen and Kenya)

Yellow: Countries with a Somali Diaspora of 20,000 to 80,000 people (Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands)

Green: Countries with a Somali Diaspora of 5,000 to 20,000 people (Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, South Africa, Turkey, Italy, Germany, Denmark and Finland)

Figures in red boxes: Request for political asylum from Somali nationals in 2008 (if there were more than 200 asylum seekers)

Figures in yellow boxes: Request for political asylum from Somali nationals in 2007 (if there were more than 200 asylum seekers; figures for 2008 are not available)

Airplanes: Most important airports used in the journey to Europe

Red lines: Primary Somali migration routes to Europe

Orange lines: Secondary Somali migration routes to Europe

Blue lines: Alleged migration routes to Europe, but not exact

1.2 Study objectives

In July 2009, the Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF) based in Somalia and Yemen commissioned the Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) of the American University of Cairo (AUC) to produce a study in Yemen, KSA and Turkey that would contribute to developing a forward looking strategy to strengthen the protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from Somalia or transiting through Somalia through:

2. Collecting and analysing data on mixed migration flows including:
    a. Region of origin and reason for leaving.
    b. Profile of people: age, gender, vulnerabilities, status (refugee, asylum seeker, economic migrant).
    c. Points of departure, mode of transportation, funding for the transportation, transit route.
    d. Countries of final destination and expected coping mechanism in the final destination.
    e. Reception conditions, current living conditions and duration of the stay.
3. Identifying the role of the various stakeholders (migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, communities, opinion leaders such as elders, religious leaders, local authorities and institututions such as the police force, migration officials, etc.) and their response capacity;
4. Identifying existing and active individual, family and group protection and coping mechanisms within the migrant population;
5. Outlining the major protection challenges faced during the journey;
6. And making recommendations to design a comprehensive and long term strategy to deal with mixed flows originating from Somalia.

1.3 Clarification on terminology and concepts used in this report

The following clarifies some of the terminology and concepts about migration and refugees that are used throughout this report.

The 'migration-asylum nexus'

The 'migration-asylum nexus' is the broad term used to describe the growing recognition of the difficulty in distinguishing between forced and economic migration, because of their closely related causes, the similarities between the migratory processes and the lack of differentiation in the policy responses to both categories (Castles and Van Hear 2005). The growing salience of the migration-asylum nexus, and its prominence, has come as a result of two factors: the first being scholarly analysis in the 1990s that highlighted the common roots of movement, where economic factors were often connected to human

rights abuses and violence; whilst the second was the recognition by multilateral agencies and governments in the global North that the asylum system was being abused to a high degree and used for other immigration patterns (Van Hear et al: 2009).

At government policy level, enmeshing the issues of asylum and economic migration arises when one wants to differentiate between those they consider 'desirable migrants' (the highly skilled migrants viewed as strengthening Europe's economies) and 'undesirable migrants' (asylum seekers, migrants with low skills and education), who are seen as a burden on the state (Castles 2007, Van Liemt 2007). Carling (2007) argues that the category of the 'unwanted' can further be divided into the 'unavoidable' – a small minority that come to Europe through smuggling networks and are impossible to return even if their applications are unsuccessful – and a much larger group that includes asylum seekers and persons granted protection with rights to family reunification who are 'reluctantly accepted.'

Irregular Migration

The term 'irregular migration' has gained mileage within discourses of migration in recent years; the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) highlights that the term irregular migration is often synonymous with illegal migration for control purposes, although it is conceptually problematic (Koser: 2005). Irregularity can take many forms and include a wide range of migrants, such as those who enter or remain in a country without authorisation, those who are smuggled or trafficked, unsuccessful asylum seekers who fail to observe a deportation order and people who circumvent immigration controls through the arrangement of bogus marriages (ibid). The term 'irregular secondary mover' is often applied to all refugees leaving a first country of asylum. The term 'irregular' adds a sense of illegality to a situation describing people who seek to leave bad conditions for a better future through education and resettlement (Sperl: 2001).

Transit Migration

The notion of transit migration and the role of transit countries is key to the migration-asylum nexus. Irregular migration is often linked with transit migration, which helps to provide the rationale for the internationalisation or externalisation of EU migration policies, notably for migration control in neighbouring countries, regions and readmission agreements (Düvell 2006). There is a great deal of literature debating the conceptualisations and discourses on transit migration (Düvell 2006, Papadopoulou 2005). Briefly, discourses on transit migration and transit migrants are more or less conceived of as temporary and illegal.

Transit migrants are viewed as people who stay for a short time in a country illegally and are planning on moving to another destination in Western countries, illegally and for economic gain (Düvell 2006). Accounts of transit migrants are essentially concerned with the time in transit, the country of origin and

the country of destination; this can detract from the human and refugee rights violations whilst in a country, which often takes the form of unlawful or violent return (réfoulement). This focus on irregular migrant status can therefore encourage officials to view and treat refugees, who are identified as in transit, as 'illegal' and thus deny them access to refugee status through determination procedures.

This is a highly politicised discourse that fails to acknowledge that transit migration is a dynamic process and countries cannot just be labelled as 'transit' countries, as it fails to take into account the different settlement patterns in any country. Perhaps more importantly, the process of labelling individuals as transit migrants makes fundamental assumptions about people's intentions, denies the significance of their sojourn in 'transit', which may result in long-term settlement. Many migrants in Cairo may speak of aspirations to move to Europe, but they have remained in Egypt for many years, establish new lives there and may actually turn down possibilities to move on should they arise. The assumption that a set of migrants are in transit is always a dangerous one and a poor guide to policy.

Smuggling and Trafficking

The focus on illegality brings to our attention smuggling and trafficking, two terms that are often viewed as interchangeable in policy discourses. However, it is very important to distinguish between the two. It is acknowledged that trafficking takes place in situations where persons are deceived, threatened or coerced and in situations of exploitation, including prostitution (Carling: 2006). Human smuggling, on the other hand, can be viewed as the voluntary purchase of a service or a transaction taken to avoid immigration restrictions; thus the person need not be a victim (Carling 2007). Gender dimensions that feature in discourses smuggling and trafficking can often draw the simple generalisations that men are seen to be smuggled while women trafficked which can be problematic in understanding of the holistic processes of migration and more importantly peoples decision making and agency(Van Liempt: forth- coming 2010) The off shoot of this generalisation is that female migrants seen to be trafficked leads to the understanding that women are better off in their country of origins rather than entering dangerous migration process. This however often ignores the grave human rights abuses they can suffer and that compel them to leave in the first instance (ibid).

However, it is often difficult to make a clear distinction on what constitutes voluntary and forced, especially as one may lead to the other (de Haas: 2007). In the current focus on preventing South-North migration, Carling (2007) highlights how the fight against smuggling is normally portrayed in relation to protecting the migrants, who are depicted as being exploited by organised criminal gangs seeking profit. This discursive linking of the exploitative nature of smuggling occurs when linked to trafficking (Carling: 2007).

EU states continue to hold to the premise that combating smuggling will reduce irregular migration, although this has been refuted since it has not reduced the number of irregular entries despite the crack down on it. Instead, what we have seen is an increase in the involvement of human smugglers as these restrictive migration policies have driven prices up and increased the personal dangers involved in smuggling (Van Liempt 2007). Furthermore, the focus on smuggling, which often figures late in the overall process of an individual's migration, ignores the reasons why people choose to turn to a smuggler in the first instance. These one-dimensional and economically focused policies fail to see the bigger picture and so end up missing important factors like the human agency of the migrants as well as the variety of different forms of smuggling practices, where the migrant is involved in different stages of the process (ibid)[2].

'Mixed migration' and protection regimes

The concerns around the asylum-migration nexus, irregular migration, transit migration and smuggling and trafficking have coalesced around the notion of 'mixed migration', which may incorporate all these different forms of movement. On the one hand, this may be seen in one person, who may be able to present themselves (without any deceit) as an asylum seeker or equally as a labour migrant, who having fled war, stayed in transit for some months and has then been smuggled into Europe. On the other hand, it may also refer to a set of people moving through the same routes who have a complex mix of motivations and journeys; hence, when a boat arrives in the Mediterranean it is both practically and conceptually impossible to differentiate between the asylum seeker and the economic migrant.

This results in debates about who deserves protection and how to ensure protection in light of such 'mixed migration' practices and at the different stages of migration. The UNHCR's stance is that "refugees are not migrants" and that it is detrimental to refugee protection to confuse the two groups, terminologically or otherwise (Feller: 2007). However, while the UNHCR strongly defends the existence of two distinct regimes based on the mandate and the 1951 Convention, other agencies question this separation.

Distinctions between economic migrants and refugees may not only be blurred initially but are also fluid at different times throughout the migration-asylum cycle, even for the same individuals (Koser: 1997). This makes differentiating between these groups still less relevant. Zetter (2007) argues that such labels in this dimension are not just static features of geographical origin, national identity and legally designated statuses, but in fact form a life narrative and an overlapping sequence of events and shifting natures. The 1951 Convention has been called into question regarding its usefulness for catering to the complexity of

[2]

migration in the post-Cold War era (Hydman: 2006), with commentators advocating that it is out-of-date and not in tune with the reality of today's forced migration (Harvey 2000).

However, at the operational level, where these policies meet the practice of 'mixed migration', commentators like Betts (2007) highlight that we are witnessing the refugee regime based on the 1951 Convention existing parallel to other institutional arrangements that have come about to facilitate the Northern states' politicised agenda to curtail migration. This has consequently had considerable implications for protection of asylum seekers and migrants in general. The UNHCR argues that the quality of refugee protection is undermined. Two examples of this can be found in some of the resultant practices. One is the creation by the EU of Frontex – a regional border control agency – which engages in military patrols of attempts by migrants to acquire access to the EU borders (Betts: 2007).

Another example given by Betts is the provision of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) of services to European states enabling them to limit the access of asylum seekers crossing from Sub-Saharan Africa to the EU via the Maghreb (Betts: 2007). These two examples highlight new institutional arrangements which enable the EU to escape its obligations under the 1951 Convention. Without these new institutions there would have been fewer means for Northern states to coordinate so as to limit asylum seekers' ability to reach the borders of their territory (ibid). Additionally, to make EU states less attractive, deterrence measures such as detention, employment restrictions, limited social welfare provision and restrictions on family reunion were designed (Castles, Crawley and Loughna: 2003). With the EU harmonisation process on asylum policies, there has been pressure on the lowest common denominator, which has led to a weakening of refugee protection.

Feller (2007) argues that the framework for international protection must preserve the fundamentals of the 1951 Convention and be solidly grounded in international human rights and humanitarian law, whilst being complimented by laws that allow some adjustment of concepts in order to cater for realties on the ground. Whilst in-line with the above arguments, UNHCR has opened its remit and developed a 10-Point Plan of Action which provides a framework of protection tools that could cover broad migration strategies. These take into account international protection needs, while creating solutions tailored to the differing categories of people in mixed-migration movements (UNHCR: 2006). The launch of this framework highlighted a shift in emphasis, accepting that there are mixed flows of migrants encompassing economic migrants as well as irregular secondary migrants.

However, there is criticism that this is still focused less on issues like country of origin and more on aspects of managing migration. In light of the misperception that the asylum-migration nexus has become associated with the practices of South-North migration and with the agendas of the migrant-receiving countries of the global North, it has become a discourse that is fundamentally concerned with irregular

migration, the control of borders, unfounded asylum claims and the return of asylum seekers whose claims for refugee status has been rejected (Crisp: 2008).

The UNHCR has shifted its stance away from the migration-asylum nexus, broadening its approach, as it has realised that the discourse associated with this concept could compromise its core purpose of refugee protection. The concept also placed all the focus on South-North migration, while in fact some of the largest migration flows, and the majority of the world's refugees, are found in South-South migration, which the UNHCR needs to address (Crisp:2008).

Thus there is recognition that both migrants and asylum seekers travel the same routes, suffer very similar human rights violations, deprivation and exclusion. At the same time, they both have rights and require international protection of those rights, even though refugees have special needs and rights. Individuals who leave their homes may do so with mixed motivations that might at once include fear of persecution, as well as a desire to improve their standard of living, find work and so on. People's interests can also change; for example, a refugee in his/her country of asylum may be more interested in finding work to sustain their families accompanying them and those who remained at home. Migrants also travel together using the same means of transport, on common routes, with the same destinations and with the assistance of the same smugglers. In short, it is argued that "refugee migration can transmute into economic or labour migration and vice versa" (Van Hear et al., 2009: 12). Others, such as Bakewell (2009), more deliberately refer to "mixed groups of asylum seekers and labour migrants" that seems to acknowledge the collective association, but not the mixed motives within individuals themselves. Although wedded to the concept, the MMTF (2008: 6-7) report on Somalia highlighted the fluidity of individual motivations and decisions during flight:

> "..the profile of persons involved in 'mixed migration' through Bossaso reflects their differing reasons for leaving their places of origin [and] their motivations for continuing to specific locations (which may change en route) … As the individuals travel further from … initial push factors, their rationale for moving may change. Interviews in Bossaso indicated that some persons from Mogadishu felt relatively secure in Bossaso and, if employment were available, would not be interested in continuing their journey even if their original intention was to go to Yemen or beyond. By contrast, other Somalis considered the living conditions in Bossaso to be deplorable and while they may not have initially intended to travel further, the opportunity for improved economic security in Yemen and beyond became an important pull factor encouraging them to risk the crossing."

Betts (2008: 2) raises the concept 'distress migrants', who "may leave their countries as a result of desperate economic and social situations, but do not conform to the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee." The dilemma for researchers is that it is difficult to determine the bona fides of an asylum seeker or refugee, for that is the role of governments and UNHCR in asylum countries through the mechanism of refugee status determination (RSD) procedures; that is, unless a country accepts prima facie refugee status, as is the case for Somalis in Yemen when the distinction becomes irrelevant. Distinguishing labour or economic migrants from refugees is important from the perspective of

humanitarian agencies distributing donated resources earmarked for refugees, but not necessarily from the general principles of human rights. Within the broad realm of 'irregular migration' the recognition by UNHCR and others is that people 'on the move' have protection needs, but despite existing norms of international migration law, these norms lack operationalization on the ground and a confusion regarding which international aid agencies should take responsibility for them (Betts, 2008).

From the example in this study, the acceptance of Somalis as prima facie refugees in Yemen means that external observers cannot be certain of actual refugee status, unless they accept the Yemeni government's decision. On the other hand, this study (and others on Somalis, such as Horwood, 2008), found that the large majority entering Yemen and Turkey had come from the south central conflict zones, but not all. Thus (and perhaps more consistent with the provisions of the 1969 Organization of African Unity refugee convention), it may be inferred that they are genuine asylum seekers even though in their country of asylum they may express a priority for seeking work and improved living standards, which was found in this study. In Turkey, by contrast, which does not confer refugee status on non-Europeans, does readily provide temporary asylum seeker status to those who register.

A 22 years old Somali woman from Mogadishu was asked why she had left her home and reported, *"I was looking for the man I love*". It may not have been the story she gave to UNHCR, but coming from Mogadishu, there is no doubt she could claim security issues and receive assistance. Although it would be reasonable to suggest she was a voluntary migrant, it would be difficult to consider her as an economic or labour migrant, unless one invoked issues in the gender division of labour in the relationship with her lover, who we presume was found.

Thus the fluidity of motivations and movements, of policies and practices, of academic reflections and assistance practicalities, the distinction between economic migrants and refugees remains unresolved as does the theoretical conceptualization versus policy, distribution of resources and protection dilemmas.

Thus, 'mixed migration' may be defined as a combination of mixed migration motivations and mixed practices and flows of migrants and asylum seekers who travel together or on the same routes for the same or similar destinations. That fewer Ethiopians cite "insecurity from conflict" does not mean that they are not refugees. Further, because individuals do not apply for asylum does not mean they would not be granted refugees status if they did register. On the other hand, although it is most attractive, to refer generically to the subjects in this study as simply 'migrants' or the phenomenon as "migration" would be difficult because the specific trajectories and interests referred to here are still very much oriented towards the various protection institutions that remain mandated in maintaining the differentiations in order to distribute humanitarian and protection resources.

1.4 Background on the context of migration

Context of Somalia

Migration is not a new phenomenon amongst Somalis; while historically as pastoralists Somalis have long been involved in moving from one place to another as a way of coping with harsh realities (Lewis: 1966), while international migratory patterns can be traced back to the movements of seamen who worked on colonial ships sailing to Western Europe in the early twentieth century (Gundel, 2002; Kleist, 2004). A small number of them ended up settling, forming communities in port cities of countries like the United Kingdom and Norway.

Somali migration continued after Somalia's independence, with students being sent abroad to study at universities in the West. In the seventies, Somali workers migrated to Gulf countries to seek better employment and financial gain that came with the oil boom in that region (Gundel 2002). From the eighties onwards, those opposed to the Said Barre regime went into political exile in many Western countries (Kleist 2004, Bang Nielsen 2004).

Despite these continuous waves of migration, the largest levels of migration began with the start of the Somali conflict and consequent collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and have continued ever since. The majority of those that took flight found themselves in Somalia's neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, where thousands still remain in protracted limbo and displacement as refugees in camps and urban cities. A smaller but considerable number of Somalis were able to migrate further, joining already established communities in the Gulf, Western Europe, the USA and Canada.

Today, the largest numbers of Somalis in the West are found in the UK, followed by Canada and United States (particularly in the states of Minnesota and Ohio). There are also notable Somali populations in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. However, there has been a recent trend for Somalis in these latter countries to migrate to the UK, due to a larger Somali community in the UK and economic, educational and religious opportunities (Van den Reek and Hussein 2003 Bang Nielsen 2004). Conversely, Somali-Europeans across Europe have been returning to Somalia/Somaliland (Hansen 2007) and other Arab countries (e.g. Egypt) for religious and cultural reasons (Al-Sharmani 2006).

Despite international intervention and various internationally facilitated reconciliation processes Somalia has experienced what many would view as the longest period of central statelessness of any country in recent history (Menkhaus 2004), having spiraled into 18 years of civil conflict. Even for those native to

the country, the fluid political landscape is perplexing and rapidly changing and has recently seen the country play stage to competing regional and international interests. Somalia's issues have also been exacerbated by the global war on terrorism, which has become another point of contention in an already complex web of regional and internal conflicts (Healy 2007, Menkhaus 2007).

The current political set-up in Somalia can only be described as a three zone/state divide. This shows the rise of governance without government (Menkhaus 2007). For years the north-east and north-west have had relative stability and a certain degree of security, which has resulted in the formation of the autonomous state-type administration of Puntland in the north-east, and the declaration of independence by Somaliland in the north-west, although this is yet to be officially recognised by the international community (Bradbury 2008). In the south-central zone (which includes Mogadishu) most sub-regions are independently governed, although this zone has the least security and stability in the country and is currently besieged by heavy fighting from the internationally backed transitional federal government of Somalia and the U.S listed terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

Internal displacement has been a persistent consequence of the Somali conflict since the early 1990s, when millions were forced to move within the country; in the mid-nineties the numbers went down as both internally displaced and refugees in neighbouring countries returned to their homes (Gundel 2002). Currently, internal displacement is still one of the major humanitarian problems the country faces; civil insecurity across most of southern and central Somalia, and the border conflict between Puntland and Somaliland in 2007 has caused massive displacement (Sheek 2009). At the beginning of 2009 there were an estimated 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDMC 2009). The humanitarian situation is made worse by the international community's lack of access in the southern region of the country.

Amnesty International (2007) reported that people were unable to escape to Kenya from Mogadishu, as Kenya closed its borders on the grounds of security in order to prevent defeated Islamists and al-Qaeda suspects from escaping into the country. This resulted in hundreds of asylum-seekers being forcibly returned to Somalia and further thousands of asylum-seekers were stranded at the Kenya/Somalia border (ibid). A recent HRW report (2009) also highlighted that since the border closure, Kenyan authorities have deported hundreds, possibly thousands of Somali asylum seekers, violating the most fundamental part of the 1951 Convention on refugees – the right not to be *refouled*. Under its obligations in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, Kenya is also bound not to send refugees or asylum seekers back to situations of generalised violence such as in Somalia.

Somalis are struggling to survive at home with 10s of 1000s each year undertaking perilous journeys to leave, to find safety and opportunities to benefit themselves and their families. The UNHCR Statistical Yearbook for 2008 shows by far the largest number of Somali refugees registered in Kenya (259,121),

followed by Yemen (132,275). By the end of 2008, asylum claims were made by Somalis in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Malta, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States (UNHCR, 2008) (see table below).

Table 1: Somali and Ethiopian Refugee Populations by Country of Asylum with 1000 or more at the end of 2008

Country of Origin	Country of Asylum	Number
Somalia	Canada	6,209
	Djibouti	8,522
	Denmark	2,483
	Egypt	5,600
	Eritrea	4,675
	Ethiopia	33,625
	Finland	1,219
	Germany	2,190
	Italy	5,251
	Kenya	259,121
	Malta	2,084
	Netherlands	8,565
	Norway	6,977
	South Africa	8,543
	Sweden	6,753
	Switzerland	3,070
	Syria	3,358
	Tanzania	1,525
	Uganda	6,085
	United Kingdom	31,665
	United States	10,154
	Yemen	132,275
	Zambia	1,868
Ethiopia		
	Canada	1,732
	Germany	3,584
	Italy	2,148
	Kenya	22,649
	Somalia	1,783
	Sudan	8,621
	United Kingdom	2,782
	United States	12,515
	Yemen	2,140

UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (2008)

Context of Ethiopia

Ethiopia has experienced a variety of disturbances over the past few decades that have caused both massive internal displacement and outward migratory flows. Political and economic turmoil, recurrent cycles of drought, flood and famine, and warfare have all contributed to the country's migration situation."

According to Amnesty International, 6.4 million Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity (AI, 2009: 1). 1.9 million are located in the Somali region, which, along with the also chronically food-insecure South Oromia and Afar regions, is also regularly affected by cycles of drought and flooding (IDMC, 2007: 11). 2009 saw below normal rains throughout the country that, together with soil degradation, poor water resources and poor transportation infrastructure, exacerbated the precarious situation of the many Ethiopians who depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods (UKBA, 2009: 13-14). Those not recognized as belonging to particular ethnic groups are often excluded from food and humanitarian aid distribution (IDMC, 2007: 7). In addition, the 2007 trade blockade instituted by the government in response to increased activities of the Oromo Liberation Front has negatively affected pastoralist livelihoods. The rural poverty caused by this combination of circumstances influences many to look abroad for employment opportunities, traditionally to the Arab and Gulf states, but also further afield (ICMPD, 2007: 19).

During the dictatorial regime of Mengistu Haile Meriam, Ethiopia produced some of the world's highest outflows of refugees (de Regt, 2007: 11). The ethnic federalist system that was instituted after Mengistu's overthrow has deepened ethnic divisions and led to a system of unequal access to basic necessities. Since that time, Ethiopia's human rights record has deteriorated, and the country has existed in a climate of generalized repression, where independent journalists, human rights activists and members (both confirmed and suspected) of the opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy face harassment, arrest, detention, and charges of treason. (UKBA, 2009: 12).

The ongoing border conflict with Eritrea has also contributed to the displacement of individuals living in the border area. (AI, 2009: 2). Internally, government forces have been involved in sporadic armed conflict in the Oromo region, where they continue counterinsurgency efforts against the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Conflicts throughout the country persist between clans competing over scarce land and water resources and access to local administrative power (IDMC, 2007: 24; ACCORD, 2009: 1)

Despite all of these sources of insecurity, it should be noted that according to the UNHCR's 2009 report to the General Assembly, by the end of 2008 Ethiopia was playing host to nearly 84,000 refugees (UNHCR Report to GA, 2009: 30). Many Ethiopian towns and cities, particularly Addis Ababa, are

important hubs on the migration routes of many seeking to leave their homes in East Africa (ICMPD, 2007: 4).

Figures from the UNHCR Statistical Database show that in 2008, Ethiopians were seeking asylum in a variety of countries throughout Africa, Europe and North America. Kenya was the leading host to Ethiopian refugees (22,649), followed by the United States (12,515), Sudan (8,621), Germany (3,584), the United Kingdom (2,782), Italy (2,148), Yemen (2,140), Somalia (1,783) and Canada (1,732). Norway, the Netherlands, Uganda, Djibouti and Switzerland also hosted refugee populations of between 500 and 1,000 – and smaller numbers in Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea (UNHCR, 2008).

The largest Ethiopian diaspora groups in Europe are located in Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which makes these countries particularly attractive as destinations. Some migrants are reported to travel directly to Germany by air, while 15 of 98 respondents interviewed for a study on Ethiopians in the United Kingdom reported that they arrived via another country, many through Bulgaria (Papadopoulos et. Al., 2004: 6). Others purchase visas for Russia or Belarus where they pay smugglers to take them across well-established smuggling routes into Western Europe (ICMPD, 2007: 27).

A 2008 study by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) of migrants and refugees in Yemen revealed that 73 percent of Ethiopians interviewed identified as coming from the Oromo region, while 18 percent identified as ethnically Amhara, 8 percent Tigrinyan, and 1 percent Gurage (MSF, 2008: 24). Around 54 percent of Ethiopians in the current study were from Oromo. It should be noted, however, that the striking lack of ethnic Somalis from Ogaden represented in MSF survey (and only around 7 percent in this survey, identified within the Darod clan) may well be due to the fact that they often identify as Somalis in an attempt to avoid deportation by the Yemeni authorities.

Indeed, ethnic Somalis have a long history of migration, dating back to the mass exodus to Somalia in 1977, following the eruption of conflict in the Somali National Regional State (MMTF, 2008: 3). That movement continued into the mid 1990s. Recent restrictions on humanitarian assistance to the Ogaden region, coupled with human rights abuses against civilians by both the government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (AI, 2009: 1) have contributed to the flow. Widespread arrests by security forces have also been documented in the Oromo region, where thousands suspected of having links to the Oromo Liberation Front have been detained, and at times tortured (AI, 2008: 2). In what has been called ‘collective punishment’ government forces confiscated livestock, restricted access to water and food and obstructed trade (HRW, 2008: 4). Neither country has taken steps to demarcate the border since the Temporary Security Zone was established in 2000 (UKBA, 2009: 10) and continued Eritrean obstruction led to the 2009 withdrawal of UN Security Council Mission that had previously patrolled the border (AI, 2009: 2). In addition to this conflict, Ethiopian forces have been deployed in recent years to support the

Somali Transitional Federal Government's fight against insurgents, where they have been accused of human rights abuses and war crimes (AI, 2009: 1).

Human rights abuses reported in Ethiopia in 2008 include unlawful killings, beatings, abuse, rape, torture, forcible conscription, extrajudicial executions, mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary arrest and detention, judicial corruption, detention without charge, illegal searches, excessive force, restrictions of freedom of the press, assembly and association, gender-based violence and discrimination, FGM, child exploitation, trafficking in persons, and ethnic/religious discrimination (UKBA, 2009: 16; AI, 2009: 4). This general human rights environment is predicted to deteriorate in the approach to the 2010 parliamentary elections, which are the first since 2005's contested race (HRW, 2010). In January 2009, the government passed the Charities and Societies Proclamation law, criminalizing the activity of any organization that receives more than ten percent of its funding from abroad. This effectively cripples human rights NGOs, making independent human rights work next to impossible (AI, 2009: 1; UKBA, 2009: 18; HRW, 2010). Additionally, 2009 counterterrorism legislation permits government authorities to prosecute political protesters, as well as non-violent expressions of dissent, as acts of terrorism (HRW, 2010).

The findings in this current study were similar to those of a 2009 IOM report on migratory movements of Ethiopians and Somalis to South Africa. However, almost double the sample of Ethiopians interviewed in Yemen and Turkey cited insecurity as their main reason for leaving home (67% versus 36% in the IOM study) (Horwood, 2009: 36). Similarly, the majority of those interviewed by MSF in Yemen cited lack of work or poverty as their main motivation for leaving,[3] while one quarter mentioned insecurity or political reasons (MSF, 2008: 27).

The lack of professional opportunities and inability of professionals to earn a living commensurate with their experience and training has led many highly skilled individuals to migrate. In 2007, the emigration rate of those with a tertiary education was 17 percent; that of physicians was 26-30 percent and of nurses, 17 percent (ICMPD, 2007: 16). Those who leave to seek educational opportunities often decide not to return after completing their education, again due to a lack of professional opportunities (ICMPD, 2007: 20). Additionally, many families view migration as a livelihood coping strategy by means of diversifying household income with remittances from abroad (MMTF, 2008: 7).

According to the 2007 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 54 percent of the Ethiopian population of concern to UNHCR that year was under the age of 18, while 45 percent were between the ages of 18 and 59 years. 49 percent of those under18 years were female, as were 43 percent of those between 18 and 59 years of age.

[3] Most of those people stated that they intended to travel to KSA to find work.

Women face particular forms of discrimination and abuse that may motivate them to migrate. While harmful traditional practices such as FGM, abduction and rape have been criminalized, enforcement is lax. Additionally, traditional gender relations provide women with fewer wage earning opportunities, which may compel them to seek employment abroad, typically as domestic workers. The particular nature of this type of work often leads them into trafficking situations (ICMPD, 2007: 39).

Indeed, Ethiopian NGOs estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000 persons were trafficked out of Ethiopia between March 2007 & March 2008 (UKBA, 2009: 36). The majority of those were women aged 16-30, and were employed as domestic workers, primarily in Lebanon, KSA, and the UAE (though some also ended up in Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria and Yemen).[4] After arriving at their destinations some are trafficked into the sex trade, while others may be trafficked onward from Lebanon to Turkey, Italy and Greece.

Traffickers typically approach vulnerable individuals at bus terminals outside Addis Ababa, tempting them with offers of jobs, food, guidance or shelter. Some traffickers employ local brokers to work on the community level, and thus many victims are approached by people they know and therefore may trust. The trafficking web also may include cross-country bus/truck drivers, pimps and brothel owners.

Marina de Regt, in her studies of Ethiopian and Somali female domestic workers in Yemen, underlines the brutality and deception inherent to the trafficking business (de Regt, 2006). The women she interviewed were deceived, isolated and forced to endure heavy workloads, often without being paid. Many had their passports confiscated, leaving them unable to flee. Others were abused both physically and psychologically.

Many of de Regt's interviewees reported that they had arrived in Yemen on tourist visas and found work through relatives or friends. Others were illegally recruited by unregistered agents, some of whom offered to pay initial expenses, thus entering the women into debt bondage. She also noted that traffickers often targeted uneducated rural women who were less likely to know their rights. There has been some effort on the part of the Ethiopian government to combat trafficking through improved policy and legislation, the creation of a national anti-trafficking task force, registration of those wishing to work abroad, and support services for returnee trafficking victims (ICMPD, 2007: 11). But the national system has limited capacity to both distinguish and prosecute offenders, and the long bureaucratic process involved in applying through a registered recruitment agency leads many women to take their chances

[4] Small numbers of men are also trafficked, mainly to the Gulf States for low-skilled forced labor.

with traffickers. Despite this, however, MMTF (2009) and in this study, no evidence of trafficking was apparent.

1.5 Legal status of Somali and Ethiopian migrants and refugees

The official status of Ethiopian and Somali migrants varies across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and other developing countries to which they travel. In many countries, Somalis have been able to obtain some form of official recognition and are entitled to certain rights and protections. However these are generally of a much lower standard than that envisaged in the 1951 refugee convention, and there are problems with documentation that hinder their ability to access the rights and protections that they are technically entitled to. This is a major factor in prompting onward movement. By contrast, comparatively few Ethiopians receive refugee status and given the same levels of protection in the region. Although their numbers are far less than Somalis, in early 2010, the number of Ethiopians who reached Yemen surpassed that of Somalis, partly because of increased security and difficulties that prevent Somalis reaching Bossaso. Because of their precarious status in Yemen, most do not register with UNHCR, but travel on from Yemen as quickly as possible to the Gulf States to find work, particularly women who can undertake domestic work.

All of Somalia's surrounding countries are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Additionally, Ethiopia and Kenya are signatories to the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. Djibouti adopted a national refugee law in 1977, and has traditionally shared responsibility for refugee affairs with UNHCR. Increasing transfer of responsibilities to the Djiboutian government over the past decade has resulted in a deterioration of the asylum system (Moret et al: 2006). Ethiopia has enacted domestic refugee legislation, and has created a governmental agency to oversee refugee affairs, which works with support and financing from UNHCR. It is important to note that the Ethiopian government has attached reservations that limit refugee access to employment and education. Kenya passed a national Refugee Act in November 2006, which created a Department of Refugee Affairs and a Refugee Appeals Board (Ayiera, 2007). UNHCR has had the responsibility of registration and status determination procedures, and Somali refugees are accepted on a *prima facie* basis. Most Somalis in Kenya, however, are considered "mandate refugees" and are thus afforded more limited protections.

While each of these countries possesses legal standards regarding refugees - whether through accession to international instruments or incorporation into domestic legislation - problems of implementation abound. This is due in some part to a lack of resources, widespread corruption, and difficulties in coordination between governments, NGOs and other implementing agencies (Moret et al: 2006). Though Somali refugees are typically afforded a high level of recognition, the issuing of documentation continues to be a

challenge. This lack of documentation translates into an inability to access the rights and protections afforded by refugee status (to employment, education, health care, freedom of movement, etc.), and is a major factor in the decision to move on from a host state.

Yemen

Yemen is the only country of the region that has signed the 1951 Refugee convention (Convention Relating to the status of Refugees) and 1967 Protocols. Although it has no domestic asylum or refugee law, a refugee policy is currently under consideration but there is no viable support system in place (MMTF: 2008). A consultative National Committee for Refugee Affairs was established in 2000, but it is not particularly active (Moret et al: 2006). The Yemeni government is highly dependent on UNHCR, which processes all asylum claims, administers services, and operates a limited resettlement program for refugees with special needs (UNHCR: 2006).

Since 1988, Somalis have been accepted as *prima facie* refugees (although the government is currently reconsidering this). Ethiopians, however, are required to undertake individual refugee status determination procedures by UNHCR. Although it is claimed by Human Rights Watch (2009) that the Yemeni government does not recognize Ethiopians as refugees, there have recently been a number of Ethiopians in the Kharaz refugee camp who have received refugee status and even registered with the government of Yemen. As a result some Ethiopians claim to be Somali in an attempt to gain access to protections associated with refugee status (MMTF: 2008). While a minority of Ethiopians do receive mandate refugee status from UNHCR, provisions and services are not equal to that of Somalis. For example, the UNHCR refugee identity card provided to Ethiopians states that the holder is not eligible for financial assistance or resettlement. Access to a hospital and pharmacy is given but refugees interviewed in Sana'a said it was inadequate. Some children under 18 years, however, are given up to $50 per month. Otherwise, there are no provisions for food, accommodation or education (see also HRW 2009:1).

There has been increased external pressure on the Yemeni government to tighten its border security in an attempt to fight terrorism. Regulation of the vast coastline has proved challenging to the Yemeni authorities, as has the policing of its borders with KSA. This has contributed to the perception of Yemen as a transit country to the Gulf (ICMPD: 2007), and has led to tensions with KSA, which has begun construction of a barrier along the border (ICMPD: 2007).

In July 2009, the Yemeni government announced its intention to create a database of all Somali refugees, stating that all those left unregistered will be deported (USCRI: 2008).

Migrants and refugees do not have citizenship rights and require work permits to be granted formal employment. Refugee identity cards grant them access to health care, education, travel, and limited forms

of informal employment, but issuance of IDs is limited due to lack of resources. The government, with the support of UNHCR, has pledged to open six registration centers to aid in the issuing of IDs.[5]

The Gulf and the Middle East

None of the Gulf countries are signatories to the Refugee Convention, and most follow a policy of detention and deportation of irregular migrants. Asylum seekers in KSA do have access to UNHCR, and are not targeted for arrest by authorities, though they are expected to regularize their status before applying to UNHCR unless they have protection needs (MMTF 2008). Refugees and economic migrants to KSA can only obtain work permits if their stay is in conformity with relevant immigration regulations (MMTF 2008: 15). Some Somalis enter KSA legally on "*umra*" visas (for religious pilgrimage purposes) and then overstay in order to find employment.

Somalia's surrounding countries have hosted an enormous share of its refugees and migrants, particularly since the late 1980s. And as has been noted, Somali refugees enjoy *prima facie* status in a number of states. However, increased pressure from Western states to curb irregular migration from Africa and the Middle East, combined with perceptions of migrants and refugees as taxing already strained resources, have rendered many states less willing to accept and integrate new arrivals (Moret et al., 2008). In KSA and Turkey, for example, Somali irregular migrants and refugees are typically detained and deported. In 2006 alone, 3,468 irregular Somali border crossers were apprehended while trying to enter Turkey (ICMPD, 2007).

Syria

Syria is not party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, and lacks a formal legal refugee framework. However, because Somalia is a member of the Arab League, Somalis do not need pre-arranged visas to enter, but are given a "permission of entry" on arrival. Despite no formal arrangements, access to assistance, basic education and primary health care to a large number of refugees, including Somalis (UNHCR country operations profile 2010). There were 1,719 Somali refugees and 3,003 asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Syria in 2007 (Dorai, 2007: 3).[6] Refugees are barred from formal employment, though there is a certain amount of official tolerance for their presence in the informal labor market. UNHCR plays a variety of roles in the protection of refugees in Syria, including direct assistance, resettlement, advocacy and awareness-raising. Local integration is not an option in Syria, due in part to a rising cost of living and lack of livelihood opportunities (UNCHR 2010). Interest in the plight of refugees in general is said to be on the wane.

5 According to the 2008 USCRI World Refugee Survey, two of the six were operational by the end of 2008.
6 Total UNHCR projections for 2010 remain more or less the same (UNHCR 2010).

Egypt

While Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 and OAU Conventions, it has no national refugee legislation, and all protection responsibilities fall to UNHCR. Somalis enjoy high refugee recognition rates (ICMPD: 2007),[7] yet convention reservations have placed extreme limitations on access to healthcare, education and employment, and refugees are not eligible for citizenship. They must obtain a work permit to be legally employed, which requires submitting to a lengthy bureaucratic process and paying a sizable annual fee of EP 1,000 (Al-Sharmani, 2006: 2). Although the numbers are unknown, there are a substantial number of Somalis in Egypt who entered from Libya, perhaps having made unsuccessful attempts from Libya to reach Europe. There was an attempt to interview a number of these Somalis in Cairo, but they were quite fearful and were eventually reluctant to participate.

The choice to remain (at least temporarily) in Egypt is influenced by historic migratory ties, acceptance of Somali documents, and ease of entry (Moret et al., 2006). Al-Sharmani notes that among Somali refugees living in Cairo, many report having come from other Middle Eastern countries due to a combination of a lack of legal status, fear of deportation and harassment, as well as a perception that the UNHCR office in Egypt resettles many refugees to Western countries. Some are drawn by the attractiveness of living in a Muslim country, where they may more easily provide their children with a Qur'anic education than in the West (Al-Sharmani, 2006: 9). It is interesting to note that at least 200 Somali families identified in Al-Sharmani's study moved to Cairo after becoming naturalized citizens of Western countries. This choice was made largely to escape economic and cultural marginalization, and was employed as a strategy to create or enhance transnational family links.

Despite these draws, a general lack of protection and local integration prospects, restriction of rights to work and education, and racism lead many sub-Saharan refugees to move on from Egypt (ICMPD, 2007). Those who do choose to stay are often treated as foreigners rather than refugees, and are overcharged for basic livelihood expenses. As such, they lead highly marginalized lives (Al-Sharmani, 2009: 2). As in Yemen, female refugees in Cairo find it easier to gain employment, largely in domestic work, child care and small-scale trading. There is a certain amount of stigma attached to domestic work, and those working for Egyptian families report anxiety that their employers might at any moment report their irregular status (Jureidini, 2009).

[7]7 Al-Sharmani notes that UNHCR Cairo has helped to resettle approximately 300 Somalis annually to the West in recent years.

Libya

Libya has no asylum procedure or protection plan, and does not distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants. It has, however, taken measures to combat trafficking (spurred largely by pressure from Italy and Malta). Its pro-African stance and leading role in the creation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states has led many sub-Saharan Africans to migrate to Libya in search of employment opportunities (ICMPD:2007). The collaboration between Italy and Libya in preventing migration across the Mediterranean is also a cause for concern. On May 15th 2009, the joint Italian-Libyan patrols started. All boats intercepted at sea will now be deported back to Libya. Between 7th and 10th May 2009, 527 people were deported to Libya, with a number of them being of Somali origin. The UNHCR, Human Rights Watch and other organisations have pointed out that sending back intercepted migrants to their point of departure is incompatible with the UN Refugee Convention, as potential refugees are thus effectively prevented from lodging an application for asylum. Moreover, externalising migration control towards Libya seems particularly problematic, given that the country has not signed the UN Refugee Convention. There is risk of detention and return at many points in the journey. In particular, arrival in Europe does not ensure adequate levels of protection. Italy's policy of returns of alleged irregular migrants to Libya, without an adequate screening process, means that there are no guarantees that those in need of international protection are not deported. Libya cannot be considered a safe country for many returnees, who face being returned to their countries of origin from Libya, which amounts to *refoulement*. Aside from the lack of protection for refugees, it is, to a great extent, hard to differentiate between the experiences of refugees and migrants both in Libya and on the desert and sea crossings (Hamood, 2006). There is an ongoing dialogue between Libya and the European Commission to establish an EU-Libya Framework agreement in relation to migration that might establish protocols that are more in line with the EU's "commitment to a Common European Asylum System offering a higher degree of protection and standards" (European Commission, 2010).

Turkey

Turkey's geo-political location makes it a natural transit point for irregular migrants wishing to gain access to the West, and has helped turn it into a "de facto country of first asylum" for refugees from many countries (IOM: 2008). Between 2000 and 2007, 560,000 irregular migrants were apprehended in Turkey, and 130,000 third-country nationals were refused entry at the borders. Alignment of its migration policies with those of Europe is a condition of its admittance to the EU. Some EU countries have expressed concern that admitting Turkey will lead to a major influx of refugees into Europe, and thus the status of Turkey's refugee policy is a source of much debate (IOM: 2008). This has led to increased focus on border policing.

Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, yet has not amended its laws to revise the Convention's original geographic restrictions. As such the government does not accept refugees from non-European countries. Under the 1994 Asylum Regulation, non-European refugees are eligible only for temporary asylum seeker status and must pay for a renewable 6 months residence permit (*ikamet*). Thus, Somalis and Ethiopians cannot be granted full refugee status in Turkey.

There is no governmental body designated to deal specifically with refugee and asylum issues, though such issues fall partially under the mandate of the Department of Foreigners, Border and Asylum and the Deputy Directorate General for Migration, Asylum and Visas. Harmonization with EU migration policies will require significant administrative capacity building. UNHCR is working with the Turkish government to develop a new national asylum system, including a legal protection framework, humane reception policies, and institutional arrangements for refugee status determination.

At present, asylum seekers must register both with UNHCR and the Foreigners Department of the Ministry of the Interior that assigns them to one of 30 satellite cities to reside and requires government permission to leave. UNHCR administers individual refugee status determination and resettlement procedures. They receive applications from asylum seekers, and can resettle those with successful claims. Third country resettlement is the only durable solution available to non-Europeans. Plans calls for the lifting of the geographical restriction by 2012,[8] provided that the necessary legal and institutional arrangements are in place.

Similarly to Libya, in Turkey, Somali refugees, along with other sub-Sahara African migrants, face physical violence by Turkish police against refugees, including cuffing, gagging and beating to enforce removal directions, and detention with the risk of deportation (Refugee Council, 2008). Most of those detained are sent to holding centres known as "foreigners' guesthouses". Turkish authorities state that only irregular migrants who have been arrested while illegally crossing the border or illegally residing in Turkey are detained in the guesthouses, and does not accept that there are asylum seekers or refugees in these centres (Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 2007). However, human rights bodies suggest that asylum seekers make up a significant portion of those held in the guesthouses.

Despite Turkey being signatory of the 1951 Convention, the lack of information on the asylum procedure in Turkey is a significant barrier preventing intercepted asylum seekers from accessing protection. Asylum seekers are not counseled on the asylum procedure, they are not offered advice or information by the police and there is a lack of interpreters. The threat of *refoulement* was the most common grievance reported by refugees and NGO respondents in Turkey.

8 Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU *Acquis* in the Field of Asylum and Migration

African Neighbours

All of Somalia's African neighbours have encampment policies. In Djibouti, all registered refugees live in camps, as do the majority in Kenya (where those who choose to live in cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa - which do host substantial Somali communities - run the risk of being apprehended and detained).

Kenyan refugee camps are home to more than 217,000 Somalis (200,000 in Dadaab, 17,000 in Kakuma) (Horwood, 2009: 53). Life in Kenyan camps offers few opportunities, and due to restrictive refugee policies, residents are not allowed to work or travel freely outside the camps (Horwood, 2009: 54). Some refugees are reported to have lived in Kenyan camps for nearly two decades with little opportunity to improve their living situations.

Registered Somali refugees in Ethiopia live largely in camps as well, though some do reside in cities. However, the vast majority of Somalis is undocumented and they live illegally in the capital city (Moret et al., 2006). Though these undocumented individuals are largely tolerated by the Ethiopian authorities, they are not afforded any sort of legal protection or assistance.

Camp conditions in all three countries are described as extremely harsh. Freedom of movement and access to employment, higher education, and vocational training are limited, and recent reductions in international aid have negatively affected the availability of food rations. Difficulties in re-registration efforts have led to many refugees remaining uncounted, which means that family ration cards often do not reflect the reality of family size (Moret et al: 2006).

The majority of Somali refugees reside in Somalia's four neighbouring countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen (though the percentage in Yemen is decreasing) (Moret et al., 2006; MMTF 2008). This is due largely to proximity and cultural/ethnic/religious similarities, as well as the fact that travel documentation is not needed to cross borders. Movements do not necessarily flow in one direction only, and particularly within this region they may cross back over themselves, sometimes including return trips to Somalia. Some refugees pass through camps, while others head directly for cities. Urban centres such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa serve as strategic transit points to destinations in Europe.

Kenya alone saw a surge in mid 2008 of 4,000-5,000 Somalis fleeing each month across its eastern border (Horwood, 2009: 34). Dhoblay-Liboi is a major crossing point for Somalis, some of whom choose to use the official border crossing point before registering with Kenyan authorities and UNCHR, and some of

whom employ smugglers to take them through unofficially. The Somali-Kenya border is particularly porous, and migrants and refugees cross frequently at many points.

The case of Ethiopians is no different. Many of those fleeing Ethiopia, whether as refugees or economic migrants, do so by crossing the border into Kenya. The majority of Ethiopians in Kenya are found in the Kakuma refugee camp[9] and in the Lavington and Eastleigh/Kariobangi areas of Nairobi (UNHCR, 2008; Horwood, 2009).

Those refugees living in Kakuma Camp face restrictions on their freedom of movement, thus limiting their livelihood options and leaving them dependent on humanitarian assistance. Other challenges faced by camp refugees are the poor quality or lack of access to education, insufficiency of food rations and other forms of assistance, limited options for integration, and lack of security, particularly from sexual and gender based violence.

Urban refugees and migrants face issues of police harassment and detention, exploitation by landlords, sexual violence, and lack of access to education, health care and work permits.

In the arena of education, some administrators of chronically overcrowded Nairobi schools refuse admission to refugee children in order to save places for Kenyan children. (UNHCR, 2009a) Other migrant and refugee children are barred for lack of proper documentation, and many parents prove unable to send their children to school due to prohibitive costs (particularly secondary schools). Those who can afford to, however, often send their children to private schools. In general the Ethiopian refugee and migrant community in Kenya suffers from low literacy rates, high dropout rates for girls, and a lack of sufficient secondary education, skills and vocational training. This, combined with issues of isolation, access to work, and competition with the local population, leads to a generalized lack of self-reliance and livelihood options.

Migrants and refugees employ a number of coping mechanisms to improve their living situations in the countries of transit and destination. Some of these mechanisms apply in all countries through which they travel, while others are used specifically to capitalize on country-specific conditions. Horwood notes that migrants will sometimes exploit the difficulties in telling the difference between Somalis from Kenya, Ogaden or Somalia itself. Depending on the varying regulations in host countries, Somalis may choose to pass themselves off as Kenyan or Ethiopian, or vice versa (Horwood, 2009: 35).

[9] 4,534 Ethiopians were living at Kakuma in September of 2008 (IOM 2009: 51).

South Africa

South Africa has only comparatively recently begun to serve as a host country to refugees. It has signed both the UN and OAU Refugee Conventions, and in 1998 passed its own Refugee Act. Authorities perform individual status determinations, though Somalis fall under a sort of *prima facie* status and thus have a very high recognition rate (Moret et al: 2006). That being said, while awaiting status determination they are not granted access to employment or education or given subsistence support, and are vulnerable to arrest. While the South African system has laid the groundwork for sound protection of refugees, it suffers from enormous implementation challenges, and is plagued by bribery. As in many other countries, refugees face serious obstacles in the application and documentation process. Smuggling along the route to South Africa is widely used, and while most of the countries involved have legislation regarding illegal migration, and some have signed the UN Smuggling Protocol, enforcement is negligible and official corruption common (Horwood 2009: 10).

Europe

It is estimated that in 2008 there were between 1.8 and 3.3 million irregular migrants residing in the European Union (European Commission, 2010). Between 2003 and 2008 there was a significant increase in the number of apprehended irregular migrants from third country nationals in the European Union (EU) – from 425,000 to 609,000. Collectively, the member states sought to return 608,000, but were only able to actually return around 241,000. Although there were differences at the national level, in 2008 over 240,000 asylum applications were recorded throughout the EU, a 6 percent increase over 2007, resulting in 65,000 asylum seekers being granted refugee protection and 4886 refugees were resettled in the EU from other countries. The most numerous of the asylum seekers were those from Afghanistan, followed by Somalia, Russia, Iraq and Serbia (including Kosovo) (ibid).

Today, significant Somali communities in the West are found in Europe; the distribution of Somalis per country in Europe is hard to measure because the Somali community on the continent has grown so quickly in recent years and Somali migration is ongoing. Due to historical and colonial ties, the UK hosts the largest community. At the start of the Somali conflict, long-established communities had been supplemented by inflows of new asylum seekers. The official 2001 UK census reported 43,515 people of Somali origin residing in the UK, but estimates go as high as 150-250,000 (Fletcher, 2009). There are also large Somali populations in Norway with the total Somali population amounting to 2005 11,000 (UNDP, 2009); Netherlands 14,000 (OECD, 2005) Denmark 11,000 (OECD, 2005)

In all of these countries Somalis arrived at different times and have had different immigration statuses. For example, amongst Somalis in the UK and in any single locality we will find British-Somalis, refugees, asylum-seekers, persons granted exceptional or discretionary leave to remain, undocumented

migrants, and people granted refugee status in another European country but who subsequently moved to Britain (Vertovec, 2006).

On the whole, in all of the countries studied the Somali migrants were received more positively in the early 1990s that today.

***Life in the United Kingdom**:* In the United Kingdom, from the mid 1990s up to 2004, people originating from Somalia consisted one of the largest asylum applicant nationalities. The first waves of migrants during this period were granted 'exceptional leave to remain' on a group basis (Harris, 2004). In the mid 90s, the UK Home Office produced a background brief on Somalia stating that many Somalis were not Convention refugees, as they were not members of a group suffering persecution from a state authority. As a result, there has been a considerable increase in refusal rates of Somali asylum applications since 1999 (ibid). In 2003 the policy changed on Somalis, moving from group determination to decisions on a case-by-case basis. Since 2007 there has been an increase in asylum applications due to the turmoil in the south. In recent years, a large proportion of Somalis seeking entry to the UK have arrived from other countries rather than directly from Somalia, through various mechanisms and routes. Somali British citizens apply to be reunited with family members from the region through reunification programs. From 2000 onwards, there has been a trend for Somalis in other EU countries such as the Netherlands, particularly Scandinavia, and also in Canada, Australia and the US, to settle in the United Kingdom although the precise numbers are unknown (Harris, 2004; Communities and Local Government, 2009). Accusations of racism against Somalis in Bristol were publicized in 2007 (BBC News, 5 October 2007). Migration of Somalis to Britain is therefore characterized by complexity and overlaps between consecutive waves of arrivals (Griffiths, 2002; Farah, 2000).

***Life in the Netherlands**:* In the Netherlands, Somali immigrants were for the most part the first substantial African community (Moret et al., 2005). The first ten asylum-seekers arrived in 1984 fleeing the repression of the Siad Barre regime (ibid). The numbers increased considerably from 1990 onwards as a result of persecution, the civil war and generalized violence (Van Liempt, 2007). Whilst the Netherlands now hosts the second largest Somali community in Europe, many Dutch-Somalis have resettled in the United Kingdom. It is estimated that 20,000 Dutch-Somalis moved to Britain, settling in cities like Birmingham and Leicester (*The Telegraph*, 2004).

In the Netherlands, Somalis initially had "tolerated status". From 1994 to 1996 this translated into granting all Somalis a residence permit. However, there was a change in this policy in 1996, as the Dutch government considered parts of Somalia, particularly the northern regions, to be a safe area for return. This resulted in the abolishment of the policy that all Somalis were to be granted a residence permit, irrespective of the outcome of their asylum application. This disregarded the complex policy

differentiating between various clan and sub-clan affiliations to determine whether or not a person qualified for an asylum status (Moert et al., 2006).

Life in Scandinavia: Norway, Denmark, and Finland*:* Somali asylum seekers joined an already existing minority of Somalis in both Norway and Denmark. In Norway, these were seamen that came in the 1960s (Horst, 2008) and Denmark had a relatively small group of Somali intellectuals who had criticized the dictatorship of Siad Barre and applied for political asylum. Although the majority of Somalis living in Norway arrived in the last five years, the Somali population in Norway is very young compared to other immigrant populations (ibid). Finland hosts the smallest Somali population with asylum seekers starting to enter in 1990, most of them via the Soviet Union (Allas, 1991).

The largest population of Somalis in Denmark and Norway came as asylum seekers fleeing civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s, whilst others arrived as quota refugees on specific resettlement programmes such as those targeting women at risk. A very small number came for family reunion (Horst, 2008). There is again a trend for onward migration from Scandinavian countries to Britain, although not in the same large numbers as seen from the Netherlands (Van Hear and Lindley, 2007).
In Denmark and Norway most asylum seekers were admitted as de facto refugees, which were granted by their lineage affiliation (Fink-Nielsen and Kleist, 2000). However from 1996, the Danish Immigration Service started to carry out DNA profiling for Somali family reunification cases in order to tighten control and lower the number of family reunifications. Finland also adopted this policy on family reunification (ibid). In the late 90s, similar to the Dutch government, the Danish Immigration Service claimed that parts of Somalia were safe areas. This caused a political debate about repatriation and the return of Somalis in Denmark (Kleist, 2007).

1.6 Transnational mechanisms of support

Somalis, like many diaspora communities, have maintained links with their home country and other Somali communities dispersed all over the globe. With the surge in global communication systems, Somalis stay connected through the internet, actively following the situation in Somalia and issues that affect Somalis worldwide. The Diaspora's involvement in Somalia and with other Somalis takes place through several mechanisms – through the nuclear family, clan networks, charitable associations and transnational business partnerships (UNDP, 2009). Whilst many assist from habitual place of residence, others return to the region, bolstering the economy through investment and infrastructure (UNDP, 2009).

However, from the start of the conflict the volume in remittance transactions has grown significantly due to the large refugee flows (Lindley, 2006; Horst and Van Hear, 2002). The amounts significantly exceed

the official development aid to Somalia (ibid); in 2004, the worldwide Somali Diaspora was estimated to send remittances worth between US$750 million and US$1 billion to Somalia each year (UNDP, 2002) making the country one of the most remittance-dependant countries in the world (Ahmed, 2006).

Much attention is given at the policy level to the link between migration and development (Gundel: 2002). At the macro-level, financial remittances, as well as other transnational flows, have enabled the provision of vital services commonly provided by the state, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure (Lindley: 2007, Horst: 2008b). At the micro-level, remittances play a major role in improving family and local community living standards. Looking at the Dadaab refugee camps, Horst (2008b) highlights that remittances hold a monopoly of assistance over international humanitarian aid as remittances assist at the household level as well as raising the general welfare of the camps.

Shortly after 9/11, the Somali remittance sector came under threat from Western governments over security concerns; the largest Somali transfer company, Al-Barakaat, was shut down by the US because of its alleged links with terrorist organisations. This had devastating effects for Somalis in the West, those in Somalia as well as Somali refugees in the region, with millions of remittance money for assistance and business frozen (De Waal, 2004; Van Hear and Horst, 2002).

However, there has been a continued control and securitisation of remittances in many Western countries since 9/11, as well as a focus on the Somali Diaspora's political engagements through remittances, as remittances are seen to perpetuate conflicts by providing support for warring factions (Van Hear, 2003). Horst's (2008) analysis of transnational political engagement of Somalis in Norway shows that engagement takes place in at the sub-local level through channels such as the sub-clan, which then chooses whether to utilise the money for localised conflicts or humanitarian initiatives.

Transitional livelihood practices connect those in urban localities in the region to those that are in Somalia or in camps as well as those in the far Diaspora such as Europe and the Gulf, and in Somalia itself (Horst , 2006; Kleist, 2007; Lindley, 2007). While the emphasis tends to be on remitters in Western countries, there are significant amounts also from the Middle East and Africa (Al-Sharmani, 2008). What has not been adequately addressed in the literature so far are the multiple transnational sources and destinations of remittance money (Al-Sharmani, 2006). This holds implications for research on Somali migration, where people at the various stages of the migration process both send and receive money.

This is linked to transnational practices facilitating mobility. At the regional level, remittances can facilitate movement between Somalia and Kenya and the refugee camps to urban cities such as Nairobi (Lindley, 2007). Transitional networks assist mobility by providing information on these 'far away countries', but also provide the financial resources for migration and create the organisational

infrastructure to enable migration to Europe and North America through a variety of ways, such as official refugee resettlement or informal arrangements (Al-Sharmani, 2008).

Global mobility is encouraged by suggesting the gains that can be made for oneself and one's family overseas (Horst, 2006). Research on remittances in relation to the senders highlights that, though it is used to maintain relationships, it could also cause social difficulties on the sender and impact the livelihoods of those in the Diaspora (Horst, 2004; Hammond, 2008; Lindley, 2009). In order to lessen that burden, Somalis assist those who are dependent on them to migrate from the region (Horst, 2004).

1.7 EU policies towards migration and asylum

The move towards a more restrictive immigration and asylum policy in the EU can be witnessed when we analyze both individual states and the convergence of policies across Europe over the last two decades, such as the 2004 Hague Programme that aims to develop a common European asylum system. Such a move is seen as a reaction from governments in Europe against the rise in asylum applications in the 1980s and 1990s from countries suffering from civil conflict (particularly Somalia, Sri Lanka and the Balkan states).

This period saw high asylum rejection rates due in part to the changing nature of the wars in these countries and to the reaction by certain political parties and the media in several European countries, who saw the rise in asylum applications as an invasion of "bogus asylum seekers" (Welch and Schuster, 2005). As a result, European policies have become more restrictive towards asylum seekers, given the growing belief (or arguably construction) that few are genuine and that many or most are attempting to achieve refugee status through false claims that are economically motivated (Zimmerman, 2007).

Other fears around asylum seekers in Europe centres on the strain they put upon resources and the perceived potential threat they may pose to stability, identity and social cohesion (Castles: 2007). Whilst in reality, evidence points to the contrary, as asylum seekers and migrants have been found to contribute to the economy of destination countries by working in low-paid, low-status jobs which citizens are reluctant to accept (Castles, 2007).

Moreover, increasingly since 9/11 there has been a link connecting immigration with national security, in the migration security paradigm (Huysmans, 2000; Van Slaeem, 2003). To illustrate this, the July 2005 attacks and failed attempts in London have focused on immigration issues and a focus of securing undocumented entry. Even though it is recognised that none of the bombers were refugees or asylum seekers, as the alleged perpetrators of 7/7 bombings were all British nationals, and 3 of the 4 were born in

the United Kingdom (Collyer, 2006; Feller, 2007). Two of the suspected failed bombers in 21/7 were seen to have originally come from the Horn of Africa having arrived in the United Kingdom as asylum-seekers when they were children, and their subsequent links to extremism were honed and developed in the United Kingdom. Yet the categorization of the issue as an asylum issue enables frames and emphasises the notion of external threat. Collyer (2006) argues that despite the fact that there has been no connection between undocumented migration and terrorism the link could lead to blanket bans on all migrants from certain regions of the world. These aforementioned debates within the EU, the common migration policy highlights that it is indeed the case that asylum policies are being developed as a subset of migration policies built around trying to keep alleged threats out - and thus certain unwanted populations out.

As a result of these fears, the EU has focused on enhanced border controls, deterrence of arrivals and limitations on stay. Deterrence includes changing the visa regimes (asylum seekers have to apply for visas yet paradoxically visas are denied to those believed to be potential asylum seekers). In the campaign, Access to Protection in Europe (2007), the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) emphasises how the EU has in place a common list of 128 countries whose nationals are subject to obligatory visas for entry into its territory, including refugee-producing countries such as Somalia.

The outcome of this 'non-entrée' regime, where legal ways of entering the EU are cut off, increases the difficulty for migrants in real need of protection to enter the EU (Chimni, 1998). This in turn raises the EU's security concerns for such persons using the illegal 'migration industry', where people-smugglers and people-traffickers, as well as people issuing false documents, operate in the illegal market where the control of movements has become even more difficult (Castles, Crawley & Loughnan, 2003).

More recent studies point to severe conditions and crackdowns at the borders of Europe, particularly in Greece and Turkey. For example, in 2008, *Operation Poseidon* project implemented by Frontex, the EU agency for border security, intercepted some 29,000 around the Greek islands of the Aegean Sea (which included Afghans, Somalis, Sudanese and Ethiopians). The tension between Greece and Turkey over irregular land and sea border crossings is ongoing, and charges against both countries of harsh and dangerous treatment of migrants and refugees, as well as *refoulement* has been increasing. Through Frontex, the EU has provided many millions of Euros for a high tech securitization of these borders that includes a contract for IBM to equip Turkey "with radar and satellite surveillance systems and thermal cameras … [and] … areas near the border will be sprayed with phosphorus that is detectable on one's skin or clothing for three or four days" (Migreurop, 2009: 17). Serious criticism has also been leveled at the Dublin II policy that allows refugees and asylum seekers to be returned to Greece as their first country of entry to the EU, particularly because Greece is refusing to grant refugee status. For example, in 2007, of

25,113 asylum applications lodged in Greece, only 138 were granted by the first decision. In 2008, only 14 were granted refugee status out of 29,573 applications (see Human Rights Watch, 2008b; Amnesty International, 2009b; Amnesty International, 2010).

In most European countries from the late 1990s onwards, legislation concerning family reunification was severely tightened with DNA testing being introduced as were the laws for obtaining and keeping permanent residence cards, which changed from granting de-facto refugee status and replaced it with a protection status on humanitarian grounds. Changes in the law restricted the possibility of obtaining protection for people who risk direct prosecution, but did not include people who 'only' risk civil war related insecurities (Kleist, 2008). Many Somali asylum seekers thus became excluded from obtaining protection that they wanted in these countries.

Governments also emphasised the temporary nature of refugee status and that people could be sent back if the situation in their home country changed before they obtained a permanent residence permit (Kleist, 2007). With the changing laws, accessing the asylum procedures saw a decrease in the positive reception of Somali claims. New systems, such as fast tracking claims, also lead to high refusal rates for Somali asylum claimants.

Human rights groups have called into question the forcible return of Somali failed asylum seekers to Mogadishu over the last couple of years in several countries. Those who enter clandestinely and claim asylum late after arrival are penalised for this and risk automatic refusal or little welfare assistance whilst their cases are decided (Refugee Council, 2008).

Given Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) membership and its position as an external border, the EU agenda has also started to play a very influential role in shaping Turkey's asylum and immigration policies. In 8 March 2001, the European Commission adopted the *Accession Partnership Document* with Turkey, which set out some of the reforms that Turkey must undertake in order to be considered for EU membership.[10] In relation to migration, the main conditions were that Turkey should:

- Align visa policies with that of the EU.
- Adopt and implement EU practices on migration, including admission, readmission and expulsion in order to prevent illegal migration.
- Strengthen border management and prepare for implementation of the Schengen system.

10 Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (2001/235/EC) OJ L 85/13 24/03/2001.

- Lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention and develop accommodation facilities and support to refugees.

In response to the Accession Partnership document, on 19 March 2001, the Turkish Parliament adopted the *National Program of Action for the Adoption of the EU Acquis* (NPAA). Under the section dealing with issues related to migration (Section 4.25 Justice and Home Affairs), Turkey agreed to take several measures regarding border control, visa regulations and its asylum system. In January 2005 the Turkish government also adopted a *National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration* (NAP) where the government confirmed the measures that would be undertaken to align asylum policy and practice with EU standards, including administrative and technical capacity development, training of specialized staff and changes in legislation. In both documents though, the only critical issue left open is that of lifting the 'geographical limitation'.

Potential refugee movements to Turkey continue to be perceived as a matter directly affecting national security (i.e. the aforementioned 'economic, social and cultural conditions of Turkey'). The reason asylum poses a 'security problem', the Turkish authorities argue, is that there is simply no capacity to carry out status determination and refugee integration bureaucratically, organizationally or socio-economically (Kirişçi 2001). Since the early 1950s, Turkish governments have been aware of the highly unstable situation in the neighboring Middle Eastern countries. The political unrest in the Middle East following the end of the 2nd World War, primarily the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbors including Syria that displaced over half a million of Palestinians, has made Turkey fear that it would have to shoulder an enormous population displacement (ibid.). With current developments in Iran and Iraq, these concerns have only been exacerbated.

Turkey's geographical terrain facilitates illegal entry and exit of the country and the extent of transit migration through Turkey is a well-documented phenomenon (İçduygu 2000, 2003, 2005, Duvell 2006, Manneart 2003). Therefore, European concerns over transit migration have had a clear effect in shaping Turkey's EU membership conditions.

Turkey's awareness of these European concerns is also precisely why, in both the NPAA and NAP, the removal of the geographical limitation is conditioned on 'burden-sharing' and the success of the EU Accession negotiations. There is a clear EU trend in pursuing increasingly exclusive immigration policies, with some countries taking up a 'zero immigration' policy. Therefore, as borders get more difficult to cross, many migrants trying to make their way into Europe are becoming stuck in peripheral zones such as Turkey. This is not necessarily limited to so-called 'illegal' or 'irregular' migrants. For instance in Turkey, all non-European refugees who wait several years before their applications and resettlement is finalized, may also be considered 'transit migrants' (İçduygu 1996). Some of them may also drift into

'illegality', a consequence of the uncertainties of the UNHCR asylum application process and indefinite waiting periods for results, not to mention the difficult living conditions in Turkey, which will be described below. Some, on the other hand, wait patiently to be resettled. But zero-immigration policies also have a bearing on refugee resettlement rates. For instance, each year fewer European countries accept refugees from Turkey and their quota levels are extremely low. In that sense, for many migrants and refugees, who have no means or intention of going back where they came from, or of legally moving forward into Europe, the supposedly transit state, is becoming permanent (Brewer & Yükseker 2006). These realities continue to feed into Turkish perceptions that they are the EU's new 'dumping ground', and constitute a powerful line of reasoning behind Turkey's reluctance to change its asylum regime. Furthermore, there are so many contradictions and uncertainties in Turkey's journey towards EU membership that this realization has perhaps led the Turkish authorities to hold onto the 'geographical limitation' issue as a bargaining chip.

1.8 International migration policies

The more recent development in intensifying the restrictions to Europe and deterring illegal entry developed mainly after 9/11. It is described amongst scholars as the 'new asylum paradigm' (Schuster, 2005) or the 'externalisation of EU asylum policy' (Betts, 2006). The two main ideas have been to link readmission agreements to aid and to ensure cooperation with countries of origin and transit in border control and joint management of illegal migration (Boswell, 2003). This facilitates the repatriation of illegal immigrants, including failed asylum seekers, to their countries of origin in cooperation with the affected countries and the detection of illegal migrants before they enter the EU via transit processing centres, thus making countries of origin more responsible (Schuster, 2005). However, as Betts and Milner (2006) argue such measures have led to an erosion of the asylum institution. These 'new' initiatives are highly Eurocentric and have been conceived in a non-participatory way, systematically excluding African states (ibid). While there has been a positive move in 'addressing the root causes' of migration (Boswell, 2003), such practices highlight that the focus has been on the basis of control and contain.

Somalis have been a focus of the EU's High Level Working Group migration (HLWG), in which Somalia was one of the chosen counties to deal with migration through comprehensive 'action plan' policies that link foreign policy and development, so as to influence the target country's policies on human rights, democratisation, poverty, asylum and migration. These policies were criticised for being static action paper documents driven by migration concerns (Gent, 2002). Somalia was also the focus in the controversial 2004 UK Home Office's proposal of setting up camps in Tanzania to receive rejected Somali asylum seekers, which Tanzania rejected because the country already hosts a large number of refugees (Schuster, 2005).

1.9 Containment and externalising refugee protection

The emphasis on protracted refugee situations in the regions of origin came about as a lack of protection, which was the cause of irregular secondary movement of refugees from the first country of asylum. Policy initiatives and international co-operation have focused on dealing with protection in the region of origin, both the Convention and initiatives. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Somali Refugees (CPA) aimed to improve refugee protection and to facilitate the resolution of refugee problems through multilateral special agreements. The CPA was initiated in 2004 as a partnership between the UNHCR, the European Commission, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in collaboration with the Somali authorities and regional host states with an aim to provide space for effective protection of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons through an integrated approach to three of the durable solutions to refugee displacement: repatriation, local integration and resettlement.

However, Kagwanja and Juma (2008) highlight that in light of the constant conflict in southern Somalia, voluntary repatriation has been hindered, as has the implementation of durable solutions for the internally displaced. In addition, Somali refugees' access to local integration has had extremely limited success. Despite the rhetoric, the scope of resettlement schemes in several EU states with significant Somali populations has also been narrow and very selective to those considered minority groups.

On the other hand, the CPA for Somali refugees made reference to the need to address protracted refugee situations on the grounds of national and international security. Betts (2006) argues that this ‘link’ poses the dilemma of potentially reinforcing a discourse of securitisation in relation to refugees and asylum seekers. Kagwanja and Juma (2008) point out that, in the context of growing xenophobic perceptions of refugees of Somali origins regionally and globally, the CPA is increasingly viewed as a tool of containing Somalis. This is echoed by Schuster (2005), who argues that such initiatives are political and are about keeping people as close as possible to their country of origin. This leaves regional governments apprehensive about the North undermining burden-sharing, leaving responsibilities for refugees in the hands of poorer states like Kenya (Kagwanja and Juma, 2008).

African states themselves face huge economic, social and security constraints in granting asylum, which are not taken into account by the EU policies (Betts and Milner: 2006). Instead of 'burden sharing' concerning refugees, policies of 'burden shifting' are promoted through the externalisation of asylum, and African countries are seen as failing to uphold their responsibilities (Schuster, 2005; Betts and Milner, 2006). There is a discrepancy between the intentions of such frameworks as the Convention Plus and comprehensive approach on linking migration and foreign relations and its practical implication, which appears to be preoccupied with control issues (Niessen, 2003).

The trend of discouraging "secondary movements" from first asylum countries to western states, which is one of the imperatives driving Convention Plus for Somali's is not favourable since they can curtail what may be vital sources of families' livelihood portfolios (Van Hear, 2006).

2.0 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF TRAVEL ROUTES AND CONDITIONS IN COUNTRIES OF ARRIVAL

The following is an overview of the known travel routes taken by Somalis and Ethiopians, principally on their way to Europe, but including the southern route to South Africa and the North Western route to Kenya, Sudan and Libya. The route through Somalia across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen and to Turkey will follow as an introduction to the results of the current study of that route. Accurate information on migratory routes is difficult to obtain, as they change regularly, depending on resources and opportunities available to the individual migrants and asylum seekers as well as on the policy responses of authorities, in particular on border control regulations and practices. It should be noted, however, that policy measures such as increased attention to border control has not noticeably reduced numbers of migrants and refugees, though restrictive policies do cause routes to shift and increase risks to smugglers, who often respond by increasing fees (ICMPD, 2007).

Somali and Ethiopian migrant and refugee flows follow a number of paths. Journeys do not typically occur all in one stage. Transit points, or hubs, play an extraordinarily important role in shaping the trajectories of the journeys. Migrants and refugees may stay for quite some time in a hub, considering options, making contacts, gathering information and earning money for the onward journey. Intended paths may change due to new information gathered, or a migrant may decide to remain in the transit point.

2.1 Europe

Routes to Europe

Most journeys of Somali migration to Europe are not direct and consist of multiple steps (Moret et al., 2006). Migration routes to Europe are constantly shifting and new routes emerge despite the focus on border regulations and restrictive policies (Refugee Council: 2008; ICMP, 2007). This highlights that border controls have had little impact on numbers, as potential migrants shift routes rather than stay put.

However, tighter border controls have increased travel dangers and physical risks for smugglers, which end up driving up prices for smuggling (Refugee Council, 2008). The growth of the scope of migration controls at national and international levels produces a constant re-design of the different routes taken by

migrants (Monzini, 2007). In the literature there are several routes indentified with Somali migration to Europe and their dangers. The journeys often involve a mixture of air, maritime and land routes to reach a desired destination in Europe.

Routes within Europe are not really documented as thoroughly as routes that lead to Europe. The general trend that appears is once they reach an EU country, they continue overland, making use of various modes of transportation (such as road) to reach their destined country. (Van Liempt, 2007).

***Air Routes to Europe*:** The easiest and safest way to reach Europe is via plane, which in other studies has been argued is the most used route for Somalis (Van Leimpt, 2007; Moert et al. 2006; ICMP, 2007). Van Leimpt's case study (2007) indicates how most of Somali migrants interviewed arrived via plane, transiting through other European cities, particularly Paris, Brussels, Frankfurt and Rome, and then by land to the Netherlands. Moert et al's (2006) study also confirmed that the country of initial arrival is not always the intended one, and that the rest of the journey is completed by land.

This route is also the most expensive option; for a trip from Somalia to the Netherlands the indicated quoted amount ranged from US$ 1,000 in the early 1990s to US$ 7,000 post 9/11. Interestingly, despite the high costs of smuggling by air, it seems that it is the favoured route for Somalis, because it is quicker and families often provide financial assistance to help pay for the costs (ICMP, 2007). Using this method often involves borrowing or renting 'look-a-like' passports from friends or families. Another method is to use an identity that falsely relates the migrant to the smuggler (e.g. parent-child or sibling). In this case, the smuggler accompanies the migrant on the journey, holds the travel documents and takes care of any contact with border officials (Van Liempt, 2007).

***East African Land Route to Europe*:** This route leads through East Africa via Sudan, Chad and Libya to the Mediterranean Sea. This route incorporates several branches and a variety of hubs where branches meet. Migrants coming from Somalia usually gather in Addis Ababa and continue towards Al Qadarif and Kassala in Sudan (where Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees join the flow) then to Khartoum and Selima, entering Libya from the south-east then head towards the city of Al Jawf (Simon, 2006). They transit through Al Jawf and Kufra (where migrants report being dropped outside of town to avoid law enforcement authorities, and where they may stay for some days before moving on to other points in Libya, typically Benghazi or Tripoli) (ICMPD: 2007) from where they cross Libya on their way to the northern coast (Van Moppes, 2006; Hamood, 2006; ICMP, 2007).

However, some of the migrants stay in Libya whilst others carry on their journeys towards departure areas in northern Libya, where they attempt a crossing to Malta or Italy (Simon, 2006; ICMP, 2007). Migrants

originating from Somalia heading towards Europe also use Egypt as a transit country, although Libya remains their main country of transit (Simon, 2006; Hamood, 2006). Some Somalis enter Egypt after travelling by plane with visas purchased by family members (Nassar, 2008). From Egypt they can go further north by boat or by land towards Turkey (Simon, 2006). The transnational nature of the Somali community is utilised by the women interviewed in Al-Sharmani's (2006) study. She found that many of them saw in Cairo an opportunity to establish middle-class lives based on small transnational businesses. As earners, they were able to provide for and coordinate the migration of other family members from Somalia to destinations within the transnational family network, and to send remittances to family members still in Somalia. Most of these families were headed by women who relocated to Cairo in an attempt to gain legal security and expand family livelihood resources. Horwood also noted the success of many Somalis in South Africa in setting up small businesses.

The improved class status of the women in Al Sharmani's study allowed them to take on important roles in the creation of a unified Somali community, providing employment opportunities and community support to, and activism on behalf of, recently arrived and more vulnerable refugees (Al-Sharmani, 2006: 3, 5). This push to activism also manifested in the 2005 protests by hundreds of Somali refugees outside the UNHCR headquarters in Sana'a, Yemen, in which they demanded better living conditions in Yemen or resettlement to a third country (de Regt, 2007). In response, the Yemeni government pledged to open six permanent registration centers as a means to issue more IDs, thus improving access to vital services.

The East Africa route is characterised by long and extremely perilous desert crossings (Hamood, 2006). The journeys usually take place in overcrowded pick-up lorries covering a considerable distance across the desert carrying anything from 25 to 45 people squeezed tightly (ibid). Most migrants would complete their journey on foot. Often water supplies are strictly rationed and as a result migrants reported starvation and thirst leading to death of some of their fellow passengers (ibid).

The quoted smuggling fees for a desert trip range from US$60-180 and up to US$1,000 (ICMP, 2007). Somalis make use of smugglers to avoid arrest and detention (Hamood, 2006). However, there have also been reports that smugglers also bring about a certain number of risks themselves, including abandoning people in a country after stealing their belongings (ibid).

Despite the grave dangers in long desert crossings, little attention is paid in Europe regarding this stage of the journey, especially when many migrants described the serious risks they undergo to seek protection in Europe (ibid). Others report to reaching Cairo from Libya, KSA and Yemen. Some also choose Egypt as a transit point, travelling along the Red Sea from Eritrea to Cairo. (Al-Sharmani, 2006: 3).

While there is much less information available on this route, Addis Ababa is an important starting and gathering point for Ethiopians travelling through Sudan, Chad and Libya, to the Mediterranean (ICMPD, 2007: 24). Kassala in Sudan, is noted as a major point of entry for Ethiopians.

Somalis complain of racism and discrimination in many countries of transit. As example, in Libya, Somalis, like many other sub-Sahara African migrants, are subject to racism, the constant risk of detention and ill-treatment, and possible deportation to their country of origin (Hamood, 2006). This comes about due to the distinction between refugees and migrants under Libyan law and the absence of an asylum policy that means that people are effectively denied the right to seek asylum in the country, resulting in a lack of adequate protection. Interviewees in Hamood's study made reference to racism from Libyans and the Libyan security forces as one of the aspects which made their life there principally difficult. They also suffered from unclear state policies towards refugees, which left many with an irregular or ambiguous legal status, adding to their sense of vulnerability. For some, their experiences in Libya pushed them to continue their journey and seek a more secure and stable life elsewhere, specifically in Europe.

Estimates put the number of Somali refugees in the Middle East (mainly in Yemen, KSA, Libya and Egypt) at approximately 75,000 (Al-Sharmani, 2009: 3), but information on Somalis living in most of these countries is scarce. There is some information available on Egypt, and the Somali refugee population in Cairo is sizable 3,609 in 2006, according to Al-Sharmani.

***Mediterranean Sea Route to Europe*:** The East Africa route meets the Mediterranean Sea route departing from Libya and Egypt. In Libya, migrants gather in temporary accommodations called *hawsh*, where they may stay for anywhere up to a few months waiting for passage across the Mediterranean. Boats from Libya disembark in Malta, Pantelleria and Lampedusa, while those from Egypt typically head for Sicily, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The main points of arrival in Europe for Somalis are Sicily, Malta and the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria and Linosa. Boats are overcrowded and often unseaworthy, and trips may last anywhere from one to several days. Costs for a trip from Libya to Italy range from 1,000 to 5,000 USD (IMPD, 2007). Joint Italian-Libyan patrols were instituted in 2009 with the goal of returning all boats carrying irregular migrants back to Libya.

MAP 2:

Red Sea Route to Europe: Travel is via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to Italy and Malta once an option is now rarely used. (ICMP, 2007)

The dangers of the Mediterranean Sea routes are also well documented; by their very nature most take place in conditions of poor, overcrowded conditions on boats. Smugglers squeeze in as many passengers as possible into each boat, which varies between 20 and 199. While a direct and straight-forward journey by boat can take just 27 hours, for others the journey lasts for days.

Mozzine (2007) observes that some policies are considered effective when they lead to the closure of a migration route. With the closure of one migration route however, new routes are formed which are more dangerous because of the way they are managed, hence the increase in the number of dead migrants. By 2008, over 11,000 people had died along European borders, although this number does not account for undocumented deaths (United Against Racism: 7 May 2008). Death on these journeys is frequent; Hamood's study (ibid) reports respondents having to throw bodies overboard to create much-needed space on the overcrowded boats. Smugglers also endanger people by not taking them to their country of destination (e.g. Greece or Italy), leaving them instead off the Turkish coast. These practices are frequent when migrants pay smugglers before travelling (ibid).

2.2 South Africa

Estimates from August 2008 put the number of Somalis living in South Africa at 25,000; 95 percent of whom entered through irregular means but immediately applied for asylum or refugee status upon arriving (Horwood 2009: 34). It is important to note that this number did not change significantly from June 2006, indicating that many people chose to leave South Africa for further destinations, largely to Europe and North America (Horwood, 2009: 34). Horwood notes that a significant number of Somali migrants to South Africa chose to return 'home' to Kenya to escape rampant crime and to try to establish themselves there.

Routes of travel

Modes of travel include a combination of air, boat, vehicle and foot passage, depending on the resources available and the environmental and security conditions along the way. 10 percent of those interviewed by Horwood used air travel as part of their journey, typically from Nairobi to a capital close to South Africa. 33 percent travelled at some point of their journey by sea (typically in small overloaded boats with little food or water, and exposed to the elements, though incidences of abuse, drowning and abandonment were not reported). 93 percent reported using overland routes for some or all of their journeys, some of that on foot. Few migrants travel the most direct route, and countries involved in the journey include Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. 80 percent crossed into South Africa from Mozambique, and the rest from Zimbabwe.

Journeys involving no air travel are comparatively affordable, but the long (and potentially dangerous) land journey means that more men than women (or families) attempt this route (Moret et al., 2006). High incidence rates of sexual assault and rape discourage women from taking this route, and what few women do make the trip to South Africa typically do it by air (Horwood 2009: 35 & 62; Moret et. al., 2006: 85-86). Horwood notes that Somalis smuggled to South Africa are mostly males between the ages of 16 and 40 (Horwood, 2009: 35).

80 percent of Somali migrants travelling south pass through camps in Malawi, which has allowed researchers to estimate that 17,000-20,000 irregular migrants make use of smugglers on their way to South Africa each year (this includes only male migrants) (Horwood, 2009: 7). Migrants using smugglers to reach South Africa reported paying initial smuggling fees, plus additional bribes, unforeseen smuggling costs and official fines.

The trip from Somalia and/or Ethiopia to South Africa typically takes seven to eight weeks, and is often characterized by widespread deception on the part of smugglers, in addition to robbery, sexual abuse,

violence, hunger, imprisonment, and abandonment (Horwood, 2009). Some of these abuses are reported to be perpetrated by state and local officials. Travel is typically done by night, travellers are often made to endure cramped living and travelling spaces (sometimes in closed containers), and provision of food, water, health and sanitation facilities is minimal. Arrests are not uncommon, and bribes were reportedly paid to local officials. Due to a general lack of legislative framework and the participation of corrupt officials, smugglers remain largely untouched by law enforcement (Horwood, 2009: 8).

Many migrants and refugees are sponsored and received by relatives in South Africa, with who they may be in contact throughout the journey (Horwood, 2009: 29). Clan systems are strong, and new arrivals receive support from clan members. Some travelling to South Africa intend to stay to take advantage of the country's relatively new refugee policy. Yet a network of skilled forgers and well-connected intermediaries make South Africa a popular transit point for those wishing to obtain documents that will allow them to continue their journey to Europe (typically the UK), North America or Australia (Horwood, 2009: 38).

In 2009 there were an estimated 45,000-50,000 Ethiopians residing in South Africa, and this number was increasing steadily, largely due to the success of the smuggling trade. 95 percent of new arrivals are thought to enter through irregular means, many applying for refugee status once inside the country. Ethiopians make up an estimated two-thirds of this flow of smuggled migrants. UNHCR estimates put the number of Ethiopian refugees in South Africa in January 2010 at 2,560, while estimates of asylum seekers were much higher, at 12,370 (UNHCR, 2010: 1).[11]

Irregular migrants from the Horn to South Africa typically use smugglers to organize the journey, and are often sponsored and received by relatives in South Africa who remain in contact with them along the journey (Horwood, 2009: 29). The smuggler is also usually someone known to the sponsor, with whom he typically shares clan or ethnic ties. The journey takes an average of seven to eight weeks, and costs an average of US $2,000, though the added cost of bribes along the way adds a significant amount to the total. The whole amount must be paid to the smuggler in advance, usually in Addis Ababa or Nairobi, where the plans are made. Most migrants and refugees who choose to make this overland journey are young men between the ages of 18 and 35, and the majority of Ethiopians interviewed came from Kembata and Gurage communities in the south of the country.

[11] The number of refugees is projected to decrease slightly over the net two years, while that of asylum seekers is projected to decrease to 12,370 by December 2011.

MAP 3: Routes to South Africa (Horwood 2009)

In Horwood's study, 5 percent of those interviewed flew directly to South Africa, while 39 percent used air transport for part of the journey (some from Addis Ababa to Nairobi, though most from Nairobi to a capital close to South Africa). 33 percent travelled in part by sea, and 89 percent went all or in part by land (Horwood, 2009: 42-49). 60 percent crossed into South Africa from Mozambique, while the rest came through Zimbabwe (See Map 3)

For Ethiopians, the voyage is most often organized in Addis Ababa, from where migrants travel through Moyale/Mandera or Dila to Nairobi. Most enter Kenya by foot, truck or bus, and must pay a bribe of

approximately US $300 to cross the border. Those who haven't finalized their plans tend to do so in Nairobi, where they are able to make contact with major smuggling operations and procure the necessary documentation. There is a sizeable Ethiopian community in Nairobi where migrants may procure information and advice. After leaving Kenya, most travel to Tanzania, either by boat or through the Taveta and Namanga border areas. Some choose Uganda instead, due to high levels of violence in Tanzania. From Tanzania, migrants travel either to Malawi and Mozambique, or directly through Mozambique to the Maputo area and into South Africa. Yet others choose to go through Zambia and Zimbabwe to the Limpapo/Beitbridge crossing (Horwood, 2009: 50-51). The journey is long and often hazardous. 35 percent of Ethiopians interviewed reported being beaten or robbed at least once.

Life in South Africa

While South Africa prides itself on welcoming migrants, the reality is that many are faced with rampant criminal violence and prejudice (Horwood, 2009: 10). Horwood characterizes the journey of irregular migrants and refugees travelling this route as taking place in a "human rights vacuum," where irregular migrants are viewed as criminals undeserving of protection. Additionally, Somalis have a history of victimization by violence (particularly xenophobic violence) in South Africa. And widespread corruption and lack of implementation measures mean that the promise of South Africa's new refugee regime has yet to reach many of those it is meant to protect.

Once in South Africa, most take advantage of the South African asylum system and register immediately. Those with relatives present often start working soon after their arrival, while others may find jobs in the informal sector as street vendors. Opportunities and protections do exist in South Africa, though the majority of migrants still plan to move on. A significant number do make it to the West, either by direct flight, or by more convoluted routes through Brazil, Mexico or the Caribbean and on to the United States (Horwood, 2009: 104). Innovative methods used to reach Europe and America include enrolment in false conferences, or scholarships for study.

Those who remain in South Africa often find themselves the targets of attacks motivated by jealousy or xenophobia. Harassment is common, and complaints are often met with indifference from the authorities. Extensive backlogs in the asylum process are also a common problem. Yet motivations to stay are many. Some realize that they lack the necessary funds or documentation for further travel, while others attain sufficient prosperity in South Africa to justify staying. Yet others trust in the asylum process to eventually resettle them to a third country. Regardless of whether migrants and refugees view South Africa as a transit point or destination, it is becoming an increasingly important hub for asylum activity.

2.3 Turkey

Route to Turkey

Generally known as a migrant-sending country, in the last two decades Turkey has increasingly evolved into a migrant- receiving and transit country (İçduygu 2000, 1995; Kirişçi 2007). Since the 1980s, indeed, Turkey has found itself on various migratory routes, receiving a steady influx of migrants from the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe and parts of Africa. Located in the center of a troubled region, Turkey has received thousands of asylum seekers fleeing from several major wars, including the Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most recently refugees from countries such as Somalia and Sudan. Several reasons might account for this increase. First, Turkey is seen as one of the few stable countries in the region. Second, Turkey's is situated at an important transit point on the migratory routes to Europe from Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

As explained below, the route from Somalia to Turkey is partly shrouded in mystery. It is clear that both Somalis and Ethiopians find the way clear to obtain either false or genuine visas in order to fly directly to Istanbul. Similarly there is ample evidence that Istanbul is also accessible directly from the Gulf States, particularly for Somalis in Saudi Arabia and for Ethiopians in Dubai. The land route, however is far more complex – from Yemen by road many are smuggled in 4-wheel drive vehicles and mini vans into Saudi Arabia along the desert coast of the Red Sea to Jeddah, where is there is a long-standing Somali community, most who live in poor areas. From Jeddah, there are smugglers who will arrange to have women and children on their passports and travel with them by air, or by land through Jordan, to Syria. From Syria, the sparsely populated agricultural areas bordering Turkey south-east region of Hatay are quite porous and many walk across. Those who are apprehended in Hatay may be sent back into Syria or placed into detention there and later released as asylum seekers to be relegated to one of the satellite cities.

Evidence from this MMTF study shows a multifaceted set of routes to Turkey, with both Somalis and Ethiopians flying direct from their respective countries to Jordan, going overland by car to Syria, then Turkey. Many Ethiopians either flew or went overland to Sudan and from there, either by bus to Cairo, by air to Syria or by air to Istanbul. Some flew all the way - directly to Yemen, to Syria to Turkey. By air, respondents claimed to have reached Turkey directly from Aden, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Dubai, Khartoum, Nairobi, and one from Malaysia. Before reaching Turkey, some respondents reached Syria by air from Beirut, Dubai, Jeddah, Amman, Khartoum and Aden. From Sudan, some claimed they travelled by car or walked to Libya and then, by boat, managed to get to Turkey (precise details of this sea journey are unknown) (See Map 4).

MAP 4: Routes to Turkey

Air

Land and Sea



Life in Turkey

Turkey is one of the few remaining countries in the world to maintain the 'geographical limitation' in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.[12] Turkey, in fact, grants asylum only to refugees who have European origins, whereas non-European refugees are granted only temporary asylum in Turkey until a 'durable solution' has been found. Security considerations, proximity to countries on its Southern and Eastern borders marked by instability, and fears over becoming the European Union's 'dumping ground,' are key factors promoting reservations over the removal of the 'geographic limitation' (Kirişçi 1996, 2001b, 2002, 2004). However, this measure has in no way prevented the increasing numbers of non-European refugees from coming into Turkey to seek asylum. Instead, Turkey has become an attractive destination hosting one of the largest refugee resettlement programs in the world, both through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and through private sponsorship programs to Canada, Australia, and the US.

Although Turkey does not accept non-European refugees on a *de jure* basis, it is the *de facto* situation that almost all asylum applications in the country are made by non-Europeans (Icduygu, 2008). Up until 2000, most asylum seekers in Turkey were from Iran and Iraq; today however, the groups of asylum seekers have diversified to some extent, being represented by more than 30 countries. In 2000, nearly 4,000 Iranians and over 1,700 Iraqis sought asylum in Turkey. From 2000 onwards these figures declined. Whereas the approximate annual number of asylum seekers towards the end of the 1990s was 6,000 this figure dropped to below 4,000 by the mid-2000s. In 2007 and 2008, however, a notable increase was observed in the number of asylum seekers as 7,600 Iraqis and 2,580 Africans arrived in Turkey. In 2008, Iraqis filed more than 50 percent of all asylum applications; Afghans and Iranians each filled approximately 20 percent, while other nationalities, such as Somalis, Sudanese, Congolese (DR Congo), Eritreans and Ethiopians, filled the remaining 10 percent.

Total rates of refugee recognition by the UNHCR in Turkey are relatively high compared to most European countries. Between 1997 and 2007, a total of more than 50,000 asylum applications were received and about 25,000 of them were recognised as refugees (Icduygu and Kirisci, 2009: 9). The overwhelming majority of those recognised as refugees continue to be resettled in third countries, mainly Canada, Australia and the USA. Those whose applications are rejected are supposed to be deported to their countries of origin, but many go underground and stay in Turkey or try to move on to European countries illegally (Icduygu and Kirisci, 2009: 9).

12 According to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2002, these countries are Congo, Madagascar, Monaco and Turkey.

Though non-European refugees in Turkey remain in the country only temporarily, the length of this period is highly variable. All Iraqi refugees (apart from Northern Iraq) and Iranian Baha'i refugees are subject to an accelerated Refugee Status Determination procedure. Therefore, between each step (which includes registration, first instance interview, appeal interview if rejected, and finally resettlement interview if recognised) they generally only wait a few months. Almost all other groups (unless they are vulnerable, such as single women, mothers or unaccompanied minors), however, can wait up to a year between each step. With rejections and appeals, the entire process can take between three to five years, or even more (Biehl, 2008).

Furthermore, during this lengthy and uncertain waiting period, asylum seekers must abide by the strict Turkish regulations on asylum. Like all foreigners in Turkey, asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey are also bound by the *Law on the Sojourn and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey.* However, there is a special provision under this law which states that refugees can only reside in locations permitted by the Ministry of Interior (Article 17), which are referred to as "Satellite Cities".[13] These cities are generally located in the lesser developed Central and Eastern Anatolian regions of Turkey. However, most refugees have minimum resources and few, if any, supportive networks in these cities, so many opt for a life of 'illegality' in Turkey's major cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir instead (Biehl, 2008). Despite the serious dangers involved, trying to enter Europe with the help of human smugglers also becomes a much more attractive prospect.

Until recently, the only law on immigration and asylum in Turkey was the Law on Settlement (aw 2510), which was adopted in 1934. During the early years of the Republic, this law served as a tool for the construction of a new and homogenous Turkish national identity, as it only allowed immigrants or refugees of Turkish descent/ethnicity and culture to settle and integrate in Turkey (Kirişçi 2003). According to Article 3 of this law, a 'refugee' was a person who had arrived to seek asylum as a result of compulsion and who had the intention of staying in Turkey temporarily. Those of 'Turkish descent and culture' on the other hand, could decide to settle permanently.

After signing and ratifying the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey was forced to revise this narrow definition of a 'refugee'. Nevertheless, by holding onto the 'geographical limitation', the Turkish authorities were able to maintain a selective criteria, by only allowing refugees of 'European origin' to seek asylum and settle in Turkey.[14]

[13] These cities are Adana, Afyon, Ağrı, Aksaray, Bilecik, Burdur, Çankırı, Çorum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hakkari, Hatay, Isparta, Maraş, Karamam, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Kırıkkale, Kırşehir, Konya, Kütahya, Mersin, Nevşehir, Niğde, Sivas, Şırnak, Tokat, Van and Yozgat. Asylum seekers are not issued residence permits for Istanbul unless there are critical circumstances related to health or safety that requires them to live there.

[14] It should be stated that in practice, 'European' refugees are also rarely granted permanent settlement. For instance, almost all the 'European' refugees coming to Turkey, the major groups being the Bulgarians in 1989, the Bosnians in 1997, and the Kosovars in 1999, were either allowed to stay temporarily on an unofficial basis (as 'guests')[14] or those who had 'Turkish

The first national regulation on asylum in Turkey was developed in 1994, when the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which is responsible for all dealings with foreigners in Turkey, rapidly prepared Turkey's first national regulation pertaining to asylum seekers and refugees, entitled 'Regulations on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Mass Influx and the Foreigners Arriving in Turkey or Requesting Residence Permits with the Intention of Seeking Asylum from a Third Country'. The 1994 Regulation was intended to bring status determination under the control of the Turkish authorities and to introduce strict procedures for asylum applicants. Accordingly, all non-European refugees who arrived in Turkey and applied to UNHCR with a view towards being resettled in a third country were required to file a separate 'temporary asylum' claim with the Turkish government. This procedure has come to be termed the 'dual procedure' because even though the examination criteria are exactly the same (i.e. whether or not there is 'well-founded fear of persecution' based on one or more of the five Convention grounds), the Turkish procedure grants non-European asylum seekers the status of 'asylum seeker' (hence the right to temporarily reside in Turkey), whereas the UNHCR application grants the status of 'refugee' (hence the right to seek third-country resettlement).

In June 2006, the MOI introduced the 'Implementation Directive' to provide very detailed instructions for the General Directorate of Security personnel on the implementation of the 1994 Regulation, such as formally defining the procedures of seeking 'temporary asylum' and the specific rights, benefits and obligations of 'temporary asylum seekers'.[15]

The primary obligation of all asylum seekers in Turkey, and the condition on which they have access to other rights, is that they must reside in places designated by the Ministry of Interior named 'satellite cities.' All asylum seekers are obligated to pursue their temporary asylum requests with the 'Foreigners Police' in the province that they were assigned to and where they must reside until their asylum application has been finalized. Once they have registered and provided their fingerprints, asylum seekers must also regularly go to the local police to give their signature documenting that they are residing in the city. The frequency of these signatures is somewhat arbitrary, but generally all family members are required to sign in every day or every other day. Asylum seekers and refugees who want to leave their city of residence to travel temporarily to another place must apply for a 'temporary leave permit'.[16] As with the signature procedure, the practice can be quite arbitrary. The lengths of temporary leave allowed may be between 2 to 15 days, and are generally only granted if the person concerned has an appointment with UNHCR, a legal representative or a doctor. Generally asylum applicants do not have a say in the city

descent' were allowed to benefit from the Law on Settlement. Hence, to date there are actually very few officially recognized 'European refugees' in Turkey. The number of people who are recognized as 'refugees' by the Turkish state is said to be around only 30 people (20 of them Chechen, some Azeris).

[15] Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Security Circular No.57, "Implementation Directive," June 22, 2006 ("2006 Circular")

16 Section 17.

that they will be assigned to. One may apply to be transferred to another satellite city only if he/she has a relative elsewhere or has health problems, which cannot be treated in the city of residence.

All social, medical and economic rights of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey are dependent upon holding a valid residence permit. However, obtaining residence permits is a costly procedure,[17] which many refugees and asylum seekers are unable to afford. There is a law, which allows for residence fee exemptions for people who are destitute.[18] Yet, it has become known that the practice is highly discretionary and that local authorities are generally reluctant to allow any exemptions (Icduygu and Biehl, 2009: 20). The foreigners' police in most satellite cities do not force refugees to obtain a residence permit. But this does not mean that refugees are simply excused for living in Turkey 'illegally'. If, or when, an asylum seeker finds the means to obtain a residence permit, on top of the expected costs, he or she must pay an additional fine that corresponds to the length of time they have spent in Turkey without a residence permit. These fees can reach exorbitant levels. And unless these fees are paid, even recognized refugees, who have been accepted to a third country for resettlement, are denied an 'exit permit' to leave the country.

According to Turkey's Law on the 'Work Permits for Foreigners' (Law No. 4817), which has been in force since September 2003, asylum seekers and refugees are allowed to apply for work permits from the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 'so that during their stay in our country, they may contribute to the national economy and become self-sustainable'. First, though, the applicant must acquire a residence permit that is valid for at least 6 months, a process which involves its own difficulties that will be described below. Second, the applicant must have found an employer interested in hiring, and willing to pay for application and extra taxes. Local unemployment levels in most satellite cities are already high, hence working opportunities for asylum seekers and refugees, who generally do not speak Turkish very well, are scant. Hence, it would be rare to come across an employer willing to go through such costly and complicated procedures. More importantly though, most asylum seekers are uninformed about this right or local police are unwilling to grant it. For the reasons explained above, getting formal work is extremely difficult for most refugees living in satellite cities. Some are able to find informal work, but there are many instances where they are exploited and not paid for their labor.

There are no particular public assistance programs in Turkey specifically targeted at migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. The *Law on the Encouragement of Social Assistance and Solidarity* (numbered 3294, dated May 1986) foresees the establishment of the *Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation* (SASF), which is responsible for the distribution of social funds to poor and disadvantaged groups. This

17 In 2009, the cost of a one-month, 6 month, 1 year and 5 year residence permit was set at 70, 306, 636 and 2890 Turkish Lira respectively

18 The Law on the Travel and Residence of Foreigners in Turkey (No. 5683), Article 88b

law covers both citizens and non-citizens alike, and states that social assistance services, including in health, education, shelter, food, clothes, etc, should be provided to all those with financial difficulties within the borders of Turkey (Article 1).

Undoubtedly, health assistance is one of the most critical matters for migrants in Turkey. In January 2005, the SASF introduced the "Principles on the Implementation of Health Assistance Programs" in an effort to cover the health costs of poor and vulnerable persons who have no social security, including foreign nationals. Accordingly, all foreigners in Turkey who incur health costs beyond their means, regardless of whether they hold a residence permit or not, may apply to the SASF for assistance. This covers the costs of inpatient treatment only, but for those with chronic illnesses, it covers inpatient and outpatient treatment, as well as medication costs.

These principles, however, were superseded in May 2009 with the adoption of the *Law on Social Insurance and General Health Insurance* (Numbered 5510, dated May 2006, entered into force October 2008). According to this new law, foreigners in Turkey who do not hold health insurance from another country and have a valid residence permit (Article 60d), as well as asylum seekers recognized by the Ministry of the Interior (Article 60c2), can receive coverage under the auspices of the General Health Insurance body.[19] The SASF recently issued a new internal directive describing the kinds of assistance extended to vulnerable foreign citizens.[20] Foreigners covered already by the general health insurance may apply only for other forms of assistance offered by the SASF, such as food, coal and clothing. Those who are not covered by the law, including asylum seekers whose applications are still pending at the Ministry of Interior, victims of human trafficking and apprehended migrants, may apply to the SASF for health assistance as well, yet only for medication costs related to outpatient treatment. In the past, UNHCR provided emergency medical care, but due to major budgetary cuts, they have had to terminate almost all health assistance.

The journey to Europe, whether by water or by land, is extremely dangerous. There are countless news stories about migrants dying on the way. The most tragic incident occurred in December 2007, when an overloaded boat smuggling migrants from the shores of Izmir to the Greek island of Chios sank forty-six Palestinian, Iraqi and Somali dying and only six being rescued.[21] Apart from the many physical risks

19 Many refugee advocates have been critical of the definition of an 'asylum seeker' under this law, as in practice, the formal recognition of asylum seekers in Turkey is based on a status determination procedure (see asylum section above), and, in practice, Turkish authorities delay all decision on temporary asylum until the decision on refugee status has been reached by the UNHCR. See editorial piece by Taner Kılıç for Zaman (Turkish Daily newspaper) 31 March 2008.

20 General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, directive number B.02.1.SYD.0.08.300.5990/8237, dated 20.05.2009

21 SABAH, 11.12.2007 "GÖZ GÖRE GÖRE ÖLÜME" ('GOING TO DEATH KNOWINGLY') HTTP://ARSIV.SABAH.COM.TR/2007/12/11/HABER,345E526A0AA546158AB9C9FE8A392AB9.HTML. BIANET, 12.12.07 '46 REFUGEES DIE IN BOAT DISASTER.' BIANET, 05.01.2008 'ÖLEN GÖÇMENLERI UNUTTUK ÇÜNKÜ MORALIMIZ BOZULUYOR' ('WE FORGOT ABOUT THE DEAD MIGRANTS BECAUSE WE GET UPSET') HTTP://WWW.BIANET.ORG/BIANET/KATEGORI/BIAMAG/103935/OLEN-GOCMENLERI-UNUTTUK-CUNKU-MORALIMIZ-BOZULUYOR

associated with smuggling, if one is caught while making such an attempt, this can lead to further threats and uncertainties as well. The Turkish authorities are generally suspicious of people who apply for asylum after being caught trying to smuggle themselves into Europe. This suspicion is reflected in the 2006 Implementation Directive (Section 13) where there is a list of the conditions under which a foreigner/asylum seeker will not be granted a residence permit, in order 'to ensure that international protection is not exploited and that people who are genuinely in need of international protection are secured'.

As Turkey's largest, wealthiest and most cosmopolitan city, in recent years Istanbul has begun to attract increasing numbers of foreigners, including an ever-growing number of tourists, as well as both regular and irregular migrants who arrive with the intention of living and working in the city. Situated at close proximity to European borders, with easy accessibility by air, land and water, Istanbul has also become the main transit point for the various groups of foreign migrants travelling through Turkey to the West.

As with internal migrants, the main pull factors of Istanbul for international migrants are economic and social. Istanbul is the economic centre of the country, with 65% of import and export companies in the country located in the city. Export related sectors, particularly textile and leather, offer many working opportunities to migrants at both the production and sales levels. Though Russian clients dominated the textile sector in the 1990s, today these areas also attract a high number of clients from the Middle East, creating a growing demand for Arabic speakers, as well.

A further economic pull factor is the size of the informal economy in Turkey, which is estimated by various sources to be around 50 percent. The state's inability to control markets is particularly evident in a city like Istanbul with a soaring population over 12 million. And it is also harder to inspect informal labour in the particular sectors where foreign migrant labour is most concentrated, notably tourism, entertainment and domestic work.

Apart from these economic pull factors, the social space of Istanbul also attracts many international migrants to the city. As briefly explained in the section above, in the absence of comprehensive immigration and integration laws in Turkey, Istanbul also provides the necessary milieu for a non-formalized kind of integration for migrants (Danis, et. al., 2006). Various migrant groups have already established small communities across different neighbourhoods in Istanbul. For instance, as noted by a variety of academic and journalistic reports, Iraqi migrants and refugees have settled in parts of the Fatih district, and in the Dolapdere, Kurtuluş and Osmanbey neighbourhoods of the Sisli district (Danis 2006);

most Afghans, Iranians and Uzbek's can be found in Zeytinburnu and Fatih districts (Taraghi 2006); many West Africans inhabit the Tarlabaşı neighbourhood within the Beyoğlu district, while East Africans prefer Kumkapı neighbourhood within Fatih district (Ozdil 2008). The choice of localities for residence are not coincidental: most of these neighbourhoods are inhabited by some of the more disadvantaged internal migrant groups as well, and they offer an abundance of informal and low-skill job opportunities, particularly in the textile, confection and service sectors. Migrants have also begun to establish small businesses in these neighbourhoods, especially Internet and call centres, as well as a few restaurants (Ozdil 2008, Perouse 2006).

2.4 The Gulf of Aden to Yemen and Beyond

Route for Somalis

This route is now famous for smuggling people out of the continent, as well as drugs and weapons into Africa and Yemen. The large majority of Somalis intend to leave Yemen and continue their journey to richer countries in the region such as KSA or the Gulf States, to the USA, Canada or Europe. Some hope to take advantage of the US government's visa lottery programme, with 50,000 visas available to people who come from countries with low rates of immigration to the USA (de Regt, 2007). Longstanding migratory relations with Yemen (and to a lesser extent, KSA and Egypt) facilitate the onward journey to the Arabian Peninsula, as does the fact that Somali passports are recognized in some Arab countries (Moret et al., 2006).

Conditions on smuggler boats in the Gulf of Aden from Somalia to Yemen have been well documented, and involve systematic violence, severe overcrowding and lack of food and water (MMTF, 2008: 12; MSF, 2008: 10-22). There are reports about the high level of violence on the journeys imposed by the smugglers, including people being frequently beaten using various objects, stabbed and incidents of rape (MSF, 2008). The causes for death were severe beatings, lack of food and water, suffocation from being in the hold of the boat and throwing persons overboard to drown when they become hard to control (MMTF, 2008; MSF, 2008). Smugglers can be arrested attempting to enter the Yemeni waters, with the result that passengers are forced to jump off the boat in deep water some miles off the coast and often drown in their attempts to swim to land.

UNHCR has been working with the Puntland government to warn Somalis in Bossaso against attempting the journey, but thousands try knowing full well of the risks involved (van Gemund, 2007: 67). Attempts by the Puntland authorities to crack down on smuggling operations have also met with little success.

The primary path leads from the Somali port town of Bossaso across the Gulf of Aden to an estimated 30 entry points along 2,400 km of Yemeni coastline (MMTF, 2008). The main point of entry is the village of Bir Ali, just north of Bossaso. A smaller number choose to travel to Yemen from Djibouti, and a relatively unexplored route departs from the port at Berbera (MMTF, 2008), but since a crackdown on smugglers there in 2008-9, it is no longer used to cross the Gulf, but possibly as a sea route to Djibouti and Obock.

Those crossing the Gulf of Aden pay smugglers 30-100 USD to take them across (ICMPD 2007: 26). Some plan to travel on to KSA, to seek employment there or in other Gulf States (particularly the UAE), and some to move on to Europe and points west (Van Gemund, 2007: 67; ICMPD, 2007: 27; Moret et al., 2006: 53).

Due to the difficulty of the desert journey, more men than women choose to travel to KSA (de Regt, 2007). Several travel routes between Yemen (Aden and Sana'a) and KSA have been documented (MMTF, 2009), though what seems to be missing in the literature is a detailed account of the journey from KSA on to Europe. The risk of detention and deportation from the Gulf States is high, and it should be noted that many Somalis attempt the journey several times, hoping to evade the authorities and gain employment (MMTF 2009: 53; MSF 2008: 31). Those who do move on to the Gulf countries reportedly often find themselves victim to economic exploitation, prostitution/trafficking rings, sexual violence, robbery and abandonment to the desert elements (MMTF, 2008: 12).

Some have been noted to travel to Syria by plane, from where they try to reach Turkey and Europe (ICMPD: 2007).

Life conditions in Yemen

Those arriving on the shores of Yemen are met either by Yemeni authorities or by NGOs working with UNHCR.[22] Some migrants and refugees have reported facing abuse by Yemeni officers, and women travelling on their own are particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual abuse (de Regt, 2007). Somali and non-Somali refugees are separated upon arrival.

Non-Somalis are increasingly perceived by authorities as irregular economic migrants, and most will face arrest, detention and deportation (MMTF, 2008).

[22] including MSF and the Society for Humanitarian Solidarity

On the other hand, Somalis are escorted to one of three registration centers in Mayfah, Ahwar and Al Kharaz, where they are fed, registered and given medical care. MSF reports that 57% of Somalis move on from the registration centres to the refugee camp at Al Kharaz (pop. 9000) (MSF, 2008). The camp is located in a harsh desert setting 165 km west of the main port of Aden. Here UNHCR and its implementing partners distribute food and provide healthcare and a variety of other services (van Gemund, 2007: 68). However, there are few job opportunities, and ultimately only 5% of refugees choose to stay. This is encouraged in part by UNHCR, which reserves camp services largely for the most vulnerable. Those considered capable of caring for themselves are encouraged to move to the cities to seek employment. Most settle in Aden and Sana'a, where they share crowded apartments and rooms in areas populated largely by other refugees (de Regt, 2007).

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula and is saddled with high unemployment and a host of social and economic problems. While most Somalis in Yemen do not intend to remain there, many stay temporarily to gather resources for financing the onward journey. Despite the bleak employment situation, female migrants and refugees have had some success finding jobs (much more so than their male counterparts). This is largely due to the demand for domestic workers, which for cultural reasons is viewed as undesirable employment for Yemeni women. Conditions of employment for domestic workers include strenuous workloads, insults, discrimination, withholding of salaries, and at times physical abuse.[23] Men can occasionally find work on farms or in other low-skilled jobs (MMTF, 2008: 9).

There have been reports of growing hostility against Somalis amongst Yemenis, some of whom feel that due to their *prima facie* status and the attendant international aid, Somalis receive better treatment within their borders than Yemenis do. There also seems to be a perception that many Somali economic migrants are taking advantage of the possibility of *prima facie* status to gain access to services meant for refugees (Chaise, 2009). Further, Africans in Yemen are reported to face a fair amount of racial discrimination, which has been on the rise in recent years, perhaps due to increasing tensions over the protracted refugee situation. Discrimination affects every aspect of a refugee's life, from employment opportunity to educational access, and the ability to obtain documents and to walk down the street without being harassed (MMTF, 2009).

According to the UNHCR 2006 Global Appeal for Yemen, the areas of greatest concern for refugees in Yemen were improvement in services relating to education (general access, long term attendance, vocational training, and adult literacy), income-generating projects, community centers and health clinics,

[23] Marina de Regt's study of domestic workers in Yemen highlights the difficulties of separating migrants from refugees. Due to the bureaucratically prohibitive nature of the legal migration routes, many economic migrants resort to using traffickers to get to Yemen, thus mixing themselves in with refugee flows (de Regt: 2007).

self-reliance, and awareness-raising among Yemenis. COMSICCA, a Yemeni NGO, also notes inflation and malnourishment as pressing issues, as well as pronounced vulnerability among the elderly, who are unable to count on younger family members to support them (COMSICCA, 2002). Marie Stopes International Yemen opened an integrated healthcare facility in response to the fact that many Somalis reported not feeling comfortable at Yemeni health centers (Jaffer, Guy & Niewczasinski, 2004).

Many refugees living in Yemen state that conditions are bad enough that they consider resettlement as their only possible durable solution (van Gemund, 2007: 69). This option, however, is less than certain – during 2006 only 350 people of the tens of thousands living in Yemen were resettled to third countries. Others are choosing to return to Somalia, where UNHCR will assist in repatriation only to Puntland or Somaliland.

Routes for Ethiopians

Route through Somalia: UNHCR estimated that there were 2,310 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia in January 2009, and this number was projected to rise to 8,580 by the end of the same year (UNHCR, 2009c: 3). There were also an estimated 1,540 Ethiopian asylum seekers in January 2009, with a projection of 990 by year's end. According to an IRIN report, the number of Ethiopian irregular migrants entering Somaliland increased from 50 daily in 2008 to 90 daily in 2009 (IRIN, 2009). Most of these were asylum-seekers from the Oromia region, and many were transiting through Somali en route to the Arabian Peninsula. Some arrive with the plan of registering with UNHCR in hopes of being granted resettlement to a third country. This is an option offered to very few, however, typically those perceived to be the most needy. In 2007, 91 individuals were resettled (32 cases), mainly to Canada, while 92 cases (252 individuals) were submitted for consideration (MMTF, 2008: 18).

Interviews of refugees and migrants in Yemen revealed that many choose to cross into Somalia rather than Kenya or Djibouti because it boasts the widest and least patrolled of Ethiopia's borders, and because it presents greater access to income for financing further migration (MMTF, 2009: 54). Many of those traveling to Somalia do so en route to Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The journey across Somalia to the port town of Bossaso tends to lead from Ethiopia's highlands or northern lowlands, where migrants and refugees are smuggled across the border into Somaliland. Hargeisa and Bura'o have been noted as transit points where some stop to seek employment, though Dessie, Harar and Hartishiek also deserve mention as hubs. Another possible route takes migrants through Laas Caanood, Garoowe and Qardho (ICMPD, 2007). From any of these points, the journey continues to Bossaso, where migrants and refugees congregate, typically to await further travel to Yemen (MMTF, 2009: 5).

The journey across Somalia to Bossaso is characterized by multiple abuses and terrible conditions, from accidental death and murder to armed robbery and sexual violence. Perpetrators include police, government officials, militias, and common criminals, as well as the smugglers paid to facilitate the journey. Detention and deportation in Somaliland and Puntland are not unheard of, particularly of those purported to be affiliated with Ethiopian opposition movements (MMTF, 2008: 11). Additionally, in late 2009 Puntland security forces are reputed to have begun cracking down in an attempt to prevent migrants and refugees from reaching their embarkation point in Bossaso (HRW, 2009: 16).

Once in Bossaso, Ethiopian migrants and refugees tend to congregate away from those from other countries, in compounds around the port. Those finding themselves in Bossaso face a number of protection risks. The open compounds where they live are overcrowded, and lack adequate sanitation facilities. Many find they cannot access healthcare since they are unable to pay for treatment. They face persecution by gangs, exploitation if from minority clans, rent-gauging, and police harassment. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, especially to sexual assault, recruitment into sex work, and FGM, which is practiced in the settlements (MMTF, 2008: 11-12).

Conditions in Bossaso are particularly difficult for Ethiopians who lack the friend and family connections that provide other groups with protection from exploitation and abuse, particularly by smugglers (MSF, 2008: 30). Those from the Ethiopian lowlands have greater access to protection than other clan members, and thus are more likely than those from other areas to stay in Bossaso, rather than crossing to Yemen (MMTF, 2008: 7). Those who choose to make the journey across the Gulf of Aden, however, do so through the offices of smugglers, who often recruit through intermediaries, many of whom own tea shops which are frequented by members with the same clan affiliation (MMTF, 2008: 5).

A reception and transit center was established in Bossaso in 2006 to address the needs of Ethiopians risking deportation as a result of a government crackdown on irregular migration. The center encountered a number of problems, including its use as a recruitment ground for smugglers. As a result, plans for subsequent reception centers were abandoned (MMTF, 2008: 17).

Route through Djibouti: A second route used by Ethiopians to access the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Peninsula passes through Djibouti. This route has gained in popularity since February 2008, when two bombs exploded in areas of Bossaso frequented by Ethiopians. Some speculate that migrants and refugees may also choose this route due to increasing awareness of the dangers posed by the Gulf crossing from Bossaso. The Djibouti route begins in eastern Ethiopia, and follows either directly from Ethiopia by road, or by boat from Berbera, or through Somaliland by road to Djibouti. The town of Arhibe is noted as a transit point (MMTF, 2008: 5).

***Route through Yemen**:* The perils of the journey across the Gulf of Aden have been well documented. Overcrowding, starvation, dehydration, suffocation, beatings, murder, drownings, sexual assault, and rape are common occurrences (Van Gemund 2007: 67, MMTF 2008: 12, MSF 2008: 10-22). Ethiopian passengers are habitually singled out for the harshest treatment (HRW, 2009: 21), and are typically forced to endure the journey in the most crowded sections of the hold, where suffocation is common. Many Ethiopians are choosing to cross the Gulf from Djibouti because the route is reputedly the faster[24] and safer of the two available, involving less abuses. This, of course, translates into higher costs, with the journey from Djibouti costing US $100-150, while that from Bossaso costs US $50-80 (HRW, 2009: 16).

For years, the majority of migrants and refugees arriving in Yemen from across the Gulf of Aden have been Somali. But recent trends have seen the proportion of Ethiopians and Eritreans growing (MMTF, 2009: 7).[25] Human Rights Watch reports that "during the first 10 months of 2009, more than half[26] of the people who arrived in Yemen by boat were Ethiopians," and that over 99 percent of non-Somalis entering the country by sea were Ethiopian (HRW, 2009: 26). The same report notes that as of September 2009 UNHCR had registered over 11,000 Ethiopian refugees in Yemen, and estimates that there are 10,000 to 20,000 Ethiopians living in the country.[27]

Ethiopians constitute the second largest migrant/refugee group in Yemen, which is comprised of three categories of people (de Regt 2007, 12). The first is former Ethiopian Navy officers who were forced to flee after the fall of Mengistu's government, and were accepted into Yemen on a *prima facie* basis. The next is young, single female domestic workers, some of whom arrive on a legal contract basis and some of whom are trafficked. The final group consists of the smuggled. The majority of the Ethiopian migrant/refugee population in Yemen is young, male and single, though 15 percent is comprised of young women, while the rest includes families, older women and unaccompanied minors (MMTF 2008, 6).

It is important to note that some statistics regarding origin are difficult to corroborate due to the fact that many ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia claim to be Somali upon reaching Yemen (HRW, 2009; HS 13,

[24] Boats leaving from Djibouti typically take 7-8 hours, while the journey from Bossaso can take 1-3 days (HRW 2009).
[25] Some attribute this shift to the deterioration of the security situation in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, coupled with improved security in Somalia (MMTF 2009).
[26] 35,272 out of 63,718 recorded arrivals
[27] This includes refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented and documented workers. The latter category is comprised mainly of female domestic workers.

MMTF, 2009: 6). This applies particularly to those from the Ogaden region, and is largely due to the fact that Somalis are granted *prima facie* refugee recognition by the Yemeni government.

The choice to come to Yemen is motivated by a variety of factors. Ethiopia and Yemen share a history of trade relations and migration flows. Geographic proximity is certainly an important factor, as is the presence of relatives and friends in Yemen who provide both information and support upon arrival. Yet despite these ties, the majority of migrants from the Horn of Africa, but particularly those from countries other than Somalia, do not intend to remain in Yemen (MMTF, 2009: 11). This is due to a combination of factors, including a generalized lack of access and opportunity, as well as government policies aimed at keeping non-Somalis out of the country. Many see Yemen as a gateway to the Gulf and Middle East, where they plan to seek low-skilled employment. Women particularly seek jobs as domestic workers in Lebanon, KSA and other Gulf countries (ICMPD, 2007: 39; de Regt, 2006: 37).

In addition to the difference in the journeys from Bossaso and Djibouti, Ethiopian migrants and refugees face drastically different situations depending on where they land on Yemeni shores. Boats from Bossaso land on the Arab Sea coast, where treatment by Yemeni authorities is generally more lenient. Here, Ethiopians are typically able to seek assistance at UNHCR reception centers in Mayfa'a or Ahwar, where they are issued forms which allow them ten days to make their way to one of two UNHCR offices in order to lodge an asylum claim (HRW, 2009). These forms, however, are not officially recognized, and thus offer little in the way of protection. As of December 2009, UNHCR was in negotiation with the Yemeni government to replace the ten-day passes with official government passes.

Treatment on the Red Sea coast, where the majority of Ethiopians arrive[28] on boats from Djibouti, is much harsher. Red Sea transit points are monitored by the Yemeni authorities, thus motivating Ethiopians to avoid accessing humanitarian agencies even when in need.

Even those Ethiopians who are able to gain refugee status from UNHCR receive differential treatment. The Yemeni government does not recognize them as legitimate asylum seekers, and thus refuses to grant them official status or documentation (HRW, 2009). UNHCR documents serve only to protect the bearers from *refoulement*, and without government-issued IDs, non-Somali refugees are vulnerable to abuses and unable to access rights to which they would otherwise be entitled.

[28] Of the 27,633 Ethiopians arriving by boat in Yemen in the first nine months of 2009, 21,131 landed on the Red Sea coast (HRW 2009: 27).

Life conditions of Ethiopians

***Life in Yemen*:** The treatment and conditions of the majority of Ethiopians interviewed for the 2009 MMTF study revealed that they did not feel protected in Yemen, and that UNHCR was unable to assist them (MMTF, 2009: 11).[29] Even those recognized as refugees are vulnerable to a wide variety of risks, including harassment, discrimination, abuse, rape, extortion by security forces, and violent crime. Many refuse to go to the authorities with their complaints, for fear of arrest or because the police rarely respond (HRW, 2009: 3). Nor do they feel comfortable approaching the Ethiopian embassy, as they are often viewed as traitors. Many reported to MMTF that for safety reasons, they choose to keep their children constantly inside. There is a perception within Yemen that Ethiopian women are prostitutes, and they often face harassment. Some have adopted the wearing of the *abeya* in an attempt to avoid this. Some choose to marry Yemenis as a means to acquire a residence permit, rent a flat or access other forms of protection.

There is widespread racial discrimination against Africans in Yemen, which many migrants and refugees identify as their primary social problem. This discrimination affects their ability to access documents, work, healthcare and education as well as their social interactions and even their ability to practice religious worship (MMTF, 2009). This is compounded for Ethiopians by religious discrimination, as they are all assumed to be Christian. They are often compelled to take on Muslim names and their children are required to study the Qur'an at school. As the Yemeni government does not allow official Christian churches, Ethiopian Christians must worship in secret, and many live in constant fear of anti-Christian violence.

There is a common perception in Yemen of Ethiopians as illegal economic migrants in search of work in a country already crippled by poverty and high unemployment. In 2006 the Yemeni government issued a standing order to deport all non-Somali migrants and asylum seekers (MMTF, 2009: 8),[30] and military forces have been ordered to arrest Ethiopians upon arrival (HRW, 2009: 28). Additionally, Yemen has faced pressure from the Ethiopian government to repatriate all its citizens who enter the country through illegal means, including asylum seekers. UNHCR statistics suggest that approximately 1,000 Ethiopians were deported in 2006 (MSF, 2008: 9), and 500 in 2008 (HRW, 2009: 37). These figures are likely severe under-estimations, however, as the Yemeni government does not share information regarding deportations, nor does it allow access to those in detention awaiting deportation.

[30] This order was reissued in 2008.

As a result of these targeted policies, some Ethiopians claim themselves as Somali in order to access protection, while many more come to think of Yemen as a transit country, resorting to smugglers to usher them into KSA as soon as possible (MMTF, 2009: 8). This last option is often negotiated before reaching Yemen, by making arrangements to meet smugglers immediately upon reaching shore, and moving on to KSA before the Yemeni authorities are alerted (HRW, 2009).

MAP 5:


UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency
Horn of Africa: Smuggling Routes to Yemen
March 2008
UNHCR Somalia
YEMEN
DJIBOUTI
GULF OF ADEN
SOMALIA
ETHIOPIA
No longer used
Approximate Migratory Routes
LEGEND
Capital
Point of Departure
International boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Railway
Locations identified by UNHCR Yemen, UNHCR Somalia, and the Danish Refugee Council - Somalia.

3.0 THE SURVEY IN YEMEN AND TURKEY

3.1 Methodology

In order to meet the objectives of the Terms of Reference, the research project was originally commissioned to survey Somalis and Ethiopians in Yemen, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Turkey. A few changes had to be made to this initial plan. For example, by November 2009, attempts to gain approval from the KSA government to conduct the survey there had failed. It was thereby agreed between MMTF and the Researchers to try and conduct it in Syria as an alternative. At the end of November, however, approval from the Syrian government also failed to be obtained. Regardless, a small amount of qualitative information was gathered from a short trip to Damascus at the end of November, which is summarized in this report.

3.2 Survey instruments

A questionnaire was constructed, translated into Somali and Amharic, independently back translated and pilot rested. The questionnaire contained questions on demographic information, travel trajectories (conditions and experiences), arrival conditions and assistance, current life situation and future plans (see Appendix).

Key informant interviews were held with UNHCR, DRC and other UN and NGO staff in Yemen, Turkey and Syria.

Finally, three literature reviews were conducted. The first was produced by a researcher overseen by Oxford University and focuses primarily on publications dealing with Somalis in Europe. The second focused upon Somalis and Ethiopians the Middle East region and was produced by the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at AUC. The third, on Turkey was compiled by the senior researcher in Turkey. These were edited and incorporated into the report.

3.3 Data collection

Somali and Ethiopian (both Amharic and Oromo) refugee interviewers were trained to use a structured questionnaire (see Appendix 2) designed for this study.

The methods for choosing the respondents varied in each of the countries. A random sampling method could not be implemented since the actual population size and location of Somalis and Ethiopians in Yemen and Turkey was not available. Instead, to maximize the study's ability to understand the experiences of all segments of the population a targeted sample frame was used including length of stay, age and gender. The primary focus was on recent arrivals, but also targeting larger proportions of unaccompanied minors and women in order to gain a better understanding of the experiences of vulnerable groups. Thus the gender balance was intentionally around 50-50 males and females, both in Yemen and Turkey and between Somalis and Ethiopians (See Table 2).

Respondents living in Yemen and Turkey for various lengths of time were included in the study. In the targeted sample in Yemen, 258 interviews were held with those who had been in the country for less than one month and 237 interviews from 2 but less than 12 months. In Aden, interviews were conducted with Somalis in 5 field sites (Mayfah, Ahwar and Kharaz Reception camps, Kharaz Camp and the Basateen neighborhood in Aden). In Sana'a, Ethiopians were interviewed around urban neighborhoods. In Turkey, interviews were held with 93 in the country less than one month and 367 over one month. 87 interviews in Turkey with respondents who had been there longer than 12 months were included since the context made it more difficult to select more targeted respondents and find new arrivals (see table 4). The interviewing of this targeted sample took place in five cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, Izmir and Isparta.

The choice of respondents in the various city communities in Turkey and those in Sana'a and Basateen in Yemen was based on a snowball sampling method implemented by the interviewers (15 interviewers in Yemen and 13 in Turkey). Each interviewer in conjunction with monitors created their own snowballing connections that reduced the network effect of this approach. Interviewees in the reception centers, including the Kharaz refugee camp, in Yemen were chosen on the basis of every ten who registered with UNHCR (through the Danish Refugee Council operatives) during the fieldwork period.

Respondents were interviewed in a variety of settings that included reception centers and the Kharaz refugee camp (in Yemen), individual homes, public places such as cafes, offices of UNHCR and NGOs and three were even conducted inside a smuggler's house. In Aden, Yemen, one interview was with a divorced 20 year old Somali woman who intended remain in the country, but who had a relationship with a Somali smuggler. The two Somali males (25 and 17 years of age) interviewed in a smuggler's house in Izmir in Turkey were awaiting a small boat to take them to Greece and then on to Vienna and Oslo respectively.

Respondents were given an explanation of the survey and were told that participation was entirely voluntary; they could refuse to answer any question and they could stop the interview whenever they wished, without having to give a reason. Each interview took 1–2 hours and responses were coded using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software.

In Syria, only one focus group took place with four young Somali refugees (1 male, 3 females) as well as meetings with representatives of DRC and UNHCR. Further observations and discussions took place during registration updating interviews with 3 female Somali refugees at the UNHCR registration and food distribution center at Douma, outside Damascus. These, however, were qualitative and were not included in the quantitative data set.

Table 2

Respondents by Nationality, Country of Interview and Gender

Country	Nationality				Total
	Somali		Ethiopian		
	Number	Column %	Number	Column %	
Yemen	386	51.5	109	52.9	495 (51.8%)
Turkey	363	48.5	97	47.1	460 (48.2%)
Total	749	100%	206	100%	955 (100%)

Gender	Nationality				Total
	Somali		Ethiopian		
	Number	Column %	Number	Column %	
Male	381	50.9	98	47.6	479 (50.1%)
Female	368	49.1	108	52.4	476 (49.9%)
Total	749	100%	206	100%	955 (100%)

3.4 Challenges in the research

This research encountered a number of challenges, beginning with the negotiations and refusals of the Saudi and Syrian governments to allow the researchers to proceed with the study, as well as the difficulties inherent in interviewing people with insecure life situations and complicated expectations of the study and the interviewers. Respondents for this study were interviewed in November-December 2009 in Turkey, Yemen and Syria. Since that time, Yemen has gone through considerable contextual changes that can influence the movement of migrants. At the time of the interviews, a conflict in the North of

Yemen was intensifying. Early in 2010, there was a foiled terrorist attack connected to a suspected terrorist who was accused of being trained in Yemen. This immediately led to tighter borders and closer surveillance. The speculation in 2008 that the government might change the prima facie status of Somali refugees was under closer scrutiny during the time of this report. Ethiopians always experienced close scrutiny in Yemen. This was further tightened as seen in the Government plan early in 2010 to deport 2000 Ethiopians accused of illegal entry to Yemen. Thus, the situation as described in this report may quickly be outdated.

There are advantages and disadvantages to having refugees interviewing refugees in any study. The advantages of similar culture, language and experience usually outweigh the disadvantages, which is why this study's interviewers were refugees themselves. Regardless of training, however, refugee interviewers are commonly not professional interviewers and lack experience and share common fears and complicated expectations and relationships with those they interview.

As an example, there were 2 subsets of interviews in Turkey. From 3 – 23 November, the first interviews with Somalis took place in Istanbul and Ankara. The initial findings were that most Somalis were traveling to Turkey straight from Somalia via sea or air. However, this was contrary to information obtained in Syria that people most often traveled overland and that Somalis were eager that Turkey be accepted as their first country of asylum. This raised the question about whether or not respondents were being honest about their travel routes. The Senior Researcher consulted UNHCR in Ankara and was informed that they too had information that Somalis actually traveled via the Syrian border by land (through the intelligence by the Turkish border patrol) but encountered the same problem of Somalis always recounting the story of traveling direct to Turkey from Somalia on one ship. The research team in Turkey was questioned about this information. They admitted that traveling overland through Syria was in fact the most common route though they insisted that there are also a number of people who do in fact travel by ship. Even if they were aware of this information, they explained that when conducting the interviews and hearing the "ship story" they did not feel comfortable confronting people and asking if this was truthful. They also sympathized with the respondents. Despite reassurance about the anonymity of the study, those respondents who had applied to UNHCR were particularly anxious to maintain a consistent story, fearing repercussions if they did not.

The Somali refugees in Syria gave a few explanations for this. First, they explained that the Somalis in Turkey "lied" because they believed that the UNHCR and other authorities in Turkey would assume that the longer route from Yemen-KSA-Jordan-Syria-Turkey meant that they would have sufficient financial resources and thus would not receive aid. It was said:

'They do not want to show a lack of suffering along the way out of fear that they will not get UNHCR assistance. Moving from one country to another needs money, so questions will be asked about how it was raised – they are supposed to be refugees - and that would jeopardize having access to resettlement.'

Also, they suggested,

'[Somalis] are lying [about making a direct journey to Turkey] because it is not their first country of asylum…It is a major Somali principle that if you tell a good lie, it will be accepted by the UNHCR. If you tell the truth without a good story, it will not be accepted.'

In the context that Somalis are not given the same treatment as Iraqis in Syria, one Somali suggested,

'Somali asylum cases in Syria are not strong, but they have to invent better stories to compete with the Iraqis … who have more rights.'

Another reported that the Somalis think that UNHCR believes that certain tribes from Somalia are more persecuted than others, and so they "claim that they are from these 'other', more persecuted tribes/clans", rather than their own. They argued that,

'Because UNHCR hears the same story from thousands of Somalis, one must maintain it, otherwise you will not be believed. If they change the story, it will not be accepted.'

Though the targeted number of Somali questionnaires for the study in Turkey had been reached, a new set of around 50 interviews were conducted in Istanbul and Ankara from 30 November -13 December. In an effort to collect additional information about travel trajectories, the research team came up with strategies to encourage people to feel comfortable to share their travel routes more openly, taking more time to chat informally about their travel routes prior to interviewing them. In this second round, interviews were conducted only with those who said they had travelled through Syria. Both sets of interviews were used in the analysis. The number of Somalis interviewed who said they had reached Turkey specifically via Syria is around 90.

Other kinds of fears can also dictate the willingness of respondents to share the total truth about themselves and their migratory patterns. For example, again in the frank discussions with refugees in Damascus, we were told that, "Some [Somalis] are university educated, but pretend to be illiterate in order to get resettled, obtain a passport and then return to the Gulf."

The study suggests that refugees in Yemen, Syria and Turkey are an amazingly resourceful group. They have had the courage and determination to travel huge distances at great risk to search for any opportunity. They will adapt to whatever is required for their situation, including when being interviewed by a researcher, or by an aid agency.

3.4 Demographic Profile of the Respondents

Note: In the text, percentages are rounded up to whole numbers. Some tables are reproduced from the SPSS data analysis program. These include some frequency tables that show the 'frequency' (number of

actual respondents), 'percent' (of the total sample), 'valid percent' (percentage of the number who responded to the question) and 'cumulative percent'.

Interviewers in both countries were instructed to select adults (with and without accompanying family members) and unaccompanied minors.

Age

There were no significant differences in the age groups between Yemen and Turkey, between Somalis and Ethiopians, nor between males and females. The largest group of all respondents (77%) was between 19-35 years, which is in keeping with previous research (e.g. Horwood 2008).

Table 3

Unaccompanied Minors Interviewed

	Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Male	55	7	62
Female	54	6	60
Total	109	13	122

Marital status

The largest number of respondents (46%) was never married: Somali (56% of males; 36% of females) and Ethiopian (46% of males; 46% of females). There were other differences between the two nationalities. Of those Somalis who were currently or previously married, 35 percent were male and 63 percent were female, compared with 40 percent and 26 percent of Ethiopians, respectively.

It is interesting to note the large proportion of Somali females who were divorced (24%) and widowed (11%), in contrast with Somali males (4% divorced; 3% widowed) and Ethiopian women (5% divorced; 2% widowed). Of the Somali youth, 3 were married (1 female 15 years, 1 male 16 years and 1 male 17 years). Three were divorced (1 female 16 years, 2 females 17 years). There were also 4 Somali females aged 18 years and 13 aged 20 years who were divorced and 12 Somali females aged 19-25 years who were widowed. Each country is noted for having a "high divorce rate" (Tilson & Larsen, 2000). It appears that 26 percent of the migrating women in this study were either divorced or widowed, most likely due to the difficulties in life style for women of this status in supporting themselves or to their freedom to travel since they do not have the controls restricting their freedom of movement, sometimes placed by husbands in this region.

Figure 1



Levels of education

The Somali communities in most countries generally show lowest employment rate and levels of education qualifications within migrant communities (Harris, 2004; Kleist, 2007) which has led in part to Somali migrants being portrayed by the press and by officials as 'difficult to integrate' (Fangen, 2006; Montclos, 2003; Kleist, 2006). The Somalis in this survey also showed low levels of education.

Indeed, there were significant differences between Somali and Ethiopian respondents in education levels. A significantly higher proportion of Ethiopians in the sample had completed secondary, university, post-university and technical training (61.6%) compared with the Somalis (18%). 40 percent of Somalis had no formal education (8% informal education and 32% with no education at all) while 17 percent had attended a Q'uranic school (see Table and Figure). This is expected since there is little formal primary and even less secondary or advanced education provided in the South and Central Zones in Somalia.

With respect to gender, females were slightly less likely to have attended university or a technical vocational school. However, females were more highly represented in having had no formal education (34.3%) compared with males (23.6%) in the sample.

Figure 2



Religion

All Somali respondents stated that they were Muslim. 620 (85%) stated they were Sunni while 92 (13%) stated they were Shaafiqi. (It may be noted that some Somali interviewers in Yemen were of the opinion: "We cannot ask a Somali their religion. It is like asking their gender. Of course, they are all Muslims!"). Just over half (51%) of the Ethiopians were Muslim (Sunni) and the remainder were Christian, including 28 percent Orthodox, 17 percent Protestant, 4 percent Catholic and 1 percent Pentecostal.

Unaccompanied minors

The study included 122 children under 18 years old (51% male, 49% female) who stated that they were unaccompanied minors and constituted 13% of the overall sample. This was easier with Somali refugees in Yemen where 89 were interviewed compared with only 9 Ethiopians. In Turkey, interviews were according to the availability of the refugees and only 20 Somali and 4 Ethiopian unaccompanied minors were interviewed.

The demographic profile of the unaccompanied youth in the study may be summarized thus:

Age:	Between 15 – 18 years old.
Registration:	87% were registered with UNHCR.
Marital status:	5% (6) Married; 8% (1) Separated; 6% (7) Divorced; 0 Widowed
Education:	35% No education; 34% Primary–Intermediate; 15% Q'uranic
Livelihood at home:	38% were working prior to departure. Their work included: mechanic, carpenter, domestic, laborer, driver, farmer, cleaner, herder, welder, restaurant, hairdresser and merchant.

3.5 Refugee Registration with UNHCR

By the end of 2008, worldwide, the total population of Somalis of concern to the UNHCR (refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and returnees) numbered 1,860,373 that included 559,153 refugees, 20,543 asylum cases pending and 1,277,200 IDPs. For Ethiopians, the total population of concern was 95,552 that included 63,862 refugees and 31,507 cases pending (UNHCR 2008).

As of September 2009, UNHCR had registered around 150,000 Somalis and 11,000 Ethiopians in Yemen; and as of June 2009, 1,246 Somalis and 34 Ethiopians were registered with UNHCR in Turkey (HRW, 2009; UNHCR Turkey, 2009).

In the overall sample, 665 (75%) respondents said they were registered with UNHCR; 223 (25%) said they were not registered. By nationality, only 49 percent of Ethiopians were registered, compared with 81 percent of Somalis (see Table 4). By country of interview, a significantly larger proportion of the sample was registered in Yemen (88%) compared with Turkey (59%). Note, however, that there were 67 respondents who did not answer this question (9 Somalis in Yemen, 9 Ethiopians in Yemen and 49 Ethiopians in Turkey). As Table 5 shows, not all registered respondents revealed where they were registered. Those in Yemen were registered with UNHCR in Yemen. Only one Ethiopian in Turkey admitted registration in Yemen. 5 Somalis and 2 Ethiopians in Turkey were registered in KSA, and, although 222 Somalis in Turkey said they were registered, only 145 said they were registered in Turkey. Thus, there was clearly some trepidation in revealing registration status and location, most likely because, in Turkey, those who said they had travelled directly from Somalia needed to be consistent. Perhaps, as one respondent stated, some Ethiopians were also anxious about their speaking of registration status, fearing it may jeopardize their claims for resettlement. Registration with UNHCR was not followed up with a question that asked whether their refugee status had been accepted, whether they only had asylum seeker status, were rejected, on appeal or closed files, although it was not relevant for prima facie refugee Somalis in Yemen.

Table 4

Registered with UNHCR? * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

Country of Interview				Nationality		
				Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Yemen	Registered with UNHCR?	Yes	Count	376	51	427
			% within Nationality	97.4%	51.0%	87.9%
		No	Count	10	49	59
			% within Nationality	2.6%	49.0%	12.1%
	Total		Count	386	100	486
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Registered with UNHCR?	Yes	Count	222	16	238
			% within Nationality	62.7%	33.3%	59.2%
		No	Count	132	32	164
			% within Nationality	37.3%	66.7%	40.8%
	Total		Count	354	48	402
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5

Country of UNHCR Registration * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

Country of Interview				Nationality		Total
				Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	Country of UNHCR Registration	Yemen	Count	369	49	418
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Total		Count	369	49	418
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Country of UNHCR Registration	Yemen	Count	0	1	1
			% within Nationality	.0%	12.5%	.6%
		Saudi Arabia	Count	5	2	7
			% within Nationality	3.3%	25.0%	4.4%
		Turkey	Count	145	5	150
			% within Nationality	96.7%	62.5%	94.9%
	Total		Count	150	8	158
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3.6 Region of origin

Regions of origin (and clans) are often used as identifiers for those applying for asylum as knowledge of conflict and difficult or dire living conditions assist in claims and distribution of humanitarian assistance. In the study, Somali respondents in Yemen and Turkey originated from all 3 zones in Somalia. (See Map 6). However, the majority (77%) originated from four regions in the South Central Zone: Banadir/Mogadishu (78%), Shabelle Hoose (14%), Shabelle Dhexe (10%) and Bay (9%). There were slight differences in the regional origins between Somalis located in Yemen and Turkey. For example, those in Yemen were more likely to have originated from the regions of Banadir and Shabelle Dhexe (60%), while those in Turkey were more likely to have originated from the Banadir and Shabelle Hoose (61%) regions. However, these regions are adjoining areas in the South Central Zone. It should be noted that a large majority of this sample's respondents (88%) reported having come from those locations most affected by the conflict and drought affected South Central Zone, including: Banadir, Shabelle Hoose, Shabelle Dhexe, Bay, Gedo, Jubbada Dhexe, Jubbada Hoose, Hiraan and Galguduud. Thus, only 12 percent of Somalis reported that they were not from conflict regions (see Table 6).

Table 6

Somali Region of Origin

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Mogadishu/Banadir	332	44.3	44.3
Bay	69	9.2	53.5
Shabeellaha Hoose	103	13.8	67.3
Shabeellaha Dhexe	76	10.1	77.4
Hiiraan	26	3.5	80.9
Galguduud	10	1.3	82.2
Mudug	4	.5	82.8
Bari	17	2.3	85.0
Sool	4	.5	85.6
Sanaag	10	1.3	86.9
Togdheer	10	1.3	88.3
Woqooyi Galbeed	27	3.6	91.9
Awdal	4	.5	92.4
Gedo	14	1.9	94.3
Bakool	14	1.9	96.1
Jubbada Dhexe	4	.5	96.7
Jubbada Hoose	25	3.3	100.0
Total	749	100.0	

MAP 6:

http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf

In Ethiopia, the main area of ongoing conflict is in the Southeastern separatist region of Ogaden (or Somali) region that borders Oromia and Somalia. As noted earlier, ethnic Somalis often claim they are Somalis in their asylum applications. However, although the Ogaden (from the Darod clan) are the most numerous in Ethiopia's Somali Region, there are also non-Ogaden Darod, Isaaq and Dir (see Map 7).

More than half of the Ethiopians in the study originated in the Oromia region (52%) that covers central and southern parts of the country. Of these, 14 percent came from the capital, Addis Ababa; Amhara (18%) and the southern Region ("Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples") (7%) (See Table 7).

Table 7

Ethiopian Region of Origin

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Addis Ababa	29	14.1	14.1
Oromia	79	38.3	52.4
Dire Dawa	11	5.3	57.8
Amhara	37	18.0	75.7
Tigray	12	5.8	81.6
Harar	11	5.3	86.9
Somali	4	1.9	88.8
Afar	2	1.0	89.8
Southern Region	15	7.3	97.1
Eritrea	5	2.4	99.5
Other	1	.5	100.0
Total	206	100.0	

Although the numbers were similar, there was a significant difference in regions of origin of Ethiopians between Yemen and Turkey. In Yemen, 62 percent were from Oromia, compared with 42 percent in Turkey.

In Turkey, 22 percent came from Amhara and 10 percent from Tigray, compared with 15 percent from Amhara and 2 percent from Tigray in Yemen.

MAP 7: Regions of Ethiopia

http://mapsof.net/ethiopia/static-maps/png/ethiopia-regions-english

3.7 Clan Affiliation

As was cautioned in the Danish Refugee Council's report on IDPs in Bossaso (DRC 2007), clan affiliation is complex. Indeed, it was difficult to locate many of the responses, particularly of sub-clans, into the more formally recognized broader clan structures. For example, many Somali respondents (27%) identified themselves as Banadiri, meaning from the Banadir region of Mogadishu. Furthermore, it is not always clear that an individual's region of origin can be associated with a particular region. The Rahanweyn, for example, may originate in the Somali region of Ethiopia or from the South Central region of Somalia; the Hawiye are mainly from the south and central regions, but also may be from the Ogaden, Somaliland or Puntland; and similarly for the Darod and Madhibaan.

Within the Ethiopian community in Yemen, cultural, linguistic and social splits between the Oromo and Amhara groups are often transplanted from Ethiopia (MMTF, 2009). Oromos are typically recognized by UNHCR as political refugees fleeing government persecution, while the Amhara tend to be viewed as economic migrants with pro-government leanings. The Oromo community established the Oromo Refugee Association of Yemen as a means to promote its interests and provide cultural activities. However, anonymous threats against ORAY members supportive of anti-Ethiopian government movements caused the group to cease operations (ibid).

The clan affiliations for the Somali and Ethiopian respondents are given in the following tables, based upon the broadest clan structures under which sub-clans were placed.

Table 8

Somali Clans

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Jareer	1	.1	.1
Hawiye	202	27.0	27.1
Banadiri	204	27.2	54.3
Bantu	128	17.1	71.4
Rahanweyn	89	11.9	83.3
Isaaq	24	3.2	86.5
Majeerteen	7	.9	87.4
Darod	53	7.1	94.5
Dir	28	3.7	98.3
Madhibaan	8	1.1	99.3
Gabooye	5	.7	100.0
Total	749	100.0	

Table 9

Ethiopian Clans

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Afar	1	.5	.5
Amhara	51	24.8	25.2
Oromia	111	53.9	79.1
Gurage	16	7.8	86.9
Somali	3	1.5	88.3
Kunama	2	1.0	89.3
Tigrinya	17	8.3	97.6
Other	1	.5	98.1
Hadiya	1	.5	98.5
Welayta	3	1.5	100.0
Total	206	100.0	

3.8 Travel accompaniment

72 percent of all respondents traveled without family members accompanying them. Of those who travelled alone, 46 percent were female and 71 percent male.

Somali woman 24 years old arrived one day before interview in Yemen.

There is no one accompanying me because I sneaked out. I worked as housemaid and saved the money. I arranged everything myself and when I had it all in order I left. No one knew and after they found out my mother told me "if you already left then why not go to your aunt and rest there." So, I continued my journey. I want to stay permanently until I get a better future, because I have nowhere to go and I am not in a rush. I will work in Yemen to save money and then

go to Dubai. I will look for a neighborhood where Somalis are living. There are girls who were my neighbors that traveled this way and built their lives in Dubai. I want to do the same. I want to obtain permanent visa residence so I can move freely and improve my life. I would not advise others to attempt to come here because many have lost their lives. There were many checkpoints and Al Shabab was running everything. I was so fortunate to be alive and safe.

They may have traveled with friends (10%), but as is shown in Table 10, they were more likely to have traveled alone. 7 percent traveled with their spouses while 9 percent traveled with children under 18 year of age (90 cases). Most of those traveling with a spouse, or with children (64%) were in the 26-35 years of age bracket, although 24 respondents (27%) who traveled with children under 18 were 19-25 years of age.

A larger proportion of Ethiopians travelled alone (78%), compared with Somalis (58%). Except for one Ethiopian, all those travelling with a child under 18 years old were Somalis (89, or 12% of Somalis).

The majority of married respondents, both male and female also traveled to either Yemen or Turkey alone.

- 70 percent of the never married females traveled alone and 28 percent with either a friend, sibling or relative compared with 79 percent of the unmarried males traveling alone with 18 percent traveling with either a friend or sibling or relative.
- 18 percent married respondents traveled with children under 18 years old (33% females; 3% males).
- Almost all of those traveling with a child under 18 were Somali.
- 21 percent divorced respondents traveled with children under 18 years old (25% females; 5% males).
- 30 percent of widowed respondents traveled with children under 18 years old (38% females; 0 males).

The number of women reporting they had traveled either alone or with children and without an accompanying male family member is worth noting. It is well known that some women with children claim they are alone when they are actually accompanied by their spouse, in order to receive benefits and financial aid in particular. In Syria, for example, to deal with this issues, single Somali mothers receiving financial assistance who say they do not know the whereabouts of their husbands are formally cautioned by UNHCR that, if their resettlement applications are

successful, their husbands will not be included. If their husband appears following notification of resettlement, it will be cancelled.

It is a paradoxical situation for refugees in such circumstances. If a refugee woman with children has her husband with her, neither she nor the family qualify for financial assistance, even if the husband is unemployed and they have no means of income. If the husband is absent, she will receive assistance based on the number of her children. It may be suggested that this is a moral hazard that rationally induces fraudulent behavior, for survival.

Those women, however, who are actually alone and/or are single mothers with accompanying children, are a potentially vulnerable group who require support due to the challenges of their living situation as well as to avoid possible exploitation. A small percentage of men (less than 5%) also reported traveling as single parents with children. Those also are also a potentially vulnerable group requiring added support.

Despite declaring themselves as unaccompanied minors prior to the interview, some of the young respondents did report while being interviewed that they were actually in the company of an adult, including one who had traveled with a parent, one with a grandparent, 4 with a spouse and 18 with a relative. It was unknown whether their spouses or relatives were adults.

57 percent of the youth reported that they traveled alone (63% male: 37% female) and 12 percent reported traveling with a sibling and 12 percent with friends. Additionally, 6 of the youth reported that a family member died during their journey. None of them reported losing a parent. Thus, around 20 percent of the unaccompanied minors in the study were accompanied, at least during the journey. The revelation during the interview of the presence of adult family members is interesting to note, for it does suggest that some of those who might initially declare that they are unaccompanied minors might actually be accompanied by an adult.

There were some significant differences in family accompaniment between Yemen and Turkey respondents. While around 77 percent of both Ethiopians and Somalis in Turkey had travelled alone, in Yemen, only 44 percent of Somalis, compared with 78 percent of Ethiopians travelled alone which is consistent with the MMTF (2009) report.

Table 10

Marital Status by Accompanied by Family and Friends by Gender

Accompanied by	Never Married %		Married %		Divorced %		Widowed %	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Alone	80	70	48	23	75	48	100	45
Family + Friends	18	30	49	44	20	27		17
Child <18			3	33	5	25		38
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

3.9 Family remaining behind

Family members of migrants and refugees who remain in their home country are an important part of mixed migration that needs further exploration and was only covered in a cursory way in this study. The extent to which the migrants themselves are dependent on the continuing support of families at home, or vice versa and that families at home are dependent upon the financial support of those in the diaspora can increase our understanding of the motivations, capacities and responsibilities of those on the move.

The diversification of location and employment is important as a coping strategy among family groups (Moret et al., 2006) and Somalis in particular have already clearly established themselves as transnational communities worldwide (Al Sharmani, 2008). Indeed, many families living in camps in Somalia's neighbouring countries will send one or more members to live in nearby cities as a way to spread out risks and expand earning opportunities. This strategy is also used when sending family members across borders into other countries.

Horwood, in his study of Somali's in South Africa, highlights the cultural expectation that sons will provide for their families - often by exploring small business opportunities in the outside world - as a motivation for many young men to leave Somalia (Horwood, 2009: 36). Moret et al (2006) also highlight in their study of Somali migrants to the Netherlands and Switzerland that the majority undertaking the dangerous sea crossing to reach Europe are mainly young men.

Respondents in the current survey were also young, with almost half (45%) in the 19-25 years of age bracket[31] and mostly single (61%). Some 42 percent of married respondents left their spouse behind (31% females and 54% males). Almost 70 percent of respondents had left siblings and

[31] 52%, when excluding those under 18 years (13%) who were targeted for the sample.

parents behind. What is not clearly understood is the extent to which the Somalis and Ethiopians were expected to either forge a livelihood elsewhere and eventually arrange to have their partners (and children) join them, and/or to support them with remittances when they have gained work. Similarly with siblings and parents who remained behind. For those who reach a permanent home elsewhere, these are potential applicants for family reunion programs.

The number of respondents who left children behind was relatively small. 12 percent of married respondents report having left a child under 18 years old in their home country as well as 7 percent of those divorced and 10 percent of the widowed. The majority of children under18 years old left behind were being cared for by the respondent's parents or the child's grandparents (63%).

3.10 Reasons for travel

Like migrants from any long lasting conflict, people from Somalia and Ethiopia have decided to leave the country and the wider region to seek safety, legal status and a better quality of life.
95 percent of Somalis interviewed in Horwood's South African study noted war and physical insecurity as the primary reason for leaving Somalia; 29 percent of the respondents claimed unemployment as a factor; and 26 percent claimed poverty (Horwood, 2009: 36). Horwood's report showed some contrast between Somalis and Ethiopians in their stated first or primary reasons for leaving home. For example, 52 percent of the Ethiopians interviewed in South Africa cited unemployment or lack of opportunity as one of their main reasons for leaving. 36 percent stated that they left to seek greater opportunities due to poverty, and 39 percent cited insecurity and/or war as one of the main motivators behind migration (Horwood, 2009: 36). The majority of those interviewed by MSF in Yemen cited lack of work or poverty as their main motivation for leaving[32], while one quarter mentioned insecurity or political reasons (MSF, 2008: 27).
Young girls and women are sometimes sent abroad with the dual goal of protecting them from the sexual assault and exploitation common to camp environments and maximizing family earning potential in wealthier countries (Moret et al 2006:124-69). Another strategy employed by women to avoid harassment and sexual abuse is highlighted by de Regt, who says that in an attempt toaccess male protection, many women choose to marry along the journey from Somalia (de Regt, 2007).

At the outset of the conflict in Somalia, it was those with capacities and funds who migrated (Gundel, 2002). Gundel asserts that both migrant workers and refugees typically come from

[32] Most of those people stated that they intended to travel to KSA to find work.

better-off families with the resources to send members abroad (Gundel, 2002), while other authors point out that they may not belong to privileged social groups, but do exhibit a common desire to seek out better opportunities, as well as the ability to marshal resources, whether through work or contributions from family members at home or abroad (ICMPD, 2007; Horwood, 2009: 39).

The following section outlines the reasons that respondents reported in this study as to why they traveled away from their home countries. "Insecurity" was a crucial issue in the question of why respondents left their home countries and it was important to be certain how respondents understood "insecurity". In Somali, it was translated as *ammaan darro*, meaning a lack of safety, protection or peace. It is understood as a situation where there is a danger to both life and property at the same time. Similarly, in Amharic, the term *dehiainent yelem* was used and understood as a lack of security, meaning both a physical and psychological (mental) threat to the individual. Thus, insecurity was understood and referred to as "insecurity from conflict". The large majority of respondents cited insecurity from conflict as their main reason for leaving. Qualitative comments included: being physically attacked, rape (one male respondent said his wife had been raped in front of him) and more general statements such as hardship, suffering and lack of freedom.

It was not possible in this study to clearly distinguish between "genuine" refugees and "economic migrants" (those who are primarily seeking work and a better life), particularly in relation to the issue of why they left their home country, a critical factor in refugee status determination. There were usually combinations of factors cited by people as their reasons for leaving Somalia.

> ***Somali girl 15 years old arrived one day prior to interview in Yemen.***
> *I left my family due to no livelihood, no means and no security in the country. I left because of war and destruction. My siblings are all younger than me and my mother is constantly sick and my father is a very old man. My sister used to support us and she is tired of working and she lives in Sana'a, Yemen. I came here to give a hand to my sister and take the load off from her and support my family and I was told that my mother died when I arrived in Bossaso. I have anxiety and extreme worry about my siblings and my father. Although I would love to continue my education but then I have a responsibility to support my family and therefore I have to work as a housemaid.*

"Insecurity from conflict" was the overall most frequent single reason (i.e. first reason) (87%) that Somali respondents gave for fleeing from their home country. This was followed by "lack of assistance to meet basic needs" (6%) and "economic reasons" (mainly related to the need for employment) (4%).

Consistent with other studies, a smaller number of Ethiopians cited "insecurity from conflict" (67%) as their single most frequent reason for leaving home, while a larger proportion said it was because of "lack of assistance to meet basic needs" (19%) and "economic reasons" (13%).

19 Ethiopians said they had fled because of "military recruitment" which they wanted to avoid.

Table 11

Reasons for Leaving Home * Nationality Crosstabulation

			Nationality		
			Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Reasons for Leaving Home	Insecurity from Conflict	Count	654	138	792
		% within Nationality	87.3%	67.0%	82.9%
	Drought	Count	19	1	20
		% within Nationality	2.5%	.5%	2.1%
	Lack of Basic Needs	Count	44	39	83
		% within Nationality	5.9%	18.9%	8.7%
	Economic Reasons	Count	29	26	55
		% within Nationality	3.9%	12.6%	5.8%
	Forced/Eviction	Count	3	2	5
		% within Nationality	.4%	1.0%	.5%
Total		Count	749	206	955
		% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Respondents were able to give multiple reasons for their decision to flee. Most did have more than one reason. When aggregated, 1,518 responses to this question resulted in 52 percent "insecurity from conflict", 19 percent "lack of assistance to meet basic needs", 16 percent "economic reasons", 6 percent "drought", 5 percent "forced eviction" and 0.9 percent "lack of health care". The figure below shows Ethiopians in Turkey were less likely to cite "insecurity from conflict" as their main reason for flight, whereas almost all Ethiopians in Turkey and Yemen said "insecurity from conflict".

Youth reasons for leaving home included insecurity from conflict (42%), lack of assistance in meeting basic needs (22%), drought (9%), poor health (5%), no livelihood (3%), no education (3%) and camp living (2%).

Importantly, 41 percent of the youth reported choosing the location of the interview in order to seek employment. This was significantly higher than other ages. 22 percent chose the location for transit and 3 percent due to their family. 67 percent of the youth knew no one in the country while 34 percent reported knowing someone that included: a spouse, a sibling (9%), parent (1%), grandparent (1%), "relatives" (9%) and friends (11%).

Figure 3: Reasons for Leaving home by Nationality by Country of Interview



3.11 Internal displacement

Overall, almost half of the respondents (49%) said they had been internally displaced prior to arrival. By 'internally displaced' was understood that they had left their homes and wentelsewhere within their country for safety and security prior to embarking on their journey to the country of interview. They were not asked if they had actually stayed in an IDP camp. A fairly even proportion of Somalis (50%) and Ethiopians (46%) said that had been internally displaced.

Table 12

Internally Displaced Before Asylum * Nationality Crosstabulation

			Nationality		
			Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Internally Displaced Before Asylum	Yes	Count	373	95	468
		% within Nationality	49.8%	46.1%	49.0%
	No	Count	376	111	487
		% within Nationality	50.2%	53.9%	51.0%
Total		Count	749	206	955
		% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Collectively, around 50 percent of those in Turkey and 50 percent in Yemen said they had been internally displaced. However, a much larger proportion of Ethiopians in Turkey (74%) had been displaced compared with those in Yemen (21%) and a somewhat larger proportion of Somalis in Yemen (56%) were previously displaced compared with the Somalis in Turkey (43%).

Thus, a considerable proportion of those in this study had already experienced considerable disruption to their lives through internal displacement prior to embarking upon their journeys to Yemen and Turkey. Many of the IDP camps throughout the country, including in Galkayo in Puntland have been insecure with incidents of bombings and violence against those from the south; and with poor conditions resulting in diseases and infections related to malnutrition (IRIN, 2008; IRIN, 2009). However, the data in the study does not reveal the extent to which the displacement itself was a part of the overall journey, or whether the conditions and experience of displacement were the motivating factors that led to the decision to travel abroad.

Table 13

Internally Displaced Before Asylum * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

Country of Interview				Nationality		Total
				Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	Internally Displaced Before Asylum	Yes	Count	216	23	239
			% within Nationality	56.0%	21.1%	48.3%
		No	Count	170	86	256
			% within Nationality	44.0%	78.9%	51.7%
	Total		Count	386	109	495
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Internally Displaced Before Asylum	Yes	Count	157	72	229
			% within Nationality	43.3%	74.2%	49.8%
		No	Count	206	25	231
			% within Nationality	56.7%	25.8%	50.2%
	Total		Count	363	97	460
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3.12 Family reunion

Family reunion was not cited as a common reason for travel. A large majority of respondents in the survey indicated they had no family members in either Yemen or Turkey. Those who did were more likely to have a sibling, an aunt, uncle or cousin or "a friend" (see Table 20).

In one case, however, a Somali woman was desperate to be reunited with her husband in Yemen.

> ***Somali woman 30 years old living in Yemen less than a month.***
> *She left Mogadishu to join her husband, a disabled beggar, in Yemen. She sold all her jewelry and travelled with her 3 children after her father was killed in front of her and cut to pieces. In Bossaso, 2 men put a gun to her stomach and threatened to rape her. She screamed out a man's name to frighten them and they fortunately left. Her husband came to meet her at the reception site, but was refused entry. Now she is feeling upset because she came to be with him.*

In asking the reasons for travelling to Yemen and Turkey, it was unclear the extent to which family members may be residing in other countries to which they were destined. When asked about their reasons for going to their final destination, most who responded to the question gave pull factors as their primary reasons - "for a better life" (53%) or for "employment" (20%). A few (14%) specifically said they were going to join family elsewhere – 35 in Saudi Arabia, 34 in Europe, 8 in Canada, 5 in the USA and 1 in Australia. Their secondary reasons, however, were overwhelmingly push factors, such as "there are no opportunities here", "there is no education here", "there is not enough health care here" and "people are unkind here".

Table 14

Family Members Already in Country of Asylum * Nationality Crosstabulation

% within Nationality

		Nationality		
		Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Family Members Already in Country of Asylum	Spouse(s)	2.4%	1.0%	2.1%
	Sibling	5.2%	3.4%	4.8%
	Child Under 18	.3%		.2%
	Child Over 18	.7%		.5%
	Parent	.8%		.6%
	Grandparent	.1%	.5%	.2%
	Aunt/Uncle/Cousin	6.0%	4.9%	5.8%
	Friend/s	10.5%	1.9%	8.7%
	none	74.0%	88.3%	77.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3.13 Other reasons for travel

Some respondents gave reasons for fleeing that were unrelated to the conflict or economics. Some said they were "looking for freedom", a few because of "sexual harassment", one wanted to avoid an arranged marriage, another was "looking for the man I love"; a young man left to accompany his girlfriend. One Somali woman said she had been raped and a Somali man said his wife had been raped in front of him. Often complaints about the drought were coupled with issues resulting from the conflict and with economic issues including no employment leading to a lack of means to meet basic needs.

Somali female now 20 years of age and living in Syria for 3 years.
After my father and brother died and my mother disappeared, I was left in the care of my stepfather who beat me. I was 17 and wanted to find my mother so I traveled with the sister of my stepfather in a Syrian airlines flight from Mogadishu to Damascus, transiting in Dubai. My aunt paid for everything. I cannot remember anything about the travel papers used and have none now. My Aunt went Turkey and I have not heard from her since. I will stay in Syria. I am afraid to go to Turkey or Europe. I live with single friends and work folding curtains, receives 3000 SL per month (approximately $60), including 1,500 SL from UNHCR.

Somali girl 15 years old arrived one day prior to interview in Yemen.
I am a pastoralist. I used to go with my mother to look after the livestock. I left home because my sister who lives in Saudi wants me to come and babysit for her children. I know nothing about my journey. I was guided by my uncle. I have no idea how I reached here or what it means. I only know Jowhar. I was guided and I don't even know where I am. My uncle is taking care of everything.

It was not only push factors that led to the reasons for travel but also the real and/or perceived pull factors within the transit and permanent destination countries.

4.0 STUDY FINDINGS OF THE JOURNEY

The following traces the journey of the migrants and refuges. It utilizes information gathered from the questionnaire from which respondents were asked to list up to 6 of the most significant stops in their journey following their initial starting point. Where gender is not given consideration, there were no significant differences between males and females in the results.

4.1 Funding the costs of the journey

Family and social networks are by far the most important resource to Somali migrants and refugees. Existing diasporic communities in all countries mentioned thus far, as well as in Europe, North America and Australia, provide the information, funding and social connections necessary to undertake the journey from Somalia. Horwood notes that Somalis in South Africa rely heavily on traditional social structures that have "remained vital for the survival protection and cultural identity" of migrants and refugees throughout the Somali diaspora. These ready-made communities facilitate travel, adjustment and communication with officials and service providers in receiving states (Horwood, 2009: 29).

Somalis, as with many other communities in displacement, mostly seek safety in other parts of their own country, whilst a large number seek protection in neighbouring countries and a smaller number seek asylum in countries further afield. Where the cause of displacement is continual, the persons between these locations develop complex connections; in the Somali case, remittances are seen as a powerful resource for Somalia (Van Hear, 2003). Remittances were a strategy for Somalis that was in place well before displacement but was broadened after displacement by Somali mobility (Van Hear, 2006). Van Hear suggests that the Diaspora and the sustaining of transnational relations might represent the most enduring, if not durable, solution to many current situations of displacement (Van Hear, 2003). For Somalis, access to social networks and mobility can be the most important asset amongst refugees (Van Hear, 2006). Indeed, although remittance behaviour was not addressed specifically in the current study, the results do show as high reliance upon family for financial support in initiating their journey as well as sustaining them along the way. In the study on the journey to South Africa, 58 percent of those interviewed by the IOM

reported funding the journey through the sale of private assets and livestock, or with donations and/or loans from relatives, either in Ethiopia or abroad (Horwood, 2009: 112).

In this study, detailing the particular cost of each stop of the journey and for the overall trip was difficult, partly because of the reliability of the answers given, the memories of the respondents and the different currencies used in responses. The information that we attempted to get on costs was seriously corrupted with the translations and data entry. To give one example, there were wide discrepancies regarding the reported airfare costs to places abroad such as Istanbul, Dubai, Jeddah, Jordan or Syria, ranging from US$800-5000. Thus, we do not feel comfortable that the survey data on stop-by-stop costs is reliable. Respondents traveling by boat from Somalia to Yemen across the Gulf of Aden reported the cost at $80-120 US dollars.

Informants in Syria suggested that irregular entry into Syria costs around $4,000 from Somalia or KSA. Falsified travel documents can be made through the Somali Embassy in Syria, with cooperation from Syrian officers. In the arrangements, the Syrians receive $2000 and the smuggler receives $2000. However, it was also noted that the $2000 is recycled through the Somali community. That is, these fees are often spent buying goods and services from within the Somali community. Smuggling from Syria to Turkey was reported to cost around $500. It was said that "Kurds" help them to get to Turkey illegally because of the tension between Turks, Syrians and Iraqis, because of antagonistic relations with these countries, including drug smuggling. It was said: "All smugglers are Kurds, with Somalis acting as brokers". The standard route from Syria in the past was to go through Bab al Hawa, a border town, but the road became dangerous because of Syrian troops operating near the Turkish border. Thus, the route shifted to the region north of Latakia, made easier because of the mountains – and because they can go through Ra el Basseet on a normal large bus route with Syrians. At the bus station on the Turkey side of the border, someone, who has been described to them, will be waiting to meet and arrange final payment for the journey. The money is paid through the *Hawala* system.[33] When they arrive, they call their relatives, who may be in Somalia or Syria, or elsewhere, to tell them they have arrived and give instructions for the money to be released. The *hawala* system of exchange is safer and, it is argued, has restored the trust that was lost during the civil war.

33 Going back as far as the 8th century Islam, the hawala is a non-juridical, honour system of money transfer using hawala brokers (*hawaladars*) who disperse funds according to a customer's wishes from one country to another, without government regulation or records of individual transactions. It has proved particularly useful for migrant remittances, and by those who are being smuggled across borders; smugglers are given final payments by the brokers when the migrant has notified them that they have arrived safely.

When asked how they mainly funded their journey (see Table 15) very few respondents gave more than one source, so multiple answers were not considered. The largest source for the respondents was their families giving them financial support (29%). The second main source was the respondents working and saving (21%), followed by the selling of material possessions (15%), remittances from family abroad (15%), selling their animals (8%), selling their home and/or land (6%) and borrowing money (5%).

Somalis were more likely to raise funds from family remittances, while Ethiopians were more likely to sell their animals and material possessions. Combining remittances and local family support we find that almost half of Somalis in the study (47%) had their travel funded by their families, compared with a lower proportion of Ethiopians (31%). With remittances and direct financial support, 43 percent of all respondents were funded by family. This is an important finding because it means that families, whether left behind, in the destination country or somewhere else abroad, have made a significant investment in the migration of selected individuals from their homeland to seek a better and more secure existence commonly with the expectation by them and the person migrating that it will also benefit others. On the other hand, those that had sold all their possessions (houses, property, livestock, etc.) may be seen to have seriously broken their asset ties to their country and locale of origin, making it more difficult to return, or at least reducing the incentive to return.

How did You Fund Your Journey * Nationality Crosstabulation

			Nationality		
			Somali	Ethiopian	Total
How did You Fund Your Journey	Sold my Animals	Count	36	37	73
		% within Nationality	5.0%	18.2%	7.9%
	Sold Material Possessions	Count	86	50	136
		% within Nationality	12.0%	24.6%	14.8%
	Sold My Home and/or Land	Count	47	10	57
		% within Nationality	6.6%	4.9%	6.2%
	Engaged in Begging	Count	3	3	6
		% within Nationality	.4%	1.5%	.7%
	Engaged in Prostitution	Count	3	2	5
		% within Nationality	.4%	1.0%	.5%
	From Illegal Activity (Stealing, Smuggling,	Count	0	3	3
		% within Nationality	.0%	1.5%	.3%
	Rely on Family Support	Count	209	55	264
		% within Nationality	29.1%	27.1%	28.7%
	Relied on Humanitarian Assistance	Count	7	1	8
		% within Nationality	1.0%	.5%	.9%
	Remittances from Family Abroad	Count	126	8	134
		% within Nationality	17.6%	3.9%	14.6%
	Borrowed Money	Count	39	4	43
		% within Nationality	5.4%	2.0%	4.7%
	Worked and Saved	Count	161	30	191
		% within Nationality	22.5%	14.8%	20.8%
Total		Count	717	203	920
		% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 15

4.2 Travel trajectories

Evidence from this study shows a multifaceted set of routes to Turkey, with both Somalis and Ethiopians flying direct from their respective countries to Jordan, going overland by car to Syria, then Turkey. Many Ethiopians either flew or went overland to Sudan and from there, either by bus to Cairo, by air to Syria or by air to Istanbul. Some flew all the way - directly to Yemen, to Syria to Turkey. By air, respondents claimed to have reached Turkey directly from Aden, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Dubai, Khartoum, Nairobi, and one from Malaysia. Before reaching Turkey, some respondents reached Syria by air from Beirut, Dubai, Jeddah, Amman, Khartoum and Aden. From Sudan, some claimed they travelled by car or walked to Libya and then, by boat, managed to get to Turkey (precise details of this sea journey are unknown).

The large majority of Somalis started their journey from the South Central region, mainly Mogadishu. Consistent with the previous MMTF (2008) study, the overland route by bus, car or

minivan takes the main highway from Mogadishu to Jowhar, Beledweyne, Dusa Mareb, and Galkayo to Garoowe.[34] From Garoowe, the route branches off to the east to Puntland coast and Bosasso, or to the west to the Somaliland coast to Lascanood, Burco, Hargeysa, Berbera, or further up the coast to Djibouti and then Obock.

Many (121 in the sample) travelled to Mogadishu as their first stop from elsewhere in Banadir and the neighbouring regions of the south central zone – mainly Shabeelaha Hoose, Bay, Shabeelaha Dhexe and Bakool, respectively. Others made their way more directly across the route specified above, taking various numbers of stops along the way[35] (See UNHCR Map 5).

Taking account of the possibility of misinformation from informants in Turkey as discussed in the Methodology section above, it is significant to note the number of respondents whose first stop was outside Somalia or Ethiopia (see Table 16). Clearly, air travel was an option for a number of both Somali and Ethiopian respondents travelling to Turkey. Suspending the 110 who claimed they travelled by ship directly to Turkey, 119 respondents travelled by air: 35 to Syria (11 males, 24 females), 22 to Dubai (13 males, 8 females), 29 to Turkey (18 males, 11 females).

Table 16

34 Note that the spelling of the names of Somali towns and cities are varied. The more simplified spellings are used here.

35 More detailed descriptions of some of the conditions and activities of these stops, particularly at the ports of Bossaso, Berbera, Djibouti (particularly in the shantytown) and Obock in MMTF (2008).

First Stop Outside Country * Transport * Nationality Crosstabulation

Count

Nationality			Transport					Total
			Air	Ship	Small Boat	Road	By Foot	
Somali	First Stop Outside Country	Dubai	17	0	0	0		17
		Turkey	7	110	0	0		117
		Jeddah	7	0	1	0		8
		Jordan	1	0	0	0		1
		Kenya	2	0	0	7		9
		Sudan	1	0	0	0		1
		Syria	21	0	0	0		21
	Total		56	110	1	7		174
Ethiopian	First Stop Outside Country	Beirut	12			0	0	12
		Cairo	4			0	0	4
		Dubai	4			0	0	4
		Turkey	22			0	0	22
		Jordan	1			0	0	1
		Kenya	1			0	0	1
		Kuwait	1			0	0	1
		Sudan	4			10	6	20
		Syria	14			0	0	14
	Total		63			10	6	79

The 12 who flew to Beirut were all Ethiopian women, who most likely had prearranged domestic work there, as we might also assume for the women who flew to Dubai, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For these countries, it is possible for contracted domestic workers to have their flights and visas paid for by a recruitment agent, who is reimbursed by the placement agency in the country of destination and who is, in turn, reimbursed by the employer (Jureidini and Moukarbel, 2004). For these women, the journey from Beirut to Syria and then on to Turkey would be relatively easy, but clandestine. Thus, generally, for those who have the financial means, it is possible to arrange to enter these countries and fly direct, as one respondent in Syria explained her journey:

> ***Somali widow (26 years of age) head of household, 4 children in Syria.***
> *She arrived in Syria from Saudi Arabia (where she had a 2 month permit). She wanted to go to Syria because she said she knew of the assistance and protection offered. She claimed she traveled for 3 days by bus through Jordan and at the Jordanian/Syrian border she "rented a passport for $1,000" and entered Syria "legally" with a Saudi man who accompanied her as her husband and the father of her 3 children (she was pregnant). She claimed that only his photo was in the passport. Having sold her house and all her possessions, she said had previously entered Saudi Arabia similarly, paying a man from Mogadishu $1,500 to accompany her by air to Jeddah. She said all her friends entered Saudi in the same way.*

The following interviews with refugees illustrate that some make multiple journeys going back and forth, whether deported or voluntary, to reach their final destination.

> ***Ethiopian Male (23 years old) in Izmir, Turkey.***

Before 9 or 10 months I had been here but, due to psychological problems and an unstable situation, I returned to my homeland. Even though I was in my homeland I was not able to fulfill my basic necessities. One of my friends told me that she directly entered to Britain. After I suffered a lot I found a visa to Turkey and I arrived [by air]. I tried to go to Greece 15 days ago, but the boat was having motor failure. After that I was imprisoned, but now I am released - by the name of God I will reach my destiny tonight. (How he "found" a visa, was not explained.)

Somali man (32 years old man) arrived one day prior to interview in Yemen.
I am a carpenter. My wife and siblings are abroad. There is no life in Somalia. I have encountered many problems when I left Mogadishu and I have traveled legally to Saudi. After staying there 5 months I was captured and I claimed to be Ethiopian and was deported to Ethiopia. After that I went to Puntland and then to Yemen. I spent most of my time in Saudi in jail. I was arrested twice and the government paid my ticket money to Ethiopia. I came to Yemen three times.

Some 43 Somali respondents (6%) began their journey in the southwestern regions of Gedo, Jubbada Dhexe and Jubbada Hoose. Although in close proximity bordering Kenya, following from the conflict between *Al-Shabab* and *Hisbul-Islam* in Kismayo in September 2009, most Somalis fled north to Jamame and Jilid. At Bulo Hawo on the border, the Kenyan authorities refused entry.[36]

For Somalis, the data shows a clear trajectory from the South Central Zone to Galkayo (Mudug region) in Puntland. The main transit stop for Somalis travelling internally was Galkayo. 65 respondents arrived there as their first stop, 128 as the second, 65 as the third, 35 as their fourth and 9 as the fifth stop. (This number constituted some 43 percent of the respondents who had not already left to another country by air.) Only 47 stopped in Beledweyne first and 28 as their second stop. Very few stopped in Garoowe (17), preferring to move from Galkayo straight to Bossaso, Djibouti or Obock. 67 percent of Somalis in the sample (500) reached one of these three ports. More than half of the respondents (60%) reached Bossaso, 19 percent to Obock and 21 percent to Djibouti from where they were smuggled by boat to Yemen.

For Ethiopians who reached Yemen, the main overland route towards the Ethiopian- Somaliland border was taken by the large majority of respondents. The road from Addis Ababa, through Nazret to Dire Dawa was common. 42 percent of respondents ended up stopping in Harer and 55 percent in Jijiga. 45 percent traveled on to the border town of Borama. Using train and road transport, half went to Djibouti and the other half made their way to Bossaso through Hargeysa and Burco in Somaliland.

36 See IRIN, 1 October 2009, "Somalia: Civilians flee fighting in Kismayo", IRIN news.org.; IRIN, 6 October 2009, Somalia: Thousands stranded near the Kenyan border", IRINnews.org.

For Ethiopian respondents in Turkey, the travel trajectory was very different. 40 percent reached Turkey through Syria, whether directly from Addis Ababa by air (16%) or from other countries. Taking just the first stop recorded of the 97 respondents in Turkey (see table above), we find that some 81 percent left Ethiopia without passing through Somalia. 5 travelled to Addis Ababa, 22 flew directly to Turkey, 20 travelled to Sudan, 14 to Syria, 12 to Beirut, 4 to Cairo, 4 to Dubai, 1 to Kenya, 1 to Kuwait, and 1 to Jordan. Others also went to these countries in subsequent stops. 5 went to Libya, 1 to Jeddah and 1 to Iraq.

Collaborating previous research (MMTF, 2009), the study found that most Ethiopians (64%) crossed the Gulf of Aden from Djibouti, while most Somalis (59%) crossed from Bossaso. 32 percent of Ethiopians crossed from Bossaso, while 21 percent of Somalis crossed from Djibouti. Only 5 percent of Ethiopians crossed from Obock compared with 20 percent of Somalis. As Djibouti is a shorter journey for Ethiopians than taking the land route across to Bossaso, it was more likely that they would cross from there, while Somalis were more likely to travel to Bossaso where they would also have more clan support. In addition, however, as has been pointed out earlier, Ethiopians are more at risk in Bossaso, particularly for those who do not have friends and family connections there and who are not from the clans of the Ethiopian lowlands (MMTF, 2008).

4.3 Length of journey

Table 17 indicates the overall time taken to reach the country of destination for all respondents. The majority (54%) took 15-30 days to complete the journey. 17 percent took 31-90 days and 15 percent took longer. As previously mentioned, a large majority in Turkey stated they traveled directly by ship (presumably through the Suez Canal) taking around 5 weeks. Others claimed they traveled more quickly by air to Turkey or by other more circuitous routes.

Table 17

Travel Time Categories (DAYS) * Nationality Crosstabulation

			Nationality		
			Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Travel Time Categories (DAYS)	1-2 days	Count	9	25	34
		% within Nationality	1.2%	15.7%	3.9%
	3-7 days	Count	29	9	38
		% within Nationality	4.0%	5.7%	4.3%
	8-14 days	Count	46	6	52
		% within Nationality	6.4%	3.8%	5.9%
	15-30 days	Count	454	22	476
		% within Nationality	63.0%	13.8%	54.1%
	31-90 days	Count	113	33	146
		% within Nationality	15.7%	20.8%	16.6%
	91-180 days	Count	32	11	43
		% within Nationality	4.4%	6.9%	4.9%
	181-365 days	Count	27	16	43
		% within Nationality	3.7%	10.1%	4.9%
	366 days or more	Count	11	37	48
		% within Nationality	1.5%	23.3%	5.5%
Total		Count	721	159	880
		% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

4.4 Conditions of the journey

Questions were asked about each major stop (up to 6) along the way and their experiences with regard to assistance, dangers and smugglers. Respondents took many different routes with some making only one stop while others made even more than 6.

Assistance along the way

The figures in Table 18 show that most respondents were assisted by friends and relatives along their journey, although this assistance reduced as they moved further from home and became more self-reliant and/or reliant upon “strangers” who were usually smugglers. The figures here include those who at various stops had already reached the country in which they were interviewed.

Table 18

Assistance along the Way (%)

Stop	Relative	Friend	Stranger	No-one
1	57	15	6	22
2	41	13	15	31
3	26	11	25	38
4	22	7	32	39
5	15	8	35	40
6	16	4	38	43

Most of the assistance in arranging the money needed was given by relatives all along their journey, with some financial assistance from friends as well. Without a proper banking system or recognized intermediaries, and with international security measures limiting financial transfers, Somali remittances rely very much on the now well-known group of companies called Al-Barakat which established a wire transfer business (Al-Barakat Finance Group) based on the hawala system was transferring some $140 million per annum from the Somali diaspora into Somalia since 2001.

Transport was initially arranged or provided by relatives, but respondents were increasingly reliant upon strangers for transport after the second stop, when they also provided hiding places and assisted in secretly crossing borders. On average, about 30 percent of respondents said no one helped them, in paying bribes, hiding and crossing borders.

It was reported that 62 percent of the youth was assisted by a relative and 10 percent by a friend in preparing for their journey. 47 percent received money and 30 percent received transport. Only 21 percent reported assistance by a smuggler.

Use of Smugglers

For each stop in their journey, respondents were asked whether they used a smuggler. They were also asked the nationality of the smuggler that assisted them. On average, respondents reported being assisted by a smuggler around 45 percent of the time throughout the journey. Overall, a larger proportion of the Ethiopian sample in the survey reported using smugglers compared with Somalis, but the latter were far more numerous.

Table 19

Assistance by Smuggler

Stop	Somali		Ethiopian		Total	
	Yes %	No	Yes %	No	Yes %	No
1	14	83	63	29	25	70
2	18	80	71	27	25	73
3	38	60	82	16	42	55
4	58	40	76	24	59	39
5	73	25	54	46	72	27

Somalis did not use smugglers very often during stops 1 and 2. When they did, they used Somalis. Only one Somali reported using an Ethiopian smuggler, which was to Obock. During this time, most were traveling within Somalia by land and probably by public transport. By stop 3, the use of smugglers increased with more than half using a smuggler if they continued to stop 4 and almost two thirds if they continued to stop 5. Somalis used Somali smugglers exclusively from Obock, Djibouti and Bossaso to cross the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Somalis also used mostly Somali smugglers to get them to Dubai, Syria, Jordan and Turkey (both by air to Istanbul and across the Syrian border by land to Antakya in Hatay).

Ethiopians commonly used smugglers (63%) at the beginning of their journey and thus were used to assist them across into Somaliland and Puntland. Around half of the Ethiopians used a Somali and the other Ethiopian smugglers. The use of Ethiopian smugglers overland, however, were very few and quite restricted to travel within Ethiopia to places like Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Harer, Hartisheikh, Jijiga, Nazret and just across the border into Borama; a few were taken as far as Djibouti and Obock. For the boat journeys to Yemen from Obock, Djibouti and Bossaso, Somali smugglers were mostly used but a few Ethiopians were reportedly used also. More importantly, Ethiopian smugglers were more used to assist Ethiopians to reach other countries direct by air, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Dubai, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria.

Countries other than Yemen used a range of nationals as smugglers. The following provides a list of these countries with the nationalities of smugglers used.

To Beirut: Ethiopian (mainly), Yemeni, Syrian.

To Egypt: Ethiopian, Eritrean

To Dubai: Somalis (mainly), Syrian, Ethiopian, Saudi, Yemeni

To Turkey:	Somalis (mainly), Ethiopian, Syrian, Turkish, Yemeni, Eritrean, Jordanian, Sudanese, Saudi
[To Antakya:	Somali (mainly), Turkish, Syrian]
To Kenya:	Somali, Syrian
To KSA:	Yemeni (mainly), Syrian, Saudi
To Jordan:	Ethiopian, Somali, Saudi
To Kuwait:	Ethiopian
To Sudan:	Ethiopian (mainly), Eritrean, Sudanese
To Syria:	Somali (mainly), Syrian, Ethiopian, Sudanese, Yemeni, Jordanian
To Libya:	Sudanese (mainly), Somali, Eritrea

The results here show a substantial reliance of the respondents on smugglers throughout their journey to the country where they were interviewed and it seems the business of smuggling is thriving both in demand and supply. This is despite increased security measures and attempts to control borders from illegal entry. It is also despite the numerous reports of horrendous violations by smugglers against their 'clients' that include extortion, robbery, physical violence, sexual abuse and abandonment (Horwood, 2009). Somali and particularly Ethiopian respondents complained about their treatment on the boats, which have been well documented, including serious overcrowding, lack of food and water (to reduced the need for the non-existing toilets and the movement on the boat that it would cause), beatings with sticks, suffocation in the holds and throwing overboard those who are considered troublesome. Despite these reports, thousands still make the journey and survive.

Combating smuggling by stopping smugglers, however, will not necessarily reduce irregular migration. Rather, it makes it more clandestine and thus more costly because it becomes riskier, for both smugglers and their passengers alike (Van Liempt, 2007; Refugee Council, 2008). As Van Liempt (2007) suggests, the smugglers are merely the messengers. The main issue is that people turn to them in need. The dilemma is that increasing the risk of arrest and punishment of smugglers can lead to the further victimization of the people they are smuggling. Notoriously, when the Yemeni government began to apprehend the boat smugglers (even though given relatively low fines and/or short term prison sentences), smugglers began to abandon their passengers to avoid arrest in Yemeni waters, sometimes in deep seas off the coast of Yemen, and many hundreds have been drowned trying to get to shore (see MSF, 2008). The practice continues (see Hauslohner, 2010).

Dangers during the journey

'Dangers along the way' was used in the study to ascertain what kinds of dangers were actually encountered or experienced by them, such as robberies, bribes, physical violence, sexual abuse, etc. Because some personal experiences are sometimes difficult to reveal, the question asked about dangers that either they, or others who were travelling with them, experienced. There was a follow-up question that asked for the outcomes of the dangerous experiences. In hindsight, this may have been better expressed because many responses were too general, such as "I survived", or "I was released". Clearly they managed to complete they journey to the place of interview, but qualitative questions on this might have revealed more understanding on how individuals actually dealt with the dangerous encounters and whether they had longer-lasting effects of particular incidents.

The information for this section was gathered through a series of cross tabulations that provide the numbers and types of incidents of dangers and the locations of these dangers. Additionally, the table below provides a list of the incidents and the perpetrators attributed by the respondents to those dangers. The number of dangers however exceeds our knowledge about perpetrators and locations since not all respondents provided this information for each incident.

Respondents reported 882 dangerous experiences. Some respondents experienced more than one incident during their journeys while others reported they did not experience any dangers. The following table summarizes the number of incidences according to the location, indicating where most of the incidents occurred which were either on the way to these locations or at them. The countries of Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen were aggregated because not all respondents specified a city or particular location within them.

The table shows substantial risks for all those travelling, not just along the land routes to the northern Somali coast, but also those who flew out directly, to Turkey in particular, where many faced further humiliations. While the circumstances and encounters have been reported widely in reports and the press, the details above do provide some statistical base by which to judge the extent of the problems. The key points of risk in Somalia are during the journeys away from the south central zone to and at Galkayo, Djibouti and Bossaso. Outside Somalia, the most numerous incidents were in Turkey and Yemen. For the respondents in this study, fewer risks of harsh treatment, it seems, are in Syria, Dubai and Lebanon.

Table 20

Main Locations by Total Number of Problems Encountered

Stop	Dangers Encountered						Total
	Robbery	Bribes	Physical Violence	Sexual Abuse	Smuggler Problems	Travel Problems	
Mogadishu	21	3	6	1	1	13	45
Beledweyne	15	6			1	6	28
Galkayo	50	20	6	3	4	21	104
Boorama	15	23					38
Burco	34	4					38
Hargeysa	16	9			5	4	34
Dire Dawa (Ethiopia)	3	1					4
Hartisheikh (Ethiopia)	10	4			2	5	21
Bossaso	66	11	9	2	1	21	110
Djibouti	62	18	7	1	11	16	115
Obock (Djibouti)	15	3	2	1	7	11	39
Sudan	3	3				1	7
Syria	2	2	1			2	7
Turkey	28	12	13	7	35	14	109
Yemen	35	13	38	5	42	50	183
Total	375	132	82	20	109	164	882

Ethiopian male 38 years old 1- 6 months in Yemen.

The departure at the Somali border has serious trouble for those forced to leave. The incidents are worse in different cities in Somalia. The Somali people are very cruel with inhuman behaviour. They do anything they like. They have armaments and they frighten travellers. They do everything. Some raped women. They robbed, they murdered, they drowned people in the water. They hit and injure with an iron bar. They make them mentally disturbed. They make trouble for Ethiopians who cross to Yemen. In Yemen, also, there is something else.

Overall, the militia was more responsible for the dangers at the beginning of the journeys. This decreased after the first stop when the smugglers and checkpoint guards become the more numerous source of danger. By Stop 3, guards at coast also became a danger. Overall, smugglers were the most common perpetrators of the dangers they encountered. Every incident of danger is, of course, serious to the victims. However, it is interesting to note that most of the dangers reported did not include physical violence. Incidents of physical assault and/or rape were reported to occur to approximately 1-5% of the population at any stop with the least risk at the beginning of the journey and greater risk by the 5th stop. Rape was reported to occur to less than .5% of the

population. This number, however, is likely to be low due to the stigma that prevents people from openly sharing this information.

1st Stop of Journey: 955 respondents

66% of the adult population reported no problems during this stop of the journey.

Respondents most commonly made Stop 1 in Galkayo (18%), Mogadishu (13%), Istanbul (11%) and Beledweyne (5%).

Robberies and extortion was the complaint most commonly reported by equal numbers of male and female respondents during this first stop of the journey. Those aged 26-35 years had the least robberies (10%) and 45-60 years the most (22%). Males under 18 years (29%) and females 45-60 years (27%) had the most robberies; males 26-35 years (8%) and females 19-25 years (11%) had the least. Despite the robberies, they clearly did not lose everything since they continued their journeys.

Somalis reported that robberies and incidents of extortion took place at stop one most often in Galkayo (39 or 23% of the people who made this their first stop), Mogadishu (21 of 17%), Beledweyne (13), Bossaso (13), Garoowe (1), Merca (1). For the others, the robberies occurred in Ethiopia (7), Sudan (3), Kenya (2) and Turkey (2).

There were 167 complaints of dangers to which respondents revealed the perpetrators. The perpetrators were most often the militia (85) committing robbery and extortion (57). 36 incidents of travel problems including harassment and delays were reported of which almost half was caused by the militia and smugglers.

Bribes were the next most complained issue. In Somalia, bribery was most common at stop one in Galkayo and Beledweyne and less often in Bossaso and Hargeysa. Most commonly the army was accused of collecting bribes.

21 people complained of being detained and released, presumably by the militia.

4 females reported being raped and 8 (7 females,1 male) complained of physical assaults. For Stop 1, the sexual assault was reported in Mogadishu (1); Galkayo (2); and Yemen (1). Incidents of physical assault were reported in Mogadishu (2), Galkayo (2) and Beledweyne (1) as well as in Yemen (2), Sudan (1), Turkey (2) and Djibouti (1). Of the 3 women who reported their perpetrators, 1 reported a Tribesman, 1 a co-traveler and 1 the militia.

6 people reported a murder but it is unclear how many were murdered.

52 percent of the youth reported having no problems during the first stop of their journeys. The largest problem during the 1st stop was that 27 percent were robbed. This was significantly more than other age groups except those from 45-60 years were robbed 22% of the time. Significantly, more males under 18 years (i.e. 29%) were robbed than females of the same age group (13%).

6 percent of the youth reported paying bribes and 7 percent had travel problems.

3 (2 female, 1 male) of the 21 people who were detained and released were under 18 years old.

The dangers in this first stop of the journey for the youth were reportedly caused 23 percent of the time by the militia; checkpoint police (4%) and by the army and authorities (6%). Other age categories seem to have had fewer problems with the militia. Only 6 percent of the dangers at this stage for the youth were caused by smugglers and 6 percent by local people.

The dangers had a direct impact on the youth 22 percent of the time ("I was detained", "raped", "assaulted" etc.) and an indirect impact 6 percent of the time (someone else was murdered, or raped etc.). 1 female under 18 years old reported having been raped and 1 male and 1 female physically assaulted. This is at the same frequency as other age groups.

2nd Stop of the Journey: 899 respondents

69 percent reported no dangers during the 2nd stop.

Respondents most commonly made Stop 2 in Bosasso (14%), Istanbul (10%), Ankara (8%), Hargeysa (9%), Galkayo (7%), Syria (5%) and Izmir (5%).

The number of robberies decreased, particularly by the militia. Somalis continued to report robberies, however, in Bossaso (9), Hargeysa (7), Galkayo (6), Borama (3) and Beledweyne (3). Robberies were also reported in Djibouti (7), Hartisheikh, at the Ethiopian border (4) plus 3 other Ethiopian locations.

The problem of bribes was reported by 22 respondents in Somalia: Hargeysa (8), Borama (5), Galkayo (4), Bossaso (3), Garoowe (1) and Jowhar (1); also in Turkey (2) in Istanbul, Izmir; Ethiopia (4) in Hartisheikh, Dawale, Jijiga, Syria (2), Djibouti (6), Jeddah (1), Libya (1), Sudan (1), Yemen (3). Checkpoint guards (37) were most commonly accused of requiring bribes.

Travel problems (i.e. harassment, hassles, deception, cheating, faulty planning, breakdowns etc.) were reported in Somalia in Beledweyne (3), Bossaso (9), Galkayo (6), Hargeysa (4),

Loyacade(2), Laascaanood (1); and in Turkey (5); Djibouti (1); Yemen (7), Latakia, Syria (1). Smugglers were reported to be the cause of the Travel Problems most often (58).

24 people complained about being detained and released.

During this 2nd stop of the journey, 6 rapes were reported including 1 male under 18 and 1 male over 18 and 4 females over 18 years. The rapes were reported to have occurred in Somalia in Bosasso (2) and Galkayo (1), Syria (1), Turkey (2). Of those people who reported the perpetrators, 3 reported that the rapists were smugglers and 2 reported the militia.

12 complaints (6 females/6 males) were made of physical assault. The physical assaults were reported in Yemen (5), Obock (2), Ethiopia (2), Syria (1), Libya (1) and Istanbul (1). The perpetrators were reported most often as smugglers (6)

5 people reported a murder but it is unclear how many were murdered.

65 percent of youth reported no dangers during the 2nd stop of the journey. This was about the same as other age groups. The greatest problems for this age group included travel problems 10 percent of the time. 9 percent of the youth reported paying bribes. 1 (female) of the 24 people who were detained and released was under 18 years.

The most common perpetrators of the problems for the youth were the checkpoint police at 11 percent and less problems with the militia at 5 percent. There was a slight increase with problems with smugglers rising to 9 percent.

During this 2nd stop of the journey, 1 male under 18 reported that he was raped and 1 male was physically assaulted.

3rd Stop of the Journey: 780 respondents

59 percent reported no dangers at stop 3.

Respondents who made a 3rd stop most commonly made it in Yemen (14%), Ankara (10%), Bosasso (8%), Djibouti (7%), Konya (4%) and Loyacade (4%).

The problems dramatically increased at this stop. There were 95 complaints: robbery (24) and travel problems (59). The Smuggler problems at this stop most often took place in Yemen (15). The travel problems most often took place in Yemen (19), Bossaso (10) and Djibouti (4).

Robberies and bribes at this stop were more commonly perpetrated by checkpoint guards. These robberies were most commonly in Borama, Somalia and Djibouti. Some robberies were also attributed to guards at the coast.

24 people complained of being detained but were released.

4 women reported having been raped. 2 of the victims reported that the perpetrators were the Army and a Smuggler. Only one rape was given a location and this was Djibouti.

13 (5 females, 8 males) respondents were physically assaulted. These assaults were reported to have occurred in Turkey and Somalia. The largest number was perpetrated by smugglers.

8 people reported a murder but it is unclear how many were murdered.

59 percent of the youth reported no dangers during the 3rd stop of the journey. Other age groups had problems from 48–71 percent of the time.

Problems with travel increased slightly to 11 percent. 8 percent of the youth complained of robbery which was half of the rate for 35-45 years old at this stop, but similar to other age groups. Of the 24 people who complained of being detained but were released 1 female was under 18 years.

The problems related to smugglers for the youth more than tripled to 30 percent while the problems with militia went to less than 2 percent during this stop of travel. Similar increases in problems with smugglers were true for all ages.

During this 3rd stop of the journey no one under 18 years old reported rape. 2 males and 1 female under 18 years old were assaulted.

4th Stop of the Journey: 500 respondents

52% of the respondents reported no problems at Stop 4.

Respondents who made a 4th stop most commonly reported it in Yemen (11%), Djibouti (7%), Bossaso (5%) and Ankara (5%).

Robbery was the greatest problem. 38 respondents complained about incidents in Somalia, Djibouti 23, Yemen 9, Turkey 7 and Ethiopia 2. The most commonly mentioned perpetrator was the checkpoint guards, followed by the smugglers and guards at the coast.

Incidents of bribery were less common. They were mostly perpetrated by checkpoint guards or smugglers and were reported in Somalia, Djibouti and Yemen.

Travel problems were most often perpetrated by Smugglers and were most often reported in Djibouti and Yemen.

The problem of detention was increased with 32 males and 26 females detained and released. 3 respondents reported that people were detained and not released.

There were 3 incidents of rape reported by females. The perpetrators were named as the army, guards at the coast and a smuggler. Only one of the rapes was given a location and that was Yemen.

12 people (3 females, 9 males) complained of physical assault. The locations reported for incidents of physical violence occurred in Somalia (1), Turkey (3), Djibouti (2) and Yemen (5). The perpetrators were reported to be smugglers.

46 incidents of travel problems were reportedly caused by smugglers.

47 percent of youth reported no dangers during the 4th stop of the journey. This is compared to the other age groups who complained of no problems from 42-80 percent of the time

The largest problem for youth during this stop was robbery at 18 percent. Robbery was the greatest problem at all ages with 32 percent of those 35-45 years old reporting robbery.

The problem of detention was increased with 32 males and 26 females detained and released. This included 2 males and 3 females under 18 years. 3 reported people who were detained and not released.

Of the 3 incidents of rape, one was reported by a female under 18 years old. 3 males under 18 years complained of physical assault.

Smugglers continued to be responsible for the problems at 29 percent of the time for those under 18 years. This was similar to other age groups. The problems with checkpoint police increased to 16 percent of the time for the youth, with similar increases in other age groups and an even higher level from 35-45 years of age at 28 percent.

5th Stop of the Journey: 290 respondents

40 percent of the respondents reported no problems.

Respondents who made a 5th stop most commonly made it in Yemen (8%), Obock (5%), Bossaso (4%) and Ankara (3%).

Robberies on this stop were attributed to checkpoint guards (25), guards at the coast (12), and smugglers (15). The robberies most commonly took place in Somalia (28) particularly in Bossaso (22) followed by Djibouti (16) and Yemen (14).

Overall, the most common perpetrators about one third of the time continue to be the smugglers.

40 people (26 males, 14 females) were detained and released.

One female reported having been raped by a smuggler.

14 (6 females, 8 males) reported being physically assaulted. Incidents of physical violence took place most often in Yemen at this stop.

Problems with travel continue to be most commonly perpetrated by the smugglers (25).

From the youth, there is a substantial increase in complaints about problems at this 5th stop with only 37 percent reporting no dangers. The other age groups also experienced more problems during this stop with only 31–50 percent reporting no problems.

The problems in travel more than doubled to 24 percent during this stop but only for this age group. 13 percent under 18 years had problems with robbery. This was less than half the problems of robbery for other age groups with robbery about 35 percent for those 35–60 years old.

The most common perpetrators continued to be the smugglers at 29 percent for the under 18 years and similarly for the other age groups. The checkpoint police also continued to be problematic for 13 percent.

40 people (26 males, 14 females) were detained and released including 3 (2 male, 1 female) under 18 years.

One female reported having been raped. 3 males under 18 years old reported being physically assaulted.

6th Stop of the Journey: 151 respondents

This small number made the analysis of the data less reliable.

The table below summarizes the number of incidents by the perpetrators at each stop as reported by the respondents. In the aggregate

Table 21

Number of Dangerous Experiences by Perpetrator

	Robbery & Extortion	Bribes	Physical Violence	Sexual Abuse	Travel Problems	Total
Army	13	25	3	2	8	51
Guards at Coast	53	7	20	1	13	94
Tribe people	27	8	2	1	4	42
Co-Travellers	1	0	3	1	6	11
Local People	21	5	3	0	18	47
Checkpoints	106	55	3	0	9	173
Smugglers	76	23	41	11	183	334
Militia	78	9	7	4	32	130
Total	375	132	82	20	273	882

The dangers most often reported were of robbery (43%) and travel problems (31%). Problems with travel most often occurred in Djibouti and Yemen. Robbery and extortion occurred in many locations, but most often inside Somalia.

> ***Somali female 22 years old interviewed in Yemen 4 days after arrival.***
> *The motor of the boat got on fire and the boat went down. When people saw, they ran to us. When I saw the fire, I got terrified and I started bleeding, heavy bleeding, like I was giving birth and my blood went everywhere. I fainted and was unconscious for 3 hours. Till now I am puzzled and I can't see well.*

In terms of those who were most vulnerable, several of those travelling alone with an under 18 year old did encounter problems of robbery, physical violence and sexual abuse along the way (in Mogadishu, Beledweyne, Galkayo and Bossaso) but also in Turkey (only a few accidents were reported in Yemen) – in Istanbul (physical violence and sexual abuse), Izmir (harassment by smugglers), Antakya (physical violence) and Konya where there were 16 cases of robbery reported.

While, on average, more than half of the unaccompanied minors reported no serious problems along the routes they took, there were cases of rape (including one male), robbery, extortion and physical violence. In Somalia, these occurred mainly in Bossaso, Galkayo, Djibouti and Obock. Most problems that the minors faced, however, were reported in Yemen, with 10 cases of physical abuse, 3 cases of sexual abuse, 16 cases of robbery, 12 of harassment by smugglers, 2 with health problems and 3 reported a lack of basic needs. In Turkey 5 minors report physical abuse in Antakya and 2 reported being robbed in Istanbul.

Table 22

Physical Assault and Rape during the journey

Stop of journey	Rape	Physical assault
1	4 females	11 (8 females / 3 males)
2	6 (4 females / 2 males)	16 (8 females / 8 males)
3	4 females	18 (8 females / 10 males)
4	3 females	17 (5 females / 12 males)
5	1 female	20 (9 females / 11 males)
Total	18 (16 females / 2 males)	82 (38 females / 44 males)

Oromo Ethiopian male (25 years old) in Yemen less than one month

This journey in Somalia makes everyone dizzy. Their behavior towards human beings is not sensitive, with their cruel behavior and no respect, especially on those who could not speak the Somali language. They have set things up for extortion - to take our possessions like it was a permanent job. If you say you have nothing, they torture you in a small cage. They forcibly take what you have. They search for money by taking off your clothes with just your pants and then they beat and injure and put you in prison. The situation was bad even when we arrived at the Yemen seacoast.

Ethiopian Catholic male (29 years old) in Yemen 1-6 months.

There was trouble on the journey in Somalia. They separated the travelers and interrogated them. They hate Ethiopians, especially Christians. They beat and robbed us and we faced many troubles in Somalia - and by the smugglers on the boat which we got to Yemen. At the Yemen seacoast we were robbed, but better (less) than in Somalia.

Somali female (40 years old) in Yemen less than one month.

When we got off the boat, we were 5 girls and one boy and many men attacked us and held four of the girls. And when the boy that was with us tried to defend us, they beat him and raped three of the girls.

As noted at the beginning of this section, when asked about the outcomes of the dangerous encounters, there were relatively few meaningful responses. However, a substantial number (20%; 191) of respondents did report having been placed into detention along the way (53 percent male and 47 percent female). In addition, 78 (8%) reported having been physically injured from violence against them and that those injuries were ongoing (76 percent males and 24 percent females). Finally, 47 of the respondents (5%) reported ongoing mental distress from the violations against them (43% male, 57% female).

The dangers reported during the study can be compared with the following data provided by UNHCR and DRC about the dangers reported surrounding the arrival of Somalis and Ethiopians to Yemen by boat. The UNHCR-DRC 2009 year-long statistic states that there were 74,155 estimated arrivals at the Yemeni coast. Of these, 534 were reported as either dead or missing.
This was 0.72% of arrivals. Even one death is of course serious; however, the numbers in these reports suggest a considerable decrease in the number of deaths since the *Medecin sans Frontiere* report (2008). They reported that in 2007, 30,000 people traveled across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Of these, they reported that according to the UNHCR Incident Statistical Report 2007 that 5% were declared dead (1,500 persons). They believed that this figure was low and that many more boats and people had gone missing. This 2007 figure is 3 times the number of deaths for less than half the number of migrants of 2009.

All violence is of concern. However, the level of violence reported by refugees to UNHCR-DRC about their boat journeys on arrival to Yemen also seems less than what was reported in the MSF report, which focused on those who they were treating. During the period of data collection for this study (i.e. November 2009) 18 boats were reported to have arrived in Yemen. In reports on 7 of these, two incidents of violence were reported (see Table 23).

Table 23

UNHCR-DRC INCIDENT REPORTS / 7 BOATS / NOVEMBER 7 – 22, 2009

DATE	Somali Arrivals			Non-Somali Arrivals			Violence reported
	Male	**Female**	**(Total)**	**Male**	**Female**	**(Total)**	
Nov 14	M-25 M-38	F-22 F-8	(47) (46)	M-1		(1)	No violence or problems reported on boat.
Nov 15	M-1	F-5	(6)	M-97	F-8	(105)	No violence or problems reported on boat. **On arrival SGBV against 3 Somali women after sole Somali male was attacked by Non-Somalis.**
Nov 16	M-39	F-22	(61)	M-76	F-12	(88)	No violence or problems reported on boat.
Nov 20	M-1		(1)	M-89	F-18	(107)	**Passengers complained of mistreatment and assault on boat. Forced to disembark in deep water. 1 Non-Somali drowned and 1 Non-Somali missing.**
Nov 21	M-66	F-27	(93)				No violence or problems reported on boat.
Nov 22	M-59	F-23	(82)	M-3		(3)	No violence or problems reported on boat.
TOTAL	**M-229**	**F-107**	**(336)**	**M-266**	**F-38**	**(306)**	

Though there continues to be serious dangers in the migration out of Somalia and into Yemen, the data suggests that the situation in 2009 for some reason had fewer serious incidents than in the past. One Somali interviewer for the study discussed the pending journey of his wife and children. He was asked if he was worried about the dangers. He replied, *"No. I will be sure to arrange a safe boat. There are different kinds of boats and captains and I know which one is safe."*

4.5 Humanitarian Assistance

Expectations on arrival

Wider research suggests that individuals take account of a number of variables when deciding where to claim asylum. For Somalis, reunions with families dispersed by the conflict was important, as is securing legal status, prospects for education, employment and permanent settlement were important in the choice of destination (Moret el al., 2006; Van Liempt, 2007; Zimmerman, 2007). Several studies have highlighted that few Somali asylum seekers are fully aware of what is available to them on their arrival, nor do they have a good knowledge of the differences between asylum determination processes in different countries (Van Liempt, 2007; Zimmerman, 2007).

Many respondents in the study seemed to have had somewhat realistic expectations about their opportunities when they arrived in Turkey and Yemen. They seemed to know that there would be limited availability of food, shelter, resettlement and employment opportunities.

Upon arrival in Yemen:

- 43 percent of the Ethiopians expected to be detained on arrival.
- 11 percent of the Somalis and 13 percent of the Ethiopians expected resettlement.
- 25 percent of the Somalis and 2 percent of the Ethiopians expected employment.

Upon arrival in Turkey:

- 18 percent Somalis and 13 percent Ethiopians expected resettlement.
- 0 percent Somalis and16 percent Ethiopians expected food.
- 3 percent Somalis and 25 percent Ethiopians expected shelter.
- 3 percent Somalis and 17 percent Ethiopians expected employment.

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Table 24

What Was Expected Upon Arrival in This Country * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

% within Nationality

Country of Interview			Nationality		Total
			Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	What Was Expected Upon Arrival in This Country	Resettlement	10.8%	13.0%	11.3%
		Detention	4.0%	43.5%	12.8%
		Food	6.9%	1.9%	5.8%
		Shelter	.8%	18.5%	4.7%
		Protection	1.3%	12.0%	3.7%
		Employment	25.1%	1.9%	20.0%
		Education	3.4%		2.7%
		Health Care	.8%		.6%
		Connection to Other Travel	10.1%	.9%	8.0%
		Find People From My Country	2.6%	2.8%	2.7%
		Other	19.6%	2.8%	15.8%
		Don't Know	14.6%	2.8%	11.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	What Was Expected Upon Arrival in This Country	Resettlement	18.0%	12.9%	17.0%
		Detention	7.5%	2.2%	6.4%
		Food		16.1%	3.3%
		Shelter	.3%	24.7%	5.3%
		Protection	.6%	4.3%	1.3%
		Employment	2.8%	17.2%	5.7%
		Education	.3%		.2%
		Health Care	.3%		.2%
		Connection to Other Travel	4.7%	10.8%	5.9%
		Find People From My Country	.6%		.4%
		Other	5.5%	5.4%	5.5%
		Don't Know	59.6%	6.5%	48.7%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

From interviews with the unaccompanied youth, 53 percent reported that their journey was as they had expected. Since many journeys included problems, this suggests that they were either aware of, or prepared, for the difficulties before travel. 47 percent, however, said the journey was not as they expected. Of these, 64 percent said it was more difficult and 10 percent reported having been deceived.

59 percent of respondents reported knowing someone who had made a similar journey. They reported the promising aspects of what they had heard. For example, 47 percent had learned that other travelers had found work; 26 percent knew someone who had been granted asylum and 5 percent had been told of others being resettled.

16 percent of the youth expected employment on arrival in this country while 10 percent expected resettlement. 10 percent expected connecting travel, 7 percent detention and 3 percent education. It is interesting that only 3 percent reported that they could further their education.

Accommodation on arrival

By way of summary, upon arrival and during the first month:

Yemen

- 94 percent of Somalis and 15 percent Ethiopians stayed in reception centers
- 19 percent of Ethiopians stayed in detention centers for refugees
- 3 percent of Ethiopians stayed in prison

Turkey

- 48 percent Somalis and 21 percent Ethiopians stayed with friends
- 2 percent Somalis and 7 percent Ethiopians stayed in reception centers
- 12 percent Somalis and 4 percent Ethiopians stayed with family
- 9 percent Somalis and 20 percent Ethiopians stayed in a hotel
- 8 percent Somalis and 19 percent Ethiopians stayed with strangers
- 11 percent Ethiopians were in prison, detention or were hiding

It should be noted that, formally, there are no "reception centers" in Turkey. Respondents who said they stayed in a reception center were mainly in the satellite cities of Konya and Isparta where the local government had allocated some apartments specifically for refugees, either without, or very little, rent. There are plans, however by the central government to build reception centers specifically for refugees.

72 percent of the youth stayed within a Reception Center upon their arrival. This was important since the majority did not know anyone living in the country. The percentage staying within a Reception Center was significantly more than other ages (40% 19-25 years; 29% 26-35 years; 37% 35-45 years; 50% 45-60 years; 100% over 60 years). Only 8 percent of the youth stayed with family and 2 percent with friends.

In Yemen, the fact that the majority of youth first stayed in a Reception Center upon their arrival is important. This means that there is immediate access to these youth and there is the opportunity to offer them protection and other services. 51 percent of the youth reported that this accommodation was adequate. However, 49 percent said they were unhappy with it, mainly due

to poor conditions. This discontent with the conditions of the accommodation might be a force to drive them out of the reception center and towards other opportunities.

The results of this, therefore, show that Somalis in Yemen are largely provided with accommodation because of their refugee status. Most Ethiopians are either detained or left to their own devices to find shelter. In Turkey, apart from those who had been detained for a period of time, all were reliant upon themselves to find their own accommodation.

The tables below provide an overview of the satisfaction of early accommodation. Recent arrivals in Yemen during the period of the survey felt that their early accommodation, provided for in the reception centers was adequate. Those who arrived months earlier, however, reported their accommodation as having been inadequate. By contrast, only two Ethiopians in Yemen found the accommodation adequate compared with Somalis. This is to be expected, since most Ethiopians do not receive shelter upon arrival.

In Turkey, the situation is reversed, with more Ethiopians satisfied with their first month's accommodation than Somalis.

Table 25

dequacy of First Accommodation * Country of Interview * Length of Time in Country o Asylum Crosstabulation

% within Country of Interview

Length of Time in Country of Asylum			Country of Interview		
			Yemen	Turkey	Total
Less than 1 Month	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes	83.5%	53.8%	75.7%
		No	16.5%	46.2%	24.3%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Between 1 - 6 Months	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes	8.0%	39.1%	22.9%
		No	92.0%	60.9%	77.1%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
> 6 -12 Months	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes	6.8%	34.8%	24.0%
		No	93.2%	65.2%	76.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
> 12 - 24 Months	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes		35.9%	35.0%
		No	100.0%	64.1%	65.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
More than 24 Months	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes		34.9%	34.1%
		No	100.0%	65.1%	65.9%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 26

Adequacy of First Accommodation * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

Country of Interview				Nationality		
				Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Yemen	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes	Count	228	2	230
			% within Nationality	60.2%	1.9%	47.6%
		No	Count	151	102	253
			% within Nationality	39.8%	98.1%	52.4%
	Total		Count	379	104	483
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Adequacy of First Accommodation	Yes	Count	124	53	177
			% within Nationality	34.9%	60.9%	40.0%
		No	Count	231	34	265
			% within Nationality	65.1%	39.1%	60.0%
	Total		Count	355	87	442
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Of those who found their first accommodation inadequate, the most common complaint was about the "poor conditions"; although in Turkey, 20 percent of Ethiopians also complained about the "lack of safety" and conflict with other refugees where they were living (6%).

Problems in first month

In Yemen, 41 percent of Somalis and 94 percent Ethiopians said they were harassed by smugglers in the first month after their arrival. However, a higher proportion (59%) of new arrival Somalis (less than one month in the country) reported smuggler harassment than new arrival Ethiopians (28%). This might be explained by the easy access smugglers have to refugees since they are in the reception centers, while it is more difficult to find the Ethiopians who are dispersed in private homes. 4 percent of Somalis and 5 percent of Ethiopians complained of having been subjected to physical violence. Other problems for Somalis included inadequate provision of basic needs (23%) separation from family members (12%), overcrowding (8%) and deportation threats (5%).

In Turkey, 18 percent Somalis and 38 percent Ethiopians complained of harassment by smugglers, significantly lower than the experience in Yemen. Ethiopians also complained of the lack of assistance to meet basic needs (14%), deportation threats (7%), physical violence (5%) and sexual abuse or harassment (8%). A smaller number of Somalis cited physical violence (3%)

and sexual abuse or harassment (1%), but 32 percent complained of "overcrowding", lack of assistance to meet basic needs (16%) and "cruel treatment" (7%).

Assistance with problems

Tables 27 and 28 describe the adequacy of the assistance provided to new arrivals. The percentage of those who said they were given no assistance is provided in the first section of the table. It is followed by 3 sections in which percentages are provided for how the respondents, who reported receiving assistance, evaluate the adequacy of this assistance as very good, adequate and poor.

The data show differences in the assistance provided to Ethiopians and to Somalis.

In Yemen, the majority of assistance provided to Somalis is through the UN (95%). 90 percent of respondents state that this assistance is adequate – very good. Ethiopians report less UN assistance (66%) and what is provided is rated mostly as adequate (23%). Somalis also report NGO assistance (68%) and again report that as adequate – very good 65 percent. Almost none of the Ethiopians reported NGO assistance. The Government, Religious Organizations and Refugee Communities provide very little assistance to either group. It is interesting to note that the greatest assistance to Ethiopians is from the "Local people" at 62 percent of which 55 percent is reported as adequate. Family and friends provide minimal support in Yemen to Somalis (18% Family; 12% Friends) while Ethiopians have somewhat more (8% Family; 27% Friends).

Table 27

Assistance by Nationality

Yemen (%)

Quality of Assistance	UN		Govt		NGOs		Religious Orgs		Family		Friends		Local People		Refugee Community	
	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth
None	5	66	93	94	32	94	97	94	82	92	89	74	65	38	81	85
Very Good	55	3	1		42				12	4	4	2	15		5	2
Adequate	35	23	5		23	2	2	2	5	2	7	16	18	55	11	6
Inadequate	5	8	1	6	3	4	1	4	1	2	1	9	2	7	3	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	101	100	100	100	101
	N=362		N=246		N=312		N=245		N=264		N=257		N=306		N=246	

In Turkey, neither Somalis nor Ethiopians receive much assistance from the UN about 12 percent; Religious organizations about 10 percent; Local people 8 percent and Refugee Community (9%). Somalis most commonly receive assistance through NGOs (68%) of which they find 65 percent adequate – very good; and some Government assistance (15%) of which 14 percent is adequate – very good. 61 percent report receiving assistance from Friends, yet 38 percent say this is inadequate while Families offer 18 percent support with a small percentage feeling it is inadequate.

Ethiopians reported receiving no assistance from Government, Refugee Community nor NGOs. They most often get assistance from Friends (82%) and from Family (18%). It is interesting to learn that they receive assistance from Local people (46%) though 6 percent complain that it is inadequate; and 54 percent were receiving assistance from Religious organizations, though 15 percent find it inadequate. The assistance of refugees by religious organisations in Turkey has indeed been growing which the Ethiopians have accessed.

In Turkey, particularly Istanbul, the provision of social, economic and medical assistance to migrants and refugees is largely divided between the Muslim and Christian charity organizations. For example, the *Humanitarian Assistance Foundation (IHH)* began as a voluntary initiative in 1992 in the aftermath of the Bosnian war, gaining official status in 1995 and now has projects and activities running across more than 120 countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans, torn by ongoing conflict, natural disaster and/or extreme poverty. As such, IHH is one of the very few Turkish aid organizations with such an extensive international outreach. Both at the international and national level, IHH programs focus on emergency aid, social assistance, health, education and cultural aid and awareness-raising, all with a focus on refugees. Also is the Catholic charity organization *Caritas* which originally opened its office in Istanbul in 1985 to help the poor. After the Gulf War in 1991, *Caritas* began its program assisting Iraqi refugees, providing food, clothing and urgent medical aid, as well as legal counselling services, particularly in matters regarding refugee and resettlement applications, and in liaising with the UNHCR and foreign embassies of the resettlement countries. *Caritas* also runs a special program for women. Since 2008, *Caritas* has extended its services to all nationalities, though the largest beneficiary continues to be Iraqis.

A number of Istanbul churches also cooperate in providing services for migrants and refugees living in the city. The services are especially vital for the survival of the migrants arriving from

Asian and African countries, who, unlike the majority of migrant groups, have few social networks to support them. In terms of health assistance, some of the churches have programs in which clients are screened for referral to Turkish medical care and medical emergencies. There are also special programs for pregnant women and their preschool children, in which pregnant women receive health information, vitamins and counselling in each month of their pregnancy. They provide donated clothes, furniture and household goods and some of the churches also run weekly soup kitchens for migrants and refugees. Food coupons are also distributed to very vulnerable women. Highly vulnerable women with children are offered the possibility of safe housing while they seek alternative longer-term sustainable alternatives and a limited number of rent subsidies are provided for a period of 3-6 months per family. A "Voluntary Repatriation Program" assists those who choose to return to their home country by guiding and counselling them through the repatriation process. Refugees and asylum seekers, who must travel to Ankara for appointments at the UNHCR, or to other Turkish cities to register with authorities, can apply for transportation assistance as well. Lastly, in 2008, the churches initiated an "Adult Education Program." This program was set up for refugees and economic migrants over the age of 18 to enable them to begin to learn a language, craft, trade, and technical skill. These services have extended to a significant number of migrants, and the demand continues to grow. In 2008, an estimated total of 1200 migrants and refugees, coming from 37 different countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, received assistance with the number of clients doubling in 20

Table 28

Assistance by nationality

Turkey (%)

Quality of Assistance	UN		Govt		NGOs		Religious Orgs		Family		Friends		Local People		Refugee Community	
	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth	Som	Eth
None	85	87	85	97	32	94	90	46	82	59	39	19	92	54	91	100
Very Good	3	3	3		42		3	6	11	21	5	33	2	11	3	
Adequate	8	7	11	3	23	2	6	33	4	9	18	33	5	29	6	
Inadequate	4	3	1		3	4	1	15	3	12	38	16	1	6		
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	101	100	100	100	100
	N=167		N=164		N=160		N=167		N=171		N=257		N=165		N=161	

4.6 Life conditions after the first month

Financial Support

Somali and Ethiopian respondents reported differences in how they support themselves financially. Most Ethiopians in both Yemen and Turkey said they had some form of employment. In addition to work as cleaners and day labors, some in Turkey admitted to "illegal employment" (7%) and "illegal activities" activities (2.4%). Over one third (34%) of Ethiopians in Turkey received remittances from family abroad as their primary source of income. Significantly, however, only 17 percent of Somalis (who often are reported to receive support through a large diaspora network and which is reflected in the travel support shown previously here) are shown receiving remittances as a response to this question. On the one hand, the majority of Somalis report reliance upon financial aid from the UN (59% in Yemen and 57% in Turkey) as their primary income source. On the other hand, they may not want to admit receiving remittances in addition to the help they receive from the UN (see Table 29).

Table 29

How Support Self Financially * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

% within Nationality

Country of Interview			Nationality		Total
			Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	How Support Self Financially	Regular Legal Employment	2.1%	35.8%	9.5%
		Day Labor	12.2%	42.2%	18.9%
		Begging	2.9%		2.2%
		Cleaning	1.0%	15.6%	4.3%
		Receive Charity	6.0%		4.7%
		UN Assistance	58.9%		45.8%
		Remittances from Abroad	16.9%	6.4%	14.6%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	How Support Self Financially	Regular Legal Employment	1.9%	8.2%	3.3%
		Regular Illegal Employment	3.6%	6.2%	4.1%
		Day Labor	11.1%	23.7%	13.8%
		Illegal Activity	.6%	2.1%	.9%
		Begging	.6%		.4%
		Cleaning	.8%	7.2%	2.2%
		Receive Charity	22.7%	6.2%	19.2%
		UN Assistance	56.5%	1.0%	44.8%
		Remittances from Abroad	2.2%	36.1%	9.4%
		From Friends		9.3%	2.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

22% of the youth report that they are working (14% day labor / 4% cleaning / 1% begging / 3% other employed). While 70% report that they are assisted by the United Nations and 7% by Charity.

Accommodation

In Yemen, Ethiopians are more reliant on privately organised accommodation, while Somalis can rely on support from the UN and NGOs; while in Turkey, both are largely reliant on making their own arrangements.

In Yemen, respondents reported:

- Reception Center: 55 percent Somalis; no Ethiopians
- Private home: 11 percent Somalis; 73 percent Ethiopians
- Hostel for refugees: 14 percent Somalis; 2 percent Ethiopians

In Turkey, respondents reported:

- Private home: 10 percent Somalis; 43 percent Ethiopians
- Private Flat: 62 percent Somalis; 13 percent Ethiopians
- Hotel for refugees: 13 percent Somalis; 4 percent Ethiopians

Respondents mainly in Izmir were staying in very cheap hotels in the Basmane neighbourhood which have been more or less transformed in to 'refugee hotels'. These are the places they stay in transit prior to their journey to Greece and so may be arranged by the smugglers. There are also a number of places in Kumkapi in Istanbul, but these are more underground hostels for undocumented migrants, from Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

61% of the youth are now living in situations specifically set-up for refugees including 43% Reception Center / 7% Camp for refugees / 8% Hostel for refugees / and 3% Hotel for refugees. This suggests that there is ongoing access to a large number of unaccompanied youth even after their first accommodation.

Most serious problems

65 percent of all respondents cited "lack of employment" as the first and most serious problem they currently faced (50% in Yemen and 84% in Turkey). The longer the residency and the lack of public or UN support, the more acute the problem of unemployment is reported to become.

In Yemen, Ethiopians (72%) were more likely to complain of the lack of employment than Somalis (44%). This might be due to the study having interviewed greater number of Somalis who had been in Yemen less than one month and had UN support. Thus, only 39 percent of the recent arrival Somalis reported unemployment as a problem. However, this number grew to 79 percent of Somalis in Yemen once they had been living there between 1 and 6 months and 89 percent of those in residence 6-12 months. This does not mean that respondents were employed initially on arrival, but rather that unemployment was felt more acutely over time when they were unable to support themselves, and in the absence or dwindling of other forms of assistance.

Somalis complained about inadequate education (3%), inadequate health care (3%), but significantly, 31 percent said they had no serious problems. By contrast, Ethiopians complained of insecurity from conflict (12%), inadequate education (6%), discrimination (5%) and inadequate health care (4%).

In Turkey, 88 percent of Somalis and 68 percent Ethiopians cited unemployment as their major problem in Turkey. This included 76 percent of recent arrivals, 81 percent of those in the country 1-6 months, 92 percent of those 6-12 months and 95 percent of those over 12 months. Ethiopians also complained about their inability to travel (7%), the high cost of living (5%), insecurity from conflict (4%), inadequate education (3%), health care (3%) and discrimination (3%).

Clearly the most pressing issue for most respondents of almost all age groups was the lack of employment to maintain a decent living in their current circumstances. However, it is interesting to note that 23% say there are no serious problems.

47% of the youth complain that lack of employment is a serious problem; 6% complain of Lack of education and 5% Lack of health care. It appears that most youth are interested in employment opportunities rather than education.

When asked if they had ever wanted assistance but were unable to receive it, 19 percent reported wanting education, although it was not reported as a serious problem, as seen above. Additionally, 15% want employment and 16% housing.

The issue of employment is always a difficult issue as irregular migrants and asylum seekers are generally relegated to the informal job sectors where low wages and difficult, dangerous and demeaning conditions prevail. It is of particular concern also for the unaccompanied minors who, despite their age, are anxious to earn a living. In Turkey, however, there are increasing provisions being tailored to minors in order to maintain their well-being. For example, since 2006, the *Provincial Directorate of Social Services and Child Protection* (SHCEK) has become a central actor due to the growing number of unaccompanied refugee minors arriving in Istanbul. Currently there are four SHCEK centres in Istanbul where unaccompanied refugee minors are accommodated: *the Kadıköy Yeldeğirmeni Centre for Children and Youth*; *the Kartal Yeldeğirmeni Home for the Observation of Children*; *the Küçükbakkalköy Home for the Observation of Children* and *the Bahçelievler Atatürk Home for Girls*.[37]

These facilities accommodate both Turkish children and the refugee minors. In November 2008, however, the *Kadıköy Yeldeğirmeni Centre* was transformed into a centre exclusively for unaccompanied refugee minors. At the end of 2009, there were between 60-65 boys living in this center, aged 14 to 18, the majority stemming from African countries and Afghanistan. The facilities in Kartal and Küçükbakkalköy are also used to accommodate a much smaller number of refugee boys, primarily because the Kadıköy Centre's capacity is not sufficient to absorb the entire male population of unaccompanied refugee minors. The female unaccompanied minors, on the other hand, are accommodated in the Bahçelievler Centre.

The personnel working within these centres, however, have very little capacity and/or training for working with unaccompanied refugee minors, these are significant efforts in improving the lives

[37] Kadıköy Yeldeğirmeni Çocuk ve Gençlik Merkezi, Kartal Yeldeğirmeni Çocuk Gözlemevi, Küçükbakkalköy Çocuk Gözlemevi, Bahçelievler Atatürk Kız Yetiştirme Yurdu.

of the children living within these institutions that provide activities ranging from courses in different languages to computer training, creative classes in arts and crafts, drama and music, cultural visits, soccer tournaments and the like.

Health problems

In Yemen, 24 percent of Somalis and 3 percent of Ethiopians said a family member had a health problem. In Turkey, only 7 percent of Somalis and 7 percent of Ethiopians reported a health problem. The only recent arrivals to cite a health problem in Yemen were Somalis. This could be due to their recent hazardous journeys. It should be noted, however, that the training for Somali interviewers in Yemen included one extra day of training on protection issues including the importance of identifying issues including health. This might also account for some of the differences in reportage between Somalis and Ethiopians in Yemen and between respondents in Yemen and Turkey.

Overall, 32 percent replied yes when asked if a family member or they themselves had a health issue (47 percent in Yemen and 14 percent in Turkey). 25 percent of those reported as a "serious health problem" in Yemen and 68 percent in Turkey were children under 18 years of age. Complaints included for both adults and children were: blood pressure, kidney pain, malnutrition, diarrhea, coughing, diabetes, headache, heartache, eyes, worms, pain in ears, leg, bones, kidney and stomach problems, paralysis and TB. Injuries cited included a bullet in leg, wounded with infection, leg injury and a broken leg.

When asked if an immediate family member needed immediate medical care, 78 Somalis in Yemen and 25 Somalis in Turkey said "yes". There were also 5 Ethiopians in Turkey who said "yes". 41 of the Somalis in Yemen were recent arrivals. 17 in Yemen and 18 in Turkey were children under 18 years needing medical assistance. The assistance required included "Expert doctor", "urgent operation", blood pressure, medication, laboratory tests, general examination, hospitalization and treatment for malaria.

24 or 2.5% of the sample was reported to have a disability including 17 Somalis and 1 Ethiopian in Yemen and 3 Somalis and 3 Ethiopians in Turkey. 5 of these were Somali children under 18 years. The disabilities were all cited as "crippled legs", with one mention of polio.

23 Somalis in Yemen as well as 2 Somalis and 2 Ethiopians in Turkey said they had a family member with a mental health problem. Two were children under 18 years. These included severe headaches, "madness", nervousness, irritation, sensitivity, being "terrified" and "caused by pain".

The reasons that the Yemen respondents cited higher levels of mental health issues could be due to their being recent arrivals and in more immediate distress and/or the result of the interviewers training which built their capacity to identify protection issues.

15% of the youth report health problems. Of these, 39% report that these problems are serious and 15% report the problem need immediate attention. None of the youth report having a physical disability but one does report a mental health problem.

*It is instructive to note here that the training of interviewers has a potential impact on the kind of responses received. More extensive training of interviewers on protection issues potentially adds a greater awareness and can influence the way questions were asked and probed, the latter being particularly important.

5.0 Returning home

In the early part of the interview, respondents were asked how long they intended to stay in Yemen or Turkey. In the latter part of the interview, respondents were asked where they intended to go. They were also asked about their feelings regarding the journey, whether it was worthwhile, and what they thought were the most important conditions to be in place in their home countries before they would consider returning.

5.1 Was the Journey Worthwhile?

When asked whether their journey was worthwhile, overall 49 percent of respondents said "yes". Somali respondents understood it as whether their journey was beneficial or something tangible, of substance – a good result (*wax ku ool ah*).

However, this positive response was more likely to come from recent Somali arrivals (82%). Although around half of Ethiopians in Turkey thought the journey worthwhile, all of the Ethiopians in Yemen thought it was not worthwhile. The disenchantment of Ethiopians of their lives and conditions in Yemen was clear, with serious complaints, particularly from the Oromo that they were being deliberately targeted and discriminated against because they were Christian.

Table 30

Feel Journey was Worthwhile * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

% within Nationality

Country of Interview			Nationality		
			Somali	Ethiopian	Total
Yemen	Feel Journey was Worthwhile	Yes	63.6%		49.7%
		No	30.9%	91.6%	44.2%
		Don't Know	5.5%	8.4%	6.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Feel Journey was Worthwhile	Yes	48.1%	50.5%	48.6%
		No	25.8%	34.1%	27.5%
		Don't Know	26.1%	15.4%	23.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

5.2 Would you recommend the journey to others?

It is interesting that while an overall majority thought the journey worthwhile, few would recommend it to others. Around 80 percent of those in Yemen said they would not recommend the journey. Only Somalis (23%) in Yemen said they would recommend it. In Turkey, only one third of respondents were prepared to recommend the journey.

Similar responses were given to the question of whether respondents would recommend the location they ended up in (see Table 31).

It may be suggested that if a media campaign were to be devised to discourage such a journey, a widely disseminated video clip of people like the respondents in this study describing and showing their conditions and experiences might be quite convincing.

Similar to the adults, 59 percent of the youth reported that their journey was worthwhile while 35 percent said it was not. Curiously, in contrast with the adults only 27 percent reported that they would not recommend this journey to others while 68 percent say they would.

As most of the Somali respondents were newly or recently arrived, the results above may reflect the immediate relief from the journey. Indeed, 58 percent of those who were positive about the journey being worthwhile had been in the country for less than one month (87% in Yemen) and 78 percent less than 6 months.

Table 31

'ould Recommend the Journey to Others * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulatio

% within Nationality

Country of Interview			Nationality		Total
			Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	Would Recommend the Journey to Others	Yes	22.8%		17.8%
		No	74.1%	100.0%	79.8%
		Don't Know	3.1%		2.5%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Would Recommend the Journey to Others	Yes	34.9%	28.9%	33.7%
		No	44.0%	61.1%	47.5%
		Don't Know	21.1%	10.0%	18.8%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 32

ɔuld Recommend this Location to Others * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulatic

% within Nationality

Country of Interview			Nationality		Total
			Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	Would Recommend this Location to Others	Yes	48.3%		37.7%
		No	49.1%	100.0%	60.2%
		Don't Know	2.6%		2.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Would Recommend this Location to Others	Yes	25.5%	25.3%	25.4%
		No	52.9%	60.4%	54.4%
		Don't Know	21.6%	14.3%	20.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

5.3 Expected length of stay outside of home country

When respondents were asked how long they intended to stay in their present destination, there was a clear difference between Yemen and Turkey.

In Yemen, 37 percent of Somalis were planning to leave within 6 months, but a significant minority of Somalis (43%) said they intended to stay permanently. None of the Ethiopians said they intended to stay, nor leave (see Table 24). Rather surprisingly, the Ethiopians all responded that they did not know, perhaps indicating the uncertainty of their circumstances and the uncertainty of their future. Of those Somalis who had a desire to remain permanently, 55 percent were female, 40 percent were married, 31 percent never married and 18 percent divorced. 57 percent were recent arrivals, 18 percent 1-6 months and 24 percent 6-12 months; 21 percent were minors, 40 percent 19-25 years and 26 percent 26-35years. Those who expected to remain in

Yemen were slightly more likely to be young, female and either married or previously married. Perhaps they felt that they had travelled enough and it was too arduous, costly or dangerous to continue.

In Turkey, only 1.5% reported that they intended to stay permanently which may only reflect their legal status there. 59 percent said they did not know how long they would stay in the country and 24 percent indicated they would stay less than one month. A larger number of Somalis in Turkey did not know how long they would stay (69%). 33 percent of Ethiopians said they would stay less than one month, 16 percent 1-6 months, 11 percent 6-12 months and 13 percent 12-24 months.

71 percent of the youth reported that they plan to continue to travel, with 18 percent reporting that this travel would be inside the country and 80 percent reporting a plan to travel outside the country. 31 percent reported wanted to continue to travel due to the need to seek employment; 25 percent for a better life; 19 percent to join family and 5 percent to join friends. It seems that employment opportunities are an important contributing factor to the choices that unaccompanied youth make in their travels. 34 percent reported having an agreement for onward travel. Of these, 52 percent had this agreement with family members and 10 percent with a smuggler (it was unclear whether the smuggler was in reality a trafficker).

Table 33

Length of Time Planned to Stay * Nationality * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

Country of Interview				Nationality		Total
				Somali	Ethiopian	
Yemen	Length of Time Planned to Stay	Less than 1 Month	Count	60	0	60
			% within Nationality	15.5%	.0%	12.1%
		1-6 Months	Count	81	0	81
			% within Nationality	21.0%	.0%	16.4%
		More than 6-12 Months	Count	11	0	11
			% within Nationality	2.8%	.0%	2.2%
		More than 12-24 Months	Count	2	0	2
			% within Nationality	.5%	.0%	.4%
		Permanently	Count	168	0	168
			% within Nationality	43.5%	.0%	33.9%
		Don't Know	Count	64	109	173
			% within Nationality	16.6%	100.0%	34.9%
	Total		Count	386	109	495
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Turkey	Length of Time Planned to Stay	Less than 1 Month	Count	77	32	109
			% within Nationality	21.2%	33.0%	23.7%
		1-6 Months	Count	20	15	35
			% within Nationality	5.5%	15.5%	7.6%
		More than 6-12 Months	Count	5	11	16
			% within Nationality	1.4%	11.3%	3.5%
		More than 12-24 Months	Count	3	13	16
			% within Nationality	.8%	13.4%	3.5%
		More than 24 Months	Count	2	3	5
			% within Nationality	.6%	3.1%	1.1%
		Permanently	Count	4	3	7
			% within Nationality	1.1%	3.1%	1.5%
		Don't Know	Count	252	20	272
			% within Nationality	69.4%	20.6%	59.1%
	Total		Count	363	97	460
			% within Nationality	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

5.4 **Future travel intentions**

As was noted earlier, the stated future travel intentions of individuals can change in a short time, so this data should be utilized cautiously. However, an important part of this study is to ascertain the future intentions of the respondents in order not only to anticipate their future needs and aspirations, but also to shed light on the reasons for the continuation of their journeys in terms of the conditions in Turkey and Yemen as transit stations of a broader trajectory. For those who do not wish to continue onwards, what are the factors that are keeping them there?

Moret et al. (2006) highlight the fact that refugees who left at the beginning of the Somali conflict (late 1980s-early 1990s) had little in the way of concrete plans for an ultimate destination. But many of those leaving at later stages have used the already existing networks to formulate longer term plans involving fewer stops to a predetermined final destination (Moret et al: 2006). That

being said, the majority of refugees and migrants share and re-shape their plan en route, absorbing new information, and using new contacts to facilitate their journeys. Networks of friends, family and Somali diaspora communities influence both the path chosen and the final destination. Those resorting to the use of intermediary agents to facilitate their journeys may also end up in an unintended destination (this largely refers to European destinations) (Moret et al., 2006). In this sense, some highlight that many asylum seekers have little or no choice in their final destination, such as instances where people smugglers and border controls cause migrants to end up in the countries were they cannot be united with family and loved ones (Van Liempt, 2007).

In first countries of asylum which are often close to the country of origin, refugees often suffer from policies of encampment, or in insecure settings which hamper livelihoods and therefore provide reasons for onward migration to secure legal status. Encampments tend to be safer (although never entirely) and more certain than internal displacement, but do not permit settlement or durable solutions for refugees (Zimmerman, 2007). Moret et al. (2006) concluded that Somalis wanted to leave Kenya in order to secure legal status, to avoid such issues as police bribery, exploitation, and precarious living due to their lack of legal status. In this context the literature highlights that Somalis move from neighbouring countries and then further to Europe because settlement in a Western country has been viewed as a positive experience for friends and family when compared to their current situations.

Many Somalis' intended destination is Europe. Somalis stated in other studies that their reasons for migrating to Europe were based on personal experiences of the conflict in forms of rape, attacks and loss of livelihood or belongings (Moret et al., 2006). Zimmerman (2007) conducted a qualitative study based on the accounts of thirteen Somali asylum seekers in the UK, who had left at different times over an 11-year period; all described in their detailed accounts how the violence, collapse of institutions and lawlessness drove them to leave. They were all personally affected by the situation and had endured suffering and loss as a result of the conflict. While the safer regions of Somalia are considered safe, they too have felt the effects of lawlessness, and there are reports of human right abuses and violence (Moret et al., 2006); the lack of basic rights to healthcare and education are decisive factors for why people leave Somalia.

The term '*buffis*', used by Somalis to refer to the desire to resettle in a Western country, is found in the connections Somali refugees maintain with their relatives and friends outside the camps in different localities (Horst, 2006). Horst's ethnographic study shows how remittances assist

Somalis back in the region to survive in the camps while simultaneously improving the general economic situation there. As a consequence of the monetary flows into Dadaab, and the images that come with them of life in places like Europe, many refugees in the camps dream of going for resettlement, and migration has become as popular investment in this light (Horst, 2006). It is suggested that Somalis suffer from '*buffis*', because of the poor quality of life in the camps and the lack of durable living solutions (Horst, 2006). It is therefore seen that asylum in a third country offers the prospect of a durable solution as well as safety, although only a minority are actually able to achieve it.

Somalis who migrated to Europe also mentioned the lack of education and employment opportunities, the absence of facilities such as schools and hospitals, and more importantly, the unfeasibility of building a future in Somalia and the wider region as important reasons for leaving (Moret et al., 2006). Many stories highlighted that the need for safety and socio-economic factors made them come to Europe. Zimmerman's interviews show how the migrants were interested in not only surviving, but in achieving normality and a future that had been lost as a result of the conflict or in exile which could not be found in their first countries of asylum.

Van Liempt (2007) states that the majority of Somalis interviewed in the Netherlands left their country as a result of violence and the future effects of the war on livelihoods and education. The notion of building a future was central to their decisions to migrate, particularly for the female respondents who indicated that migration was a mean to secure their children a better future (Van Liempt, 2007). After living in the refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, they continued their journeys to Europe to achieve this.

Onward migration of Somalis from other European countries to the United Kingdom can further be explained by the failure to meet protection requirements or quality of life in these countries. Van den Reek and Hussein (2003) show that these Somali migrants considered several factors when migrating to Britain from the Netherlands, the most important of which were the restrictive social-economic environment and the lack of perspective regarding cultural and religious participation. Similar findings looking at migration from Scandinavia and the Netherlands were reported by Van Hear and Lindley (2007), who stressed that even though factors such as housing and healthcare were better in these countries, Somali refugees wanted to move in order to gain access to a better social environment, education and economic opportunities (Kleist, 2004).

In this study, when asked what their final destinations were, many Somali (143) and Ethiopian (90) respondents in Yemen did not answer because they had indicated that they were not going to continue travelling or did not know their future plans. Thus, overall, 265 (28%) did not answer the question on final destination.

As Table 34 shows, overall, the main intended final destination of respondents who answered the question was Europe (35%), KSA (22%), Canada (15%), U.S.A. (9%), Yemen (8%) and Australia (2%). For the main destinations of Europe, Canada, U.S.A. and KSA, there were no significant gender differences.

In Yemen, 62 percent of Somalis who responded said they were going to KSA; 23 percent said they were staying or going elsewhere in Yemen; 20 cases were heading for Europe (8%), 6 cases to the UAE., 3 to the USA., 2 to Canada, 2 to Syria and 1 to Australia as their final destinations. One young man stated that the next stop in his journey was to Al Qaeda in Yemen. (It was not clear whether he meant the Islamic organization, or the small town of Al Qa'idah which is about halfway between Aden and Sana'a and on the land route to Saudi Arabia.) The remainder said they did not know.

> ***Somali man (22 years old) arrived one day earlier in Yemen.***
> *A girl assisted me and led me to Yemen. I am smuggling myself into Saudi Arabia and I was informed to head to the west and keep going and when you reach there, before you cross, sit down, and look around and when you see no-one, cross. And that is how I am planning to get into Saudi.*

> ***Somali woman (30 years old) arrived one day prior to interview in Yemen.***
> *I came from Saudi. I used to work there. I was only 6 days in Somalia and now I am going through smuggling back to Saudi. I am going back to my family in Saudi. I have no family in Somalia. I am accompanied with three children, my nephew, child of my cousin and another child was a neighbor and I am taking three of them to Saudi Arabia. No one assisted me. I had money and I knew the owner of the boat. I know this route and am only transiting. I raised money from remittances.*

> ***Somali woman (37 years old) arrived one day prior to interview in Yemen.***
> *I used to live in Saudi Arabia for about 10 years. I used to work as a maid. I gave birth to 10 children, 5 died and 5 are alive and living with their father and I left them with him. Now I am going back to Saudi to earn some money.*

In Turkey, 48 percent of Somalis and 65 percent of Ethiopians said their final destination was Europe; 25 percent of Somalis and 15 percent of Ethiopians to Canada; 15 percent Somalis and 8 percent Ethiopians to the USA; while 8 percent of Ethiopians indicated their interest in Australia. The remainder did not know. From Turkey, 90 percent of respondents said their next stop would

be outside Turkey – 55 percent to Greece, 22 percent to Canada, 21 percent to U.S.A and 2 percent to other parts of Europe.

262 respondents specified the European country they were aiming for in subsequent stops – Greece (21%), Sweden (17%), Holland (12%), Norway (11%), U.K. (10%), Italy (10%), France (7%), Finland (6%), Germany (2%), Denmark (2%), Austria (1%) and Switzerland (1%).

Interestingly, for those wanting to go to Europe from Turkey, a large majority (76%) was not registered with UNHCR. This perhaps confirms that at least for many of the Somalis in Turkey, their plans were to avoid asylum claims until reaching a European destination. That is, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were not thought to be appropriate locations as their first country of asylum, but merely transit points.

Reflecting either successful resettlement applications, waiting or aspiring for resettlement, of those wanting to go to the U.S.A., 91 percent were registered with UNHCR and for those wanting to go to Canada, 99 percent were registered. Similarly, of those in Yemen whose final destination was KSA, 95 percent were registered. For KSA, it also makes sense as those wishing to be smuggled from Yemen to KSA are most likely to be Somalis who have had the benefits of prima facie refugee status and usually register with UNHCR. For Europe, however, individuals would want to register as refugees in their destination country as their first country of asylum, rather than elsewhere and run the risk of being sent back to the country where they were registered, such as Yemen, Syria or Turkey.

Of those who said they were continuing to travel in order to join family, the main destinations were KSA (36%), Europe (34%) and Yemen (12%). Those who said they were “searching for a better life” tended towards Europe (40%), Canada (23%), the U.S.A. (13%) and KSA (7%). Those who were seeking employment opportunities looked to KSA (66%), Europe (11%), Yemen (11%) and the UAE (4%).

Table 34

Final Destination * Country of Interview Crosstabulation

			Country of Interview		Total
			Yemen	Turkey	
Final Destination	Yemen	Count	55	0	55
		% within Country of Interview	21.0%	.0%	8.0%
	Saudi Arabia	Count	154	0	154
		% within Country of Interview	58.8%	.0%	22.3%
	U.A.E.	Count	6	0	6
		% within Country of Interview	2.3%	.0%	.9%
	Turkey	Count	0	2	2
		% within Country of Interview	.0%	.5%	.3%
	Europe	Count	22	216	238
		% within Country of Interview	8.4%	50.5%	34.5%
	U.S.A.	Count	5	58	63
		% within Country of Interview	1.9%	13.6%	9.1%
	Syria	Count	2	0	2
		% within Country of Interview	.8%	.0%	.3%
	Canada	Count	3	99	102
		% within Country of Interview	1.1%	23.1%	14.8%
	Australia	Count	1	10	11
		% within Country of Interview	.4%	2.3%	1.6%
	Don't Know	Count	14	43	57
		% within Country of Interview	5.3%	10.0%	8.3%
Total		Count	262	428	690
		% within Country of Interview	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

While the European and North American planned destinations for respondents in Turkey in particular is clear, as pointed out earlier in this report, the problems of reaching those destinations remains fraught with further dangers and risks. With increasing surveillance and securitization of Europe's borders against irregular migrant entry, and the harsh realities of reaching and attempting to reach there through Greece, the logic is for the mixed migration flows to find alternative routes, perhaps through Eastern Europe. As Greece is currently in serious financial difficulties, it may be anticipated that their tolerance of irregular migrants, perhaps particularly from Africa and Dublin II returnees, will be even further reduced and will have more serious effects such as scapegoating against them from the local population as well as the government.

It was surprising that none of the respondents mentioned Bulgaria as an alternative exit instead of Greece as there is evidence of that route having been used by Ethiopians (Papadopoulos et. al., 2004). Taking another land journey through Turkey to Georgia would presumably be a difficult option in getting to the western European states by crossing the Caucasus into Russia and skirting the Black Sea to the Ukraine, Romania and onward. Irregular labour migration of Georgians into Turkey and human trafficking has been of recent concern (İçduygu and Yükseker, 2008) despite the opening of the Sarp crossing in March 2009.[38]

Movements of Somalis within Europe have also been noted, as well as onward migration from Europe back to countries like Egypt, which highlight that even though migration to Europe is often considered as the final destination, people return to places like Egypt for religious purposes and a better quality of life (Al-Sharmani, 2007). Reasons for onward migration from Europe are two-fold; first, once they obtain European citizenship there is less concern about security and protection, as they are guaranteed protection from embassies abroad and are always able to return to Europe at any point. Second, with the financial gains of living and working in Europe, Somali families can secure a higher standard of living in countries like Egypt, and can afford to send their children to private international schools (ibid).

5.5 Conditions required within home country before returning

Finally, respondents were asked what conditions would be required in their home country before they would consider returning. They were given various possibilities and could choose any or all of them with the option of stating other conditions. The following table summarizes the results by taking the number of answers as a percentage of the numbers of each category, namely Somalis in Yemen (386), Somalis in Turkey (363), Ethiopians in Yemen (109) and Ethiopians in Turkey (97). The results showed a number of differences in the stated requirements, not only comparing Somalis and Ethiopians, but also between those in Yemen and those in Turkey.

[38] In November 2009, the EU signed a Mobility Partnership with Georgia (European Commission, 2010).

Table 35

Conditions Required at Home Before Returning by Nationality and Country of Interview

Conditions Required Before Returning	Somali		Ethiopian	
	Yemen	Turkey	Yemen	Turkey
Safety and Security	81.6	39.7	95.4	67.0
Employment	31.6	18.5	7.3	36.1
Political Stability	21.0	23.4	92.6	47.4
Health Services	20.0	13.5	5.5	20.6
Education	15.5	12.9	2.8	21.6
Food Assistance	7.0	3.9	1.8	2.1
Family Reunion	8.6	2.8	4.6	5.2
Housing	3.1	5.0	2.8	18.6
Land for Farming	1.0	1.9	0.0	0.0
Clean Water	0.8	4.1	0.0	0.0
Will Not Return	5.4	30.6	0.0	9.3

When respondents were asked what conditions would be necessary for them to return to their home countries, the large majority cited “safety and security” and “political security”. However, there were significant differences between nationalities of the respondents and between those in Turkey and Yemen. For example, Ethiopians in Turkey were more inclined than those in Yemen to want employment in order to return. The most striking feature of the responses to this question, however, was that 82 percent of Somalis in Yemen said they would need safety and security, compared with only 40 percent in Turkey. This was explained by the 31 percent of the Somalis in Turkey who stated clearly (and unprompted), that they simply did not want to return at all to Somalia. That is, 140 Somalis in Turkey included the “other” option, most stating “I will never return”, “I do not want to return”, “I am not going back to that country” and so on. A few said “when there is freedom” or “when there is equality” and one said “he doesn’t want to marry me, so I can’t go”.

A similar, but not such a wide gap, was evident between Ethiopian responses in Yemen and Turkey. 9 percent of Ethiopians in Turkey said they did not want to return. It is noteworthy how relatively few respondents in this study cited employment and education as a condition for their return (and a relatively negligible number cited food assistance, family reunion, housing, land for farming and clean water). Rather, it was the need for safety and security and political stability in

their home countries that needed to be addressed first, with perhaps the assumption that the rest will follow naturally.

The relatively low number of Somalis who mentioned political stability may well have been despairing about the possibility. However, safety and security and political stability are very much connected.

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